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ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
During the September Term, 1974, the Court of Appeals reviewed
several decisions by three-judge Circuit Court panels in disciplinary pro-
ceedings brought against Maryland attorneys.' Of particular importance
was the court's holding in Maryland State Bar Association, Inc. v. Sugar-
man2 that testimony by an attorney in a criminal trial given under the
protection of a federal immunity statute could, nonetheless, be used against
the attorney in a disciplinary proceeding. 8 In another important develop-
ment, the court explored, in a series of 1974 Term cases,4 the types of
extenuating circumstances that will justify the imposition of a sanction
less severe than disbarment for misconduct involving fraud or moral
turpitude.5
"The Sugarman Decision"
In Sugarman the attorney had testified under a grant of immunity6
as a government witness in a federal criminal prosecution.7 He admitted
that he had knowingly assisted a client in the wilful evasion of federal
income taxes,8 an act which both the disciplinary panel and the Court
1. Charges of misconduct against an attorney generally are first heard by a
three-judge panel designated by the Court of Appeals. See MD. P-P. BV 9-10. In
1975 the Court of Appeals adopted a new statutory structure for the investigation and
prosecution of disciplinary violations by attorneys. See MD. R.P. BV 1-18. For an
extensive review of the new disciplinary system see Comment, Discipline of Attorneys
in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REv. 236, 244-46 (1975).
2. 273 Md. 306, 329 A.2d 1 (1974). Sugarman is but one of a number of attor-
ney discipline cases growing out of the continuing probe of political corruption in
Maryland. See, e.g., Bar Ass'n v. Siegel, 275 Md. 521, 340 A2d 710 (1975) ; Maryland
State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974) ; cf. Childs v. McCord,
Civil No. H-75-498 (D. Md., filed Sept 29, 1976) (revocation of an engineering
license).
3. 273 Md. at 318-19, 329 A.2d at 7.
4. Bar Ass'n v. McCourt, 276 Md. 326, 347 A.2d 208 (1975); Bar Ass'n v.
Siegel, 275 Md. 521, 340 A.2d 710 (1975); Bar Ass'n v. Snyder, 273 Md. 534, 331
A2d 47 (1975).
5. See note 9 and accompanying text infra.
6. Sugarman was granted use immunity under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-03 (1970) after
refusing to testify on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. See text
at notes 25 to 26 infra.
7. Sugarman testified in United States v. Anderson, Criminal No. 73-0527-Y
(D. Md., filed Mar. 15, 1974), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1398 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 991 (1975).
8. Specifically, Sugarman admitted that he had purchased and sold stock in his
own name for the fraudulent purpose of assisting a client to avoid income taxes and
(351)
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of Appeals concluded involved moral turpitude.9 Although Sugarman was
protected from criminal prosecution by the use immunity grant, the
Court of Appeals held that the testimony elicited under the immunity
statute could form the evidentiary basis for disciplinary action against
had participated in a fraudulent scheme to launder funds and conceal custody of
money received from his client. In furtherance of this scheme, Sugarman had also
drawn up and delivered to his client false bills for services that had not been ren-
dered, for the purpose of enabling his client to use such statements to support tax
and business deductions. 273 Md. at 308-09, 329 A.2d at 2.
9. Id. at 319, 329 A.2d at 8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 19, § 16 (1976), provides
in part that:
Every attorney who shall, after having an opportunity to be heard, . . .be found
guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime involving moral
turpitude, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, or of being a sub-
versive person .... shall, by order of the judges finding him guilty, be suspended
or disbarred from the practice of his profession in this state (emphasis added).
An inquiry under the statute necessitates determining whether a particular
activity fits within one or more of the categories requiring sanction. Perhaps the
most frequently applied category is "crime involving moral turpitude." Moral turpi-
tude has been defined as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man." Braverman
v. Bar Ass'n, 209 Md. 328, 344, 121 A.2d 473, 481 (1955). The Court of Appeals has,
in the past, determined that a number of crimes involve moral turpitude. Together
with Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Lackey, Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV), Mary-
land Court of Appeals, December 2, 1974, and Bar Ass'n v. McCourt, 276 Md. 326,
347 A.2d 208 (1975), the Sugarman case discusses tax crimes as crimes involving
moral turpitude.
Sugarman clearly establishes that assisting in the wilful evasion of income
taxes constitutes a crime of moral turpitude, for the court noted that such activities
reflected Sugarman's "lack of the basic moral character essential to membership in
the legal profession." 273 Md. at 319, 329 A.2d at 8. In Lackey the attorney had
been convicted of wilful tax evasion following a guilty plea and had served an eight
month jail sentence. Like Sugarman, he was disbarred by the Court of Appeals
following a unanimous panel recommendation of disbarment. The foundation of
Sugarman and Lackey is the notion that engaging in, or assisting another to engage
in, the wilful evasion of income taxes through the intentional filing of false returns is
conduct involving moral turpitude. These two cases can be profitably compared with
McCourt; in the latter case disciplinary charges were filed against an attorney who
had pled nolo contendere to charges of wilful failure to file income tax returns, but
who was not disbarred. See notes 102 to 118 and accompanying text infra.
The element of fraud is crucial in explaining why Lackey and Sugarman
were disbarred for wilful evasion of income taxes, while McCourt was only sus-
pended for his offense of wilful failure to file income tax returns. The Court of
Appeals has consistently held that misconduct involving fraud warrants disbarment.
See, e.g., Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Rosenberg, 273 Md. 351, 329 A.2d 106
(1974); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 326 A.2d 180 (1974);
Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974) ; Fellner v.
Bar Ass'n, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957) ; Klupt v. Bar Ass'n, 197 Md. 659, 80
A.2d 912 (1951); Rheb v. Bar Ass'n, 186 Md. 200, 46 A.2d 289 (1946). As the court
stated in Agnew: "[W]hen a member of the bar is shown to be wilfully dishonest
for personal gain by means of fraud, deceit, cheating or like conduct, absent the most
compelling extenuating circumstances, . . . disbarment follow[s] as a matter of
352 [VOL. 36
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Sugarman without infringing on his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination."0 The court adopted the panel recommendation and ordered
Sugarman disbarred. 1'
A significant portion of the evidence offered against Sugarman in the
disciplinary proceeding consisted of testimony that had been compelled by
a court order issued pursuant to the federal immunity statute.12 That
statute shields the witness by assuring that testimony compelled under it,
or the fruits of such testimony, may not be used to obtain criminal penalties
course." 271 Md. at 553, 318 A.2d at 817. The crimes committed by Sugarman and
Lackey fall within the prohibited category because they entail affirmative action for
personal gain through dishonest or misleading reporting of income. Thus, irrespec-
tive of whether such conduct involves moral turpitude, it warrants disbarment because
of the element of fraud. McCourt's failure to file, on the other hand, even if wilful,
did not necessarily involve a fraudulent intent; thus, conviction of the misdemeanor
was not proof of fraud. McCourt, however, admitted that he wilfully failed to file
returns for four years, thereby systematically depriving the United States of money
due it. In a memorandum of dissent, Judges Smith and Digges asserted that such
action warranted disbarment, absent compelling extenuating circumstances. 276 Md.
at 327-28, 347 A2d at 211. See Rheb v. Bar Ass'n, 186 Md. 200, 46 A.2d 289 (1946),
where the Maryland court disbarred an attorney who had wilfully failed to file income
tax returns for three years. The McCourt majority, although acknowledging Rheb,
nevertheless adopted the findings and recommendation of the panel, which apparently
recommended suspension becaues of extenuating circumstances.
Moreover, the McCourt decision may be distinguished from Rheb on the
basis of fraudulent intent; whereas the attorney in Rheb failed to make returns "for
the purpose of cheating the Federal Government and the State of Maryland out of
taxes justly due," 186 Md. at 204, 46 A.2d at 291 (emphasis added), no similar intent
was found in McCourt. Conviction for wilful failure to file returns does not require
proof of intent to defraud the government: "'the only bad purpose or bad motive,
which it is necessary to prove . . . is the deliberate intention not to file returns which
the defendant knew ought to have been filed, so that the Government would not know
the extent of the liability."' Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56, 61 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956) (emphasis added), as clarified in United States
v. Fullerton, 189 F. Supp. 211, 215-16 (D. Md. 1960) ; cf. United States v. Murdock,
290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933). While the more probable explanation for the sanction
imposed in McCourt is that the court considered "compelling extenuating circum-
stances," see notes 106 to 112 and accompanying text infra, it is possible that the
absence of a finding of wilful dishonesty for personal gain meant that McCourt's
misconduct was not serious enough to warrant disbarment because it did not involve
fraud or moral turpitude.
10. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself ... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
11. 273 Md. at 319-20, 329 A.2d at 8.
12. Immunity was granted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-03 (1970). Section 6002
provides that a witness, when testifying or providing other information in a proceeding
before or ancillary to a United States court or grand jury, may not refuse to comply
with an order to testify issued by one presiding over the proceeding on the basis of the
privilege against self-incrimination; however, his compelled testimony may not be
used against him in "any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a
false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order." 18 U.S.C. § 6002
(1970). The immunity provided by section 6002 is also required in state criminal
proceeding. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
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against him.'8 Sugarman argued that the disciplinary proceeding against
him sought a possible criminal or quasi-criminal sanction and that use
of his compelled testimony in the disciplinary action was therefore pro-
hibited by the immunity statute and the fifth amendment. 14  Focusing
on the question whether disbarment is a criminal or quasi-criminal penalty
for purposes of asserting the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, 15 the Court of Appeals concluded that disbarment tradi-
tionally "is intended not as punishment, but as protection to the public."' 6
Consequently, the court determined that a disciplinary proceeding was not
a criminal case covered by the fifth amendment or the federal immunity
statute.
The fifth amendment privilege17 against self-incrimination ensures that
a witness will not be compelled to give testimony which reveals that the
witness himself has committed a crime.18 Under the interpretation de-
veloped by the Supreme Court, the self-incrimination clause seeks to protect
a witness who is compelled to reveal information or give testimony that
may lead to the imposition of criminal penalties for the acts discussed in
the testimony.' 9 The Court has determined, however, that the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination may be displaced by a statute
that grants a witness protection from criminal sanctions in exchange for
his compelled testimony.20 Thus 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970)21 permits the
13. See note 12 supra.
The Sugarman court observed that "[a] 'criminal case' is one that may 'lead
to the infliction of criminal penalties.'" 273 Md. at 310, 329 A.2d at 3, quoting from
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972); see notes 41 to 47 and accom-
panying text infra.
14. 273 Md. at 309, 329 A.2d at 3.
15. The court correctly observed that if disbarment is a criminal sanction, then a
disciplinary action is a criminal proceeding in which testimony compelled under an
immunity statute could not be used against the attorney. Id. at 310, 329 A.2d at 3.
16. Id. at 318, 329 A.2d at 7.
17. While the privilege at issue is consistently referred to as "the fifth amend-
ment" privilege in this note, a more accurate label is the fourteenth amendment due
process right, because Sugarman is a state case and the fifth amendment is incorpor-
ated into the fourteenth amendment, as applied against a state. See note 18 infra.
18. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892). The fifth amendment self-incrimination clause is fully
applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment. Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S.
511, 514 (1967) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).
19. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) ; Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1956); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886); see
note 62 infra.
Both state and federal witnesses are protected under the self-incrimination
clause from incrimination under either federal or state laws. See Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964) ; note 12 supra.
20. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
21. See note 12 supra.
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compulsion of testimony but prohibits the use of that testimony in any
criminal case against the witness. 22 In Kastigar v. United States,28 the
Court, in upholding section 6002 against the claim that it did not meet
constitutional standards, ruled that a grant of immunity need only be
coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination and
that use and derivative use immunity offered adequate protection against
the imposition of criminal penalties as a result of compelled testimony to
meet the fifth amendment standard.24
Sugarman relied on Kastigar and on Spevack v. Klein25 to support
his contention that a disciplinary proceeding involved a criminal sanction
that could not, consonant with the privilege against self-incrimination,
be imposed on the basis of his testimony compelled under the immunity
statute. In Spevack an attorney refused to produce financial records in
compliance with a subpoena duces tecum and to testify at a judicial pro-
ceeding on the grounds that such production and testimony would in-
criminate him.28 The Court observed that the threat of disbarment and
its concommitant professional and financial disabilities are "powerful forms
of compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege," 27 and concluded
that
the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been ab-
sorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as
well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down
by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a
livelihood as a price for asserting it.28
Sugarman argued that Spevack had established that a disciplinary pro-
ceeding was a criminal proceeding, and that he therefore could not be
subjected to disciplinary proceedings based on information obtained under
22. Under 6002, testimony may be compelled by granting use and derivative use
immunity, which immunizes the witness from any use of the compelled testimony or
evidence derived from that testimony. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
453 (1972). Transactional immunity, which would prohibit prosecution for any offenses
to which the compelled testimony is related, is not required by the Constitution. Id.
23. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
24. Id. at 453.
25. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
26. Id. at 512-13.
27. Id. at 516.
28. Id. at 514.
Four Justices joined in the opinion of the Court. Justice Fortas concurred
in the judgment of the Court that Spevak could not be disbarred for asserting his
privilege against self-incrimination, but added that
[i]f this case presented the question whether a lawyer might be disbarred for
refusal to keep or to produce, upon properly authorized and particularized demand,
records which the lawyer was lawfully and properly required to keep by the State
as a proper part of its functions in relation to him as licensor of his high calling,
I should feel compelled to vote to affirm ....
Id. at 520.
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a grant of immunity. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, however,
the Supreme Court in Spevack did not hold that a disciplinary proceeding
was a criminal proceeding.2 9 The issue before the Spevack Court was the
use of threatened disbarment as coercion to secure a waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination, and the Court merely concluded that disbarment
could not be imposed as a price for asserting the privilege. 0 As was
recently stated in Childs v. McCord,3 1 "[the Spevack] decision therefore
does not turn upon the nature of the disciplinary proceedings but upon
the form of compulsion exerted upon an attorney to waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege. '32 Coercion designed to obtain a waiver of the
privilege was not involved in Sugarman because the immunity grant
preserved Sugarman's fifth amendment rights to protection from criminal
sanctions based on his testimony.
The holding in Spevack does not, therefore, appear dispositive of the
issue raised in Sugarmnan.38 Also not dispositive are statements by a num-
ber of state courts that an attorney cannot, through invocation of a fifth
amendment privilege, refuse to answer questions posed during a bar
29. 273 Md. at 312, 329 A.2d at 4; accord, Childs v. McCord, Civil No. H-75-498,
slip op. at 10 n.10 (D. Md., filed Sept. 29, 1976); see Frank, The Myth of Spevack
v. Klein, 54 A.B.A.J. 970 (1968); Niles & Kaye, Spevack v. Klein: Milestone or
Millstone in Bar Discipline?, 53 A.B.A.J. 1121 (1967).
30. See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277 (1968), where the Court, in
discussing its holding in Spevack, stated that: "[W]e ruled that a lawyer could not
be disbarred solely because he refused to testify at a disciplinary proceeding on the
ground that his testimony would tend to incriminate him."
31. Civil No. H-75-498 (D. Md. filed Sept. 29, 1976).
32. Id. slip op. at 10 n.10.
The Court of Appeals' explanation of Spevack seems less than complete. In
Sugarman the court stated that the privilege against self-incrimination was at issue in
Spevack only because the attorney's testimony would have subjected him to criminal
prosecution. 273 Md. at 312, 329 A.2d at 4. While that characterization of Spevack
is basically correct, it is also plausible that the issue whether the attorney in Spevak
could be disbarred might have arisen even had there been no possibility of actual
criminal prosecution; for the question was whether disbarment could be imposed
because of the attorney's refusal to waive his privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court answered that a threat of disbarment could not be used as a means to
coerce a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege.
33. Spevack has generated a significant amount of commentary, and numerous
attempts have been made to define precisely the breadth of that decision as it relates
to the scope of an attorney's fifth amendment rights. See, e.g., Buchanan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination: To What Extent Should It Protect a State Employee
or Professional Licensee Against the Loss of His State-Created Status?, 7 HousToN
L. REv. 297 (1970); Cathey, The Fifth Amendment - Its Protection of the Right
to Become and to Remain a Lawyer, 21 ARK. L. REv. 361 (1967); Friendly, The
Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L.
REv. 671 (1968); Underwood, Fifth Amendment and the Lawyer, 62 Nw. U.L. Rav.
129 (1967); Comment, Black v. State Bar; The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in Disbarment Proceedings, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 633 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Black v. State Bar]; Note, Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity,
and Comment in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings, 72 Micn. L. REv. 84 (1973).
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disciplinary proceeding on the basis that a response might supply grounds
for disbarment where the response could not subject the attorney to the
danger of criminal prosecution.8 4 The California Supreme Court, for
example, has concluded that an attorney facing a disciplinary committee
does not have a fifth amendment privilege coextensive with that of a
defendant in a criminal case because a disciplinary proceeding is not a
criminal proceeding; the attorney therefore cannot refuse to answer ques-
tions solely on the basis that a response could furnish grounds for his
disbarment. 85
Nevertheless, Spevack and other cases do supply a background helpful
to resolution of the precise issue faced by the Sugarman court: whether
testimony compelled under an immunity grant may form the basis for
disciplinary action. Although the Supreme Court has not yet squarely
addressed this point, the highest courts of both New York and Illinois
have summarily concluded that so long as there is immunity from use
of the compelled testimony in a federal or state criminal prosecution, an
attorney's fifth amendment rights are not violated by subjecting him to
disciplinary proceedings based upon the compelled testimony.38 This con-
clusion is supported primarily by the argument that disbarment is not a
criminal sanction and by the argument that because the privilege against
self-incrimination is limited to criminal proceedings, immunity from dis-
ciplinary sanctions is not constitutionally required. Preliminary to a de-
termination that disbarment is not precluded by an immunity grant because
it does not involve criminal sanctions, however, is the Supreme Court's
decision in Ullmann v. United States37 that the imposition of noncriminal
sanctions based on testimony or information compelled under a grant
of immunity is not prohibited by the Constitution.
In Ullmann immunity had been granted to compel testimony before
a grand jury investigating Communism and its relation to espionage. The
petitioner claimed that the immunity statute was unconstitutional because
it would allow such disabilities as "loss of job, expulsion from labor unions,
state registration and investigation statutes, passport eligibility, and general
public opprobrium" to be imposed as a result of his testimony.38 The
Court reaffirmed its position that if a grant of immunity is to survive a
constitutional challenge, it need only remove the coercive threat of criminal
34. E.g., Black v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d 676, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288, 499 P2d 968
(1972), noted in Comment, Black v. State Bar, supra note 33; Kelly v. Greason, 23
N.Y.2d 368, 244 N.E.2d 456, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1968); Zuckerman v. Greason, 20
N.Y.2d 430, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1, 231 N.E.2d 718 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968).
35. Black v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d 676, 687-88, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288, 294-95, 499
P.2d 968, 974 (1972).
36. In re Schwarz, 51 Ill. 2d 334, 282 N.E2d 689, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047
(1972); In re Klebanoff, 21 N.Y.2d 920, 289 N.Y.S.2d 755, 237 N.E2d 75, cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968); cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
37. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
38. Id. at 430.
1976]
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sanctions, because the privilege against self-incrimination applies only where
testimony may subject the speaker to criminal charges. 9 The core ques-
tion in analyzing Sugarman thus becomes whether disbarment is a "crimi-
nal" sanction.40
The Sugarman court concluded that disbarment is not a criminal
sanction because it seeks to protect the public rather than punish the
attorney who acts unethically.41 This position is supported both by existing
Maryland precedent and by decisions from other jurisdictions.42 Moreover,
two federal decisions in closely analogous areas have reached the same
result as the Sugarman court. In Napolitano v. Ward43 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a state judge's privilege
against self-incrimination had not been violated by his removal from the
bench on the basis of immunized grand jury testimony, specifying that
removal was not a criminal sanction.4 4  Recently, in the thorough and
well-reasoned opinion of Childs v. McCord,45 the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland concluded that the use of the immunized
testimony of professional engineers in disciplinary proceedings before a
state licensing and registration board would violate neither the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination nor the immunity conferred by
the federal immunity statute.46 The Childs court reasoned that the pro-
39. Id. at 431; accord, Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigating Comm'n, 406 U.S.
472 (1972) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
The applicability of the privilege thus depends upon the criminality of a
possible sanction imposed on the basis of the testimony, and not upon whether the
proceedings during which the privilege is invoked are criminal proceedings. The
Court has recognized that the privilege may be invoked in a variety of noncriminal pro-
ceedings where answers might lead to the imposition of criminal penalties. Lefkowitz
v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); see, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551
(1976) (prison disciplinary proceedings); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190
(1955) (legislative hearings) ; McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (civil
proceedings); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478-80 (1894) (administrative pro-
ceedings).
40. Alternatively, the issue can be framed as whether disciplinary proceedings
are criminal proceedings.
41. 273 Md. at 318, 329A.2d at 7.
42. See, e.g., Balliet v. Baltimore County Bar Ass'n, 259 Md. 474, 478, 270 A.2d
465, 468 (1970); Braverman v. Bar Ass'n, 209 Md. 328, 336, 121 A.2d 473, 477, cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 830 (1956) ; Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State
Bar v. Graziani, 200 S.E.2d 353, 355-56 (W. Va. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995
(1974).
43. 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972).
44. Id. at 284.
45. Civil No. H-75-498 (D. Md., filed Sept. 29, 1976) (Harvey, J.).
46. Id. slip op. at 13. The five plaintiffs sought to enjoin the state board from
using their testimony in its disciplinary proceedings. All five had been witnesses along
with Sugarman in United States v. Anderson, Crim. No. 73-0527-Y (D. Md., filed
Mar. 15, 1974), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1398 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975),




ceedings before the board did not focus on the illegality of alleged acts but
rather on the fitness of these individuals to continue as registered pro-
fessional engineers; the purpose of the proceedings was to protect the
public and the profession, not to punish the individuals for their mis-
conduct. 47
The Supreme Court in Baxter v. Palmigiano,4s its most recent dis-
cussion of this area, held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination does not prohibit the drawing of an adverse inference from
an inmate's silence during prison disciplinary proceedings.49 The Court
observed that "[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not criminal pro-
ceedings ;"5o rather, they are concerned with important interests other than
conviction for crimes. 51 Thus, so long as the inmate's silence during his
disciplinary proceeding is not used in a criminal proceeding, there is no
self-incrimination issue; the privilege does not protect him from an adverse
inference drawn from his silence at the disciplinary proceeding.5 2 The
Baxter Court distinguished the situation presented there from situations
covered by a line of Supreme Court decisions that prohibited governmental
attempts to compel interrogation about job performance or contract rela-
tions with the government through the threat of loss of employment or
termination of contract eligibility.53 In those cases, the Court observed,
mere failure to respond was taken as an admission of guilt, which re-
sulted in termination of employment or of contract eligibility, whereas in
Baxter the adverse inference drawn from silence was only a part of the
evidence considered at the disciplinary proceeding.5 4
47. Childs v. McCord, Civil No. H-75-498, slip. op. at 10-11 (D. Md., filed Sept.
29, 1976).
48. 96 S. Ct. 1551 (1976).
49. Id. at 1558. The Court noted the significance of the fact that under the
applicable state law "an inmate's silence in and of itself is insufficient to support an
adverse decision by the disciplinary board," since disciplinary decisions must be
grounded on "'substantial evidence manifested in the record of the disciplinary proceed-
ceedings.'" Id. at 1557 (quoting Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857, 873 (D.R.I.
(1970)).
50. 96 S. Ct. at 1557.
51. Id. at 1558.
52. Justice White's opinion for the majority noted that if the state had sought to
compel the inmate's testimony despite the fifth amendment claim, a grant of use
immunity consistent with the Federal Constitution might have been employed. Id.
1557-58.
53. See id. at 1557.
This line of cases includes Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967);
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm'r,
392 U.S. 280 (1968); and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973). Moreover,
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), can be included within the rationale of these
decisions because it also was concerned with the coercive use of loss of employment
(through disbarment) to promote a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.
See notes 25 to 27 and accompanying text supra.
54. 96 S. Ct. at 1557.
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Consistent with the analysis in Baxter, it does not seem that this line
of cases supports a conclusion different from that reached by the Sugarman
court. In Garrity v. New Jersey,55 which initiated the line, police officers
were interrogated during a state investigation into alleged fixing of traffic
tickets. The officers were warned in advance that if they chose to exercise
their privileges against self-incrimination, they would be subject to removal
from office. They answered the questions posed and subsequently were
convicted in criminal prosecutions based in part on their answers. The
Court held that the fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibited the use
in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements coerced under a threat
of removal from office, where the choice afforded was either to forfeit
one's job or to incriminate oneself.50 Likewise, in Lefkowitz v. Turley,5 7
the most recent in this line of decisions, the Court held that incriminating
responses to inquiries into corruption relating to state contracts may not
be compelled from state contractors by the threat of cancellation of existing
contracts and ineligibility for future contracts, where no immunity from
subsequent criminal prosecution has been granted.58 These and related
decisions59 do not resolve the issue presented in Sugarman because, rather
than declaring that immunized testimony cannot form the evidentiary basis
for disciplinary proceedings, they instead condemn only improper forms
of compulsion used to obtain the waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination. In the Garrity-Lefkowitz line of cases the Court has con-
sistently invalidated statutes that seek, through threats of economic re-
prisal, to compel testimony that has not been immunized.60 As the court
cogently observed in Childs v. McCord,61 "[r]ather than prohibit dis-
ciplinary action based on compelled testimony, these decisions do no more
than require that the employee have first been immunized from future
criminal prosecution. '62
55. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
56. Id. at 500. The Court cited and followed its decision in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886), discussed infra at note 62 and accompanying text. 385 U.S.
at 496-97.
57. 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
58. Id. at 82-85.
59. See note 33 supra.
60. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1557 (1976).
61. Civil No. H-75-498 (D. Md., filed Sept. 29, 1976).
62. Id. slip op. at 13.
In a separate series of cases, the Supreme Court has established the principle
that "proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's
property by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form,
are in their nature criminal," and the privilege against self-incrimination is fully
applicable to such proceedings. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886);
accord, Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893); see United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971). While these cases do recognize an
extension of the privilege against self-incrimination to proceedings and sanctions not
equivalent to traditional criminal prosecutions, they are premised on the strongly
criminal nature of civil proceedings used to enforce criminal statutes or recover
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The Sugarman court's conclusion that disbarment is not a criminal
sanction and that immunized testimony therefore can be used in dis-
ciplinary proceedings is sound,68 although the depth of the court's analysis
is not commensurate with the complexity of the problem. Determining
whether a sanction is criminal or noncriminal is often a difficult task, and
the Supreme Court has used two distinct techniques when faced with the
question.64 Under one approach, the Court has relied upon a test of the
penalties for criminal violations. These forfeiture cases do not support the position
that disciplinary proceedings are criminal proceedings for purposes of the applicability
of the fifth amendment privilege. See Childs v. McCord, Civil No. H-75-498, slip. op.
at 6-9 (D. Md., filed Sept. 29, 1976).
63. While the weight of authority seems to support the Sugarman result, some
commentators have argued that disciplinary proceedings are at least quasi-criminal
in that penal-type sanctions may be imposed, and that consequently the privilege
against self-incrimination is as fully applicable to disciplinary proceedings as it is to
criminal prosecutions. See Note, Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity, and Com-
ment in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 84, 88-108 (1973) ; Comment,
Black v. State Bar, supra note 33.
64. See generally Note, Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity and Comment
in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 84, 89-93 (1973).
On one occasion the Supreme Court has labeled bar disciplinary proceedings
as "adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature." In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,
551 (1968). The Court's discussion of the issue is quite superficial, however, and the
term "quasi-criminal" was not further clarified. Furthermore, the context in which
the issue was presented in Ruffalo was whether adequate notice of all disciplinary
charges prior to the proceedings in which they were eventually considered is required
by due process. The Court did not consider what additional requirements might be
necessary to afford due process to an attorney facing disciplinary proceedings, and
therefore the privilege against self-incrimination was not considered.
The Sugarman court considered Ruffalo inapposite to its inquiry, stating that
the issue before it was whether disbarment is a criminal sanction which cannot be
imposed on the basis of compelled testimony, and "[n]othing in . . . In re Ruffalo
bears precisely upon the point." 273 Md. at 311, 329 A.2d at 3 (citation omitted).
No further reference to Ruffalo was made by the Sugarman court.
Ruffalo was also considered in two other disciplinary cases decided by the
Court of Appeals during the 1974 term. In Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Hirsch, 274
Md. 368, 335 A.2d 108 (1975), the evidence submitted was the attorney's testimony
given in four judicial proceedings. The testimony included his admission of "con-
spiracy to obstruct justice, bribery, [and] false pretenses." 274 Md. at 371, 335 A.2d
at 110. The panel found that the charges were supported by clear and convincing
evidence, and that Hirsch's conduct violated certain disciplinary rules; accordingly,
disbarment was unanimously recommended. Id. at 373, 335 A.2d at 111. Hirsch filed
several exceptions, including the contention that the charges against him should have
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt in the disciplinary hearing. The court dis-
agreed, upholding Maryland precedent that applies the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 374, 335A.2d at 112. See Mary-
land State Bar Ass'n v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 538-39, 325 A.2d 718, 724 (1974) ; Bar
Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 516, 307 A.2d 677, 680-81 (1973). Ruffalo was
found inapposite because, while it extended procedural due process, including fair
notice of the charges, to attorney disciplinary proceedings, it did not require a standard
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intent of the sanction, examining prior legislative history and judicial
application.6" If the statute imposes a sanction for the purposes of punish-
ment, it is considered criminal; if, on the other hand, the statute, although
imposing a disability, is designed to accomplish a legitimate governmental
goal other than punishment, the statute is considered noncriminal. By a
second technique, the Court has looked beyond the legislative or judicial
characterization of the proceedings and instead has balanced the govern-
ment function involved against the private interests that have been affected
by governmental action.66
Under the first approach, disbarment should certainly be characterized
as noncriminal. Disbarment has traditionally been viewed as a necessary
means of protecting the public rather than as a punishment.67 Thus, the
of proof other than clear and convincing. 274 Md. at 375, 335 A.2d at 112. See In re
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 550.
In Bar Ass'n v. Cockrell, 274 Md. 279, 334 A.2d 85 (1975), the hearing panel
found that Cockrell had committed both the serious violation of misappropriating a
client's funds and the charged misconduct of extending improper monetary advances
to his client. The former misconduct had not been charged in the original complaint.
The Bar Association was granted leave to amend the petition to include the additional
charges; a second panel was chosen and they considered the new charges in the
amended complaint, having as evidence the entire transcript from the first panel's
hearing, including Cockrell's self-incriminating statements. The Court of Appeals
determined that this procedure violated the Ruffalo directive regarding fair notice
to the accused: "The charge must be known before the proceedings commence. They
become a trap when, after they are underway, the charges are amended on the basis of
testimony of the accused. He can then be given no opportunity to expunge the earlier
statements and start afresh." In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 551. The situation in Ruffalo
mirrored that in Cockrell and the court felt constrained to limit Cockrell's accounta-
bility for professional misconduct to the charges in the original petition for dis-
ciplinary action. In so ruling, however, the Court of Appeals noted with apprehension
that if strictly construed, Ruffalo might cripple the effectiveness of disciplinary
proceedings in protecting the public:
[O]nce an attorney is brought before a disciplinary tribunal for some minor
offense he can take the stand and make known every other professional indis-
cretion (perhaps even those of a more serious nature) he ever perpetrated and,
in this way, immunize himself from any potential professional censorship for them
because, under Ruffalo, "due process" would prevent an amendment of the initial
allegations.
274 Md. at 286, 334 A.2d at 88-89.
65. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167 (1963); Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
66. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967) ; cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970). The balancing approach has resulted in holdings that a
proceeding may be found to be criminal for purposes of certain procedural safeguards,
but not criminal for purposes of other due process considerations. Compare In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile proceedings are criminal for purposes of the
privilege against self-incrimination), with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971) (juvenile proceedings are not sufficiently criminal to warrant extending to
them the right to trial by jury).
67. See, e.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882) ; In re Echeles, 430 F.2d
347, 349 (7th Cir. 1970); Balliet v. Baltimore County Bar Ass'n, 259 Md. 474, 478,
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Sugarman court correctly observed that disbarment is intended to safeguard
the public from the evils of attorney misconduct and not to punish the
attorney for such misconduct.68
Disbarment might also be viewed as a noncriminal sanction under
the second approach, although the affected interests of the individual attor-
ney are substantial. Disbarment deprives a lawyer of his means of liveli-
hood; it forecloses all job opportunities as an attorney. It also deprives
him of his professional and personal reputation and may impose a stigma
that is, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable from that imposed by
a criminal conviction. Although disbarment does not result in imprison-
ment, the Supreme Court has held that serious sanctions not involving
imprisonment are criminal for purposes of certain constitutional safe-
guards.69 There can be no doubt that disbarment is a very serious sanction
for the individual attorney. Yet, while disbarment substantially affects
the attorney's interests, the interests of the state are also substantial.
The special roles of the attorney as officer and representative of the court
and fiduciary of his client demand the highest ethical standards. 70 Be-
cause he occupies a position of control over important aspects of his
clients' lives, the attorney must be trustworthy; the court, in its supervisory
capacity, has the obligation to protect the public from the unscrupulous
attorney. The function of the court in disciplinary proceedings is to
examine the fitness of the attorney so as to determine whether he has
maintained the moral and ethical standards necessary to remain an officer
of the court.71 Disbarment is imposed, therefore, not for punishment, but
as a means of protecting society from one who no longer possesses qualities
necessary for the fulfillment of one's responsibilities as an attorney. In
this light, the sanction of disbarment can be viewed as remedial and non-
criminal, as the Sugarman court found.
270 A2d 465, 468 (1970); In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84-85, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917);
In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 383, 240 N.W. 441, 444 (1932). But cf. In re Ruffalo,
390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968) ("[d]isbarment, designed to protect the public, is a
punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer"), discussed at note 64 supra.
68. The court emphasized the frequently cited language of Lord Mansfield's
opinion in Ex parte Brounsall, 98 Eng. Rep. 1385 (1778):
[T]he question is, whether, after the conduct of this man, it is proper that he
should continue a member of a profession which should stand free from all
suspicion. . . . [Disbarment] is not by way of punishment; but the Court, on
such cases exercise their discretion, whether a man whom they have formerly
admitted, is a proper person to be continued on the roll or not.
See 273 Md. at 314, 316, 329 A.2d at 5, 6.
69. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (loss of citizenship); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (permanent exclusion from public employment); Cum-
mings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (disqualification from the clergy).
70. See MARYLAND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 1-5, DR 1-102,
published at MD. R.P. 1007-08 (App. F).




The Sugarman decision does not seem inconsistent with existing law
on the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination in bar dis-
ciplinary proceedings. Although disciplinary proceedings approximate
criminal proceedings in certain aspects, disbarment should not be viewed
as a criminal sanction so as to require the full protection of the privilege
as it applies to criminal prosecutions. A grant of immunity to an attorney
will not, under Sugarman, preclude subsequent disciplinary proceedings
based upon the immunized testimony. Thus, the anomalous consequence
apprehended by the Sugarman court is averted:
If Sugarman's contention were to prevail, then the decision as
to whether an individual would continue to be a member of the bar
of this Court might well pass from this Court to the prosecutor em-
powered to grant immunity, be he State or Federal, because by such
a holding this Court could be powerless in the future to protect the
public after a grant of immunity to an attorney, no matter how out-
rageous his conduct might be.72
Extenuating Circumstances
In Bar Association v. Agnew 73 and Bar Association v. Callanan74 the
Court of Appeals established that unless "compelling extenuating circum-
stances" have been demonstrated, the proper sanction for misconduct in-
volving moral turpitude or fraud is disbarment. During the 1974 Term,
the court considered the types of extenuating circumstances that might
justify the imposition of a sanction other than disbarment. As the opinion
in Bar Assdciation v. Siegel particularly demonstrates, 75 the Court of
Appeals apparently is not likely to recognize such mitigating circumstances
for crimes traditionally requiring disbarment.
The attorney in Siegel had pleaded nolo contendere to a felony charge
of wilfully and knowingly attempting to evade payment of federal income
taxes. The plea was accepted only after the judge fully interrogated Siegel
as to his understanding of the charges and the voluntariness of the plea.76
The plea operated as conclusive proof of Siegel's guilt,7" and, since the
crime charged involved moral turpitude,78 disbarment was a possible sanc-
tion. In response to an order to show cause why he should not be dis-
barred,79 Siegel proffered several extenuating circumstances: (1) two
72. 273 Md. at 318, 329 A.2d at 7.
73. 271 Md. 543, 553, 318 A.2d 811, 817 (1974).
74. 271 Md. 554, 556, 318 A.2d 809, 810 (1974).
75. 275 Md. 521, 340 A.2d 710 (1975).
76. Id. at 522-23, 340 A.2d at 711.
77. MD. R.P. BV 10(e) (1). See Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Rosenberg, 273
Md. 351, 355, 329 A.2d 106, 107-08 (1974), in which the court discusses conviction in
a criminal trial as final for purposes of Rule 10(e) (1), formerly Rule BV 4(f) (1).
78. See, e.g., Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Callanan, 271 Md. 554, 556, 318 A.2d
809, 810 (1974).
79. 275 Md. at 524, 340 A.2d at 711.
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prominent former United States Attorneys8" had recommended that the
prosecution be abandoned; (2) the prosecution was overzealous and
prompted by animosity towards Siegel; (3) his plea of nolo contendere
was necessitated by severe health problems that made undergoing trial
extremely hazardous; and (4) his professional record was unblemished. s '
The Court of Appeals rejected each claim of extenuating circumstances
and ordered Siegel disbarred.
2
In rejecting these circumstances, the court concluded that the only
considerations that might qualify as extenuating circumstances for an
attorney who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude are
those which may cause this Court to view the conviction in a light
which tends to show that the [attorney's] illegal act, committed in
violation of a criminal statute, resulted from intensely strained cir-
cumstances or that the magnitude and the nature of the crime are
not so severe as to compel disbarment.83
Excluded from this category are all circumstances proffered in order to
impeach the integrity of the conviction itself. These, in direct consequence
of Rule BV 10(e) (1),84 must be rejected as constituting a collateral
attack on the finding of guilt.85 Mitigating circumstances are those that
80. Stephen H. Sachs and George Beall. Id. at 525, 340 A.2d at 712.
81. Id. at 525, 528, 340 A.2d at 712, 714.
82. Id. at 528-29, 340 A.2d at 714.
83. Id. at 527, 340 A.2d at 713. But see Prince George's County Bar Ass'n v.
Vance, 273 Md. 79, 84, 327 A.2d 767, 770 (1974). In Vance the court accepted as
factors militating against disbarment the attorney's otherwise unblemished record and
the esteem in which he was held in his community. Both of these factors were
expressly rejected as extenuating circumstances in Siegel. The Siegel court stated
that their responsibility to the public to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity
of the bar could not be "shaken by our respect for an individual attorney's reputation,
by our recognition of the longevity of his career at the bar, or by our appreciation
for his service to the community." 275 Md. at 528-29, 340 A.2d at 714.
84. MD. R.P. BV 10(e) (1) states in part:
In a hearing of charges pursuant to this Rule, a final judgment by a judicial
tribunal in another proceeding convicting an attorney of a crime shall be con-
clusive proof of the guilt of the attorney of that crime. A plea or verdict of
guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere followed by a fine or sentence, is a conviction
within the meaning of this Rule.
85. Cases applying this rule include Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Rosenberg,
273 Md. 351, 329 A.2d 106 (1974) ; Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687,
326 A.2d 180 (1974); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d
811 (1974). See also the concurring opinion in In re Braverman, 271 Md. 196, 212,
316 A.2d 246, 253 (1974) (Digges, J., concurring). In Rosenberg, disciplinary pro-
ceedings were brought against an attorney who had been convicted of perjury before
a federal grand jury. Among the exceptions to the panel recommendation of dis-
barment was the claim that BV Rule 10(e) (1), formerly BV Rule 4(f) (1), which
states that a "final judgment by a judicial tribunal in another proceeding convicting
an attorney of a crime shall be conclusive proof of the guilt of the attorney of such
crime," deprived him of due process. 273 Md. at 354, 329 A.2d at 107. Rosenberg
asserted that because the rule provided for a hearing, the hearing must be meaningful,
1976]
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in some manner explain or justify the commission of the crime itself, not
those that challenge the trial or the conviction. Thus, examining judges
will disregard evidence that seeks to undermine the trial court's finding
of guilt.
Evaluating the proffered circumstances in light of these principles, the
court experienced little difficulty in rejecting Siegel's arguments. The
first circumstance, that two United States Attorneys recommended against
prosecuting the indictment, was rejected on the reasoning that even if this
indicated a weak case against Siegel, these misgivings would not diminish
his admitted guilt.8 6 There are many possible reasons behind a suggestion
not to prosecute an indictment. Technical errors by police may necessitate
dropping the case, or crowded dockets may lead a prosecutor to enter a
noll prosequi. Plea bargaining may underlie a decision not to prosecute;
or, as was the case in Sugarman, a grant of immunity may preclude
prosecution. None of these reasons reflect on the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Thus, the recommendation was properly rejected by the court
as an extenuating circumstance. Likewise, Siegel's contention that the
charges against him had been generated by the animosity of certain federal
law enforcement officials was properly rejected. Even if this allegation
were true, it "does not erase the crime's occurrence or diminish the
criminality of one's participation in it."87
Siegel also asserted that his poor health, evidenced by two heart
attacks, was largely, if not solely, the cause of his nolo contendere plea.
The court observed, however, that the heart attacks occurred after the
criminal activity and thus could not serve as a basis to attack the gravity
of the offense.88 Siegel's final proffered circumstance, his unblemished
record as an attorney, was also rejected. His record of more than 40 years
good service only meant that the court's responsibility and duty to disbar
was "more distasteful."8' 9 Because Siegel had demonstrated an inability to
maintain the requisite standard of conduct, the court's duty to ensure that
an attorney's character remain above reproach mandated his disbarment
despite his prior impeccable record.90
and therefore must entail a determination of the ultimate fact - whether perjury had
indeed been committed by him. Id. at 354, 329 A.2d at 107. The court answered that
[t]he requirements of due process having been satisfied at the criminal trial, and
the attorney's guilt having been established beyond a reasonable doubt at that
proceeding, a new or other inquiry into the guilt of the attorney for disciplinary
purposes is not mandated by either the State or federal constitutions.
Id. at 355, 329 A.2d at 108.
86. 275 Md. at 525-26, 340 A.2d at 712-13.
87. Id. at 526, 340 A.2d at 713.
88. Id. at 527, 340 A.2d at 713; see Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Callanan, 271
Md. 554, 557, 318 A.2d 809, 810 (1974).
89. 275 Md. at 528, 340 A.2d at 714.
90. Id. at 528-29, 340 A.2d at 714.
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Judge Levine, with Judges Singley and Eldridge concurring, dissented
in Siegel.9 1 The dissent stated that the circumstances, though not acceptable
as an attack on the guilt of the attorney, were legitimate mitigating forces
that should have been considered in determining the appropriate sanction.
The dissent felt that Siegel was confronted with a Hobson's choice:
[E]ither run a serious risk of losing his life by going to trial
on a case acknowledged by virtually everyone officially associated
with it to be a weak one; or face certain disbarment by pleading nolo
contendere in reliance upon the sound medical and legal advice which
he had received.92
Whereas the majority had concluded that the extenuating circum-
stances offered by Siegel were precluded by Rule BV 10(e) (1) as an
attempt to dispute his guilt, the dissent stated that, assuming guilt, the
fact that a plea entry is mandated by forces beyond the attorney's control
should result in a different sanction than that imposed in the absence of
such circumstances. Thus, because Siegel's plea might be considered in-
voluntary,93 the dissent insisted that it should not result in the same
penalty as a freely given plea. Nevertheless, an inquiry into the circum-
stances surrounding the entry of the plea amounts to a questioning of
the validity of the plea. That, in turn, may be a questioning of the attorney's
guilt, a challen specifically foreclosed by Rule BV 10(e) (1). 94 That rule
is unqualified - it forbids such an inquiry during all stages of the dis-
ciplinary proceeding. The approach advocated by the dissent would, despite
the unqualified language of Rule BV 10(e) (1), allow the plea to operate
as conclusive proof of guilt in that statge of the proceeding determining
the issue whether there has been any misconduct, but not as conclusive
proof of guilt in that stage determining the proper sanction to be imposed.
The majority's approach, which precludes consideration of such circum-
stances even in the stage of a disciplinary proceeding where a sanction
is imposed unless those circumstances demonstrate that the criminal activity,
as opposed to a plea, was attributable to extenuating circumstances, seems
the sounder one.
In Bar Association v. Snyder,95 the Court of Appeals concluded that
the absence of personal gain is not an extenuating circumstance. Dis-
ciplinary proceedings were brought against Snyder, who had plead nolo
contendere to federal charges of fraudulent receipt of monies from a savings
and loan association 96 and making a false statement of material fact to a
91. Id. at 529, 340 A.2d at 714.
92. Id. at 533, 340 A.2d at 716-17.
93. A fundamental question is whether in most cases it is possible to determine
why a certain plea actually was entered, and whether the plea can be considered
voluntary.
94. The text of Rule BV 10(e) (1) is set out in note 84 supra.
95. 273 Md. 534, 331 A.2d 47 (1975).
96. This was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1951) and 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (1961).
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government agency.9 7 Snyder conceded that his plea operated as con-
clusive proof of guilt for the purposes of disciplinary proceedings9" and
that his offense involved moral turpitude, but asserted as an extenuating
circumstance his failure to realize personal gain. 9 He relied upon the
statement by the Court of Appeals in Bar Association v. Agnew that an
attorney will be disbarred, absent the most compelling circumstances,
if "shown to be wilfully dishonest for personal gain by means of fraud,
deceit, cheating or like conduct."' 0 0 The Snyder court responded, how-
ever, that "[t]he fact that Snyder's share of the surplus was paid to his
brother does not negate the concept of personal gain."''1 1 Thus, Snyder
makes clear that one cannot use as a mitigating circumstance the fact
that money wrongfully obtained was not kept for one's own use; so long as
an attorney has secured money through fraud or deceit, it is irrelevant
whether he personally enjoyed the receipts.
97. Snyder defrauded the government by making false statements to the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board; he did not disclose receipt of the fraudulently obtained
monies on a questionnaire he was required to submit annually to the Board. He
arranged to route illegally charged fees through a real estate agency, the result of
which was either to defraud the savings and loan association of income to which
it would otherwise have been entitled, or to saddle borrowers with fees for which they
ought not have been liable. 273 Md. at 535-36, 331 A.2d at 48.
98. Id. at 536, 331 A.2d at 48.
99. Id. at 536-37, 331 A.2d at 48. Other circumstances advanced by Snyder were
that the scheme was devised in order to bring the savings and loan association into
conformity with the new usury law, id. at 536-37, 331 A.2d at 48, and that his con-
duct was the consequence of inadvertence rather than of criminal intent, id. at 537,
331 A.2d at 48. Both were summarily rejected as not being in any way extenuating.
100. Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 553, 318 A.2d 811, 817
(1974) (emphasis added); see Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Callanan, 271 Md. 554,
556, 318 A.2d 809, 810 (1974) ; cf. Prince George's County Bar Ass'n v. Blanchard,
276 Md. 207, 345 A.2d 60 (1975). In Blanchard the attorney was charged with violat-
ing DR 1-102A(4) by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation. Specifically, during the period from April or May 1969 until
January 1972, in approximately 1826 cases, Blanchard had charged clients higher
survey fees than he remitted to the surveyor, ultimately keeping about $17,090.00. The
padded fee, however, was less than the going rate for such services. Blanchard re-
tained the balance, usually $10.00 though sometimes only $5.00, in accordance with an
agreement with the surveyor for services rendered in aid of the surveyor's work.
The client was totally uninformed as to this arrangement. The Court of Appeals
merely reprimanded the attorney. The panel noted:
[Tihis would appear to be an arrangement beneficial to all parties in that
[the attorney] would get quick house location service, [the surveyor] would
have a good survey practice receiving fair compensation for his work in view of
assistance given by [the attorney]; and the client would really receive a dis-
counted survey charge of $5.00 less than the going rate.
276 Md. at 210, 345 A.2d at 62. Nevertheless, the panel concluded that the practice
could not be condoned: "the professional conduct of an attorney should not be reduced
to this type of rebate without advising the client." Id. at 211, 345 A.2d at 62. The
Court of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, adopted the recommendation of the panel
and issued a reprimand.
101. 273 Md. at 537, 331 A.2d at 48.
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In contrast to Siegel and Snyder, the Court of Appeals in Bar Asso-
ciation v. McCourt102 apparently accepted the extenuating circumstances
proffered by the attorney. McCourt was convicted of one count and pleaded
nolo contendere to three other counts of wilful failure to file federal income
tax returns. 0 3 The Bar Association of Baltimore City recommended that
he be suspended from practice for a reasonable period, and the three-
judge disciplinary panel subsequently recommended to the Court of Appeals
a one year suspension. In a per curiam opinion, with Judges Smith and
Digges dissenting, 04 the Court of Appeals adopted the panel's memo-
randum opinion and recommendation and ordered McCourt suspended
from practice in Maryland for one year. 10 5
The memorandum opinion of the panel acknowledged that wilfully
failing to file income tax returns is an act involving fraud or deceit and
moral turpitude, and one which normally requires disbarment absent
"compelling extenuating circumstances."' 1 6 In recommending only sus-
pension, the panel was apparently persuaded by two considerations: the
Bar Association recommendation against disbarment and "other factors
proffered in mitigation."'107 Neither the Court of Appeals nor the dis-
ciplinary panel discussed the weight that should properly be given in an
attorney disciplinary proceeding to a recommendation of a specific sanc-
tion by the charging body. Subtitle BV of the Maryland Rules of Pro-
cedure, which governs the procedures for disciplining Maryland attor-
neys, 06 does not discuss the role of a Bar Association, acting through the
Bar Counsel,1°9 in recommending sanctions to the Court of Appeals or to
the panel appointed by the Court of Appeals. 110 Further, Subtitle BV
does not indicate whether a recommendation of a particular sanction
should influence the decision of the panel or the court."' Certainly such
a recommendation is not irrelevant; nevertheless, the reasons supporting
a recommendation would seem to be of greater value to the court or panel.
Such underlying reasons were not evident, however, in McCourt. If, as
may well be the case, the reasons behind the Bar Association's recom-
mendation were the same extenuating circumstances presented to and
apparently considered by the disciplinary panel, then the Bar Association
recommendation would not appear to constitute an independent factor
that could justify the lesser sanction of suspension.
102. 276 Md. 326, 347 A.2d 208 (1975).
103. McCourt's failure to file tax returns was a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203
(1968).
104. 276 Md. at 327, 347 A.2d at 208.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 331-32, 347 A.2d at 211.
107. Id. at 332, 347 A.2d at 211.
108. See note 1 supra.
109. See MD. R.P. BV 1(c).
110. See MD. R.P. BV 9(b).
111. See MD. R.P. BV 9-11.
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Unfortunately, it is not clear what extenuating circumstances the
panel and, by adoption, the Court of Appeals relied upon in determining
the proper sanction to impose. While the panel opinion stated expressly
that "other factors proffered in mitigation" helped to make suspension the
proper sanction," 2 neither the panel nor the court indicated precisely
what factors had persuaded them. Two possible extenuating circumstances
are mentioned in the panel opinion," 3 neither of which, however, seems
sufficient to justify the substitution of a one year's suspension for the
normal sanction of disbarment.
One possible extenuating circumstance mentioned was the suspended
sentence received by McCourt, following the prosecution's recommenda-
tion of probation." 4 However, since an attorney need not be convicted
before disbarment is imposed," 5 the absence of a jail sentence should
have no bearing on whether an attorney should be disbarred. The absence
of a jail sentence is not an extenuating circumstance; rather, it is merely
an insignificant attendant circumstance. An extenuating circumstance is
one that explains or justifies the attorney's commission of the miscon-
duct;16 the imposition of probation instead of imprisonment neither
explains why the attorney committed the offense nor justifies the conduct.
The second extenuating circumstance discussed by the panel was the
conclusion in a psychiatric report that McCourt suffered from a neurotic
personality disorder, manifested by emotional immaturity, dependency, and
procrastination." 7 Nevertheless, the examining doctor found that " 'at the
time of the due dates of the tax returns in question, Mr. McCourt did
not lack the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or
112. 276 Md. at 332, 347 A.2d at 211.
113. The panel expressly rejected as a mitigating circumstance the fact that a
very small tax liability was involved. 276 Md. at 332, 347 A.2d at 211.
114. The federal court suspended sentences under all counts and ordered McCourt
placed on one year's probation. Id. at 330, 347 A.2d at 210. The prosecution recom-
mendation of probation apparently was prompted by the prospect of lengthy hearings
on the issue of the use of "tainted" evidence against McCourt, and the fact that if
this evidence were excluded virtually no tax liability would have remained. The
Court of Appeals observed that only "non-tainted" facts had been considered by the
sentencing judge. Id. at 330, 347 A.2d at 210.
115. See, e.g., Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 535-36, 325 A.2d
718, 722 (1974); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Sugarman, 273 Md. 306, 329 A.2d
1 (1974).
116. Bar Ass'n v. Siegel, 275 Md. 521, 527, 340 A.2d 710, 713 (1975) ; see note 85
and accompanying text supra.
Circumstances that demonstrate that an act is not serious enough to require
disbarment may also be considered extenuating. See Bar Ass'n v. Siegel, supra at
527, 340 A.2d at 713; note 83 and accompanying text supra. Nevertheless, the crime
of which Siegel was convicted clearly was of sufficient severity to warrant disbar-
ment. See notes 86-90 and accompanying text supra.
117. 276 Md. at 330-31, 347 A.2d at 210.
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strictly speaking, to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law.' "118
It is startling that the panel apparently relied upon a debilitating
disorder as a circumstance mitigating against disbarment. An attorney who
is neurotic yet responsible, and who can therefore control his actions,
should not be excused from accountability for his actions because he is
neurotic. An attorney who is neurotic but not responsible, and who thus
cannot control his actions, is clearly untrustworthy and should not be
treated so as to ease his return to the practice of law. In both situations,
the attorney's conduct has demonstrated his unfitness to practice law.
The panel, in relying upon the presence of a neurotic disorder as an
extenuating circumstance supporting suspension, confused the issue of
culpability with mitigation. A neurotic disorder may make McCourt less
responsible and therefore less reprehensible, but it should not mitigate
against disbarment or suspension from practice for a period longer than
one year. Suspension for a short period provides no assurance that the
attorney will be trustworthy and responsible upon termination of the
period and thus could defeat the main purpose of the disciplinary action:
protection of the public from the unfit practitioner.1 1 9
118. Id. at 331, 347 A2d at 210. McCourt apparently had sought no further
treatment or evaluation of his disorder. Id. at 331, 347 A.2d at 210.
119. But whatever the merits of the possible extenuating circumstances relied
upon in McCourt, the panel and the Court of Appeals did not meet their obligation
under Rule BV 11 (a) (1) to provide a "written statement of . . . the recommendation
of the court, and its reasons therefor." MD. R.P. BV 11 (a) (1). The "other factors
proffered in mitigation" should have been identified with greater specificity.
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Actions for the recovery of real estate brokers' commissions are among
the most common court dockets.' Although the broad principles governing
brokers' commissions are relatively clear, 2 application of those principles
depends on the particular facts at issue and the relevant statutory struc-
ture. In Maryland, section 14-105 of the Real Property Article of the
Maryland Annotated Code governs the entitlement of a real estate broker
to a commission.3 By its terms, however, the statute applies only absent
a special agreement between the real estate broker and his employer, and
a significant portion of the litigation involving brokers' commissions is
concerned with the interpretation of such contractual agreements. Brokers'
commissions cases decided by the Court of Appeals during the September
Term, 1974, presented questions of both statutory and contractual inter-
pretation.
Section 14-105 provides that if a broker secures a purchaser or lessee
who ultimately enters into an enforceable written contract with the broker's
employer, then "the broker is deemed to have caused the customary or
agreed commission" in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.4
Two 1974 Term cases involved attempts by brokers to recover commissions
under this statutory provision. In Steward Village Shopping Center v.
Melbourne5 a real estate broker who had not entered into a listing agree-
ment with the property owner sought the recovery of a commission for
procuring a tenant for a commercial property.6 After consideration of
1. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 683 (2d ed. 1969).
2. See generally F. GROSS, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS (1917); WALKER,
REAL ESTATE AGENCY (2d ed. 1932); Mechem, The Real Estate Broker and His
Commission, 6 ILL. L. REv. 145 (1911).
3. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-105 (1974) provides:
In the absence of special agreement to the contrary, if a real estate broker
employed to sell, buy, lease, or otherwise negotiate an estate, or a mortgage or loan
secured by the property, procures in good faith a purchaser, vendor, lessor, lessee,
mortgagor, mortgagee, borrower, or lender, as the case may be, and the person
procured is accepted by the employer and enters into a valid, binding, and en-
forceable written contract, in terms acceptable to the employer, of a sale, pur-
chase, lease, mortgage, loan, or other contract, as the case may be, and the con-
tract is accepted by the employer and signed by him, the broker is deemed to have
earned the customary or agreed commission. He has earned the commission re-
gardless of whether or not the contract entered into is performed, unless the per-
formance of the contract is prevented, hindered, or delayed by any act of the broker.
4. See note 3 supra.
5. 274 Md. 44, 332 A.2d 626 (1975).
6. Id. at 46-47, 332 A.2d at 627. The broker acted pursuant to the owner's
oral permission to show the premises. See Glaser v. Shostock, 213 Md. 383, 131 A.2d
724 (1957) (oral contract with broker for sale of business is sufficient); Heslop v.
Diendonne, 209 Md. 201, 120 A.2d 669 (1956) (employment may be implied when
owner permits broker to show property).
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expert testimony on the amount of a "customary" commission,7 a jury
awarded the broker a lump sum commission based on the gross amount
of rent collectable under the lease. The property owner did not contest
on appeal that the broker was the procuring cause of the lease, which is a
statutory prerequisite to recovery of a customary commission under sec-
tion 14-105,8 but did contend (1) that the amount of commission re-
coverable should have been limited to a percentage of the rents actually
collected, and (2) that the actual time expended by the broker in pro-
curing the tenant was relevant to the amount of commission due. 9 The
Court of Appeals rejected both contentions in affirming the judgment
awarding a customary commission paid in a lump sum.10
Expert testimony in Steward Village indicated that the customary
real estate broker's commission was approximately five percent of the gross
rent collectable under the lease." The court observed that further testimony
established that when a commission was paid in a lump sum at the outset
of the lease period, instead of being paid as rent was collected each month,
the customary amount was one-half the total of such periodic payments. 12
Noting that expert evidence was properly before the jury, the court rejected
the property owner's contention that the trial court should have instructed
the jury that the commission recoverable was limited to a percentage of
rents actually collected; the custom seemed to be that lump sum com-
missions were computed on the basis of the total rent that could be
collected under the original term and all renewal option terms. Because
7. 274 Md. at 47-48, 332 A.2d at 627-28. Both the broker and the owner also
introduced testimony by licensed real estate brokers that there was a customary com-
mission for processing a lease.
8. See note 3 supra. The burden of proof on the procurement issue is on the
broker. See Steele v. Seth, 211 Md. 323, 127 A.2d 388 (1956). The broker's efforts
are the procuring cause of a lease or sale if they are the proximate cause of the agree-
ment. See Weinberg v. Desser, 243 Md. 347, 355, 221 A.2d 66, 70 (1966).
The question of procuring cause was at issue in MacWilliams v. Bright, 273
Md. 632, 331 A.2d 303 (1975). A broker found a potential purchaser for a home,
but negotiations broke off. Ten days later the owner contacted the buyer, and sub-
sequent negotiations resulted in a contract of sale. Id. at 634, 331 A.2d at 304. The
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's factual finding that the owner had not
revoked the broker's authority to sell the house. Id. at 636, 331 A.2d at 305; accord,
Yasuna v. National Capital Corp., 273 Md. 617, 331 A.2d 49 (1975). The MacWilliams
court further held that inaction by the broker for 24 days following authorization for
a period of three years did not constitute abandonment of the undertaking. 273 Md. at
637, 331 A.2d at 306.
9. 274 Md. at 48, 332 A.2d at 628.
10. Id. at 51, 332 A.2d at 629.
11. Id. at 47, 332 A.2d at 627. The lease provided for an original term of three
years, with two renewal options for five years each. Total minimum rental for the
thirteen year period would be $228,800, a five percent commission on which would
come to $11,440. Id.
12. Id. at 48, 332 A.2d at 628. Thus, the jury award of $5700 is explainable as
being approximately one-half the $11,440 commission based on five percent of the
gross collectable rental. Id. at 49 n.1, 332 A.2d at 629 n.1.
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the broker relied exclusively on the provisions of section 14-105 for its
standard of recovery, rather than suing in quantum meruit, the Steward
Village court also concluded that the actual time spent by the broker
in procuring a tenant was not relevant, the standard being the "customary"
commission and not the reasonable value of the broker's services.13
The second case involving section 14-105, Eastern Associates, Inc. v.
Sarubin,14 concerned the liability of a lessor to a broker who had procured
a tenant for a commercial property. A listing agreement between the
broker and the property owner that included a specified commission sched-
ule had expired prior to the procurement of the tenant. 15 The lessor had
paid the broker a commission based on the original lease but refused to
pay an additional commission when the lease was renewed. Eastern, relied
upon section 14-105 and sought recovery of the customary commission.
The trial judge concluded that the broker could not recover a commission
based on rent paid under a renewal option exercised by the tenant. 16
Without citation to its earlier opinion in Steward Village, the Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on
the question whether the broker was entitled to a commission upon a lease
renewal pursuant to an option in the lease, when the broker played no role
in procuring the renewal.' 7 The court stated, however, that the broker
had the burden of establishing that the customary commission for a pro-
curement of a commercial tenant in Baltimore City includes a commis-
sion on rent paid under a renewal not procured by the broker, and that
this custom was either known to the parties or "so uniform and notorious
that they must be supposed to have contracted with reference to it."18
Expert testimony in Steward Village convinced the jury that the
customary commission included a percentage of the rents that would be
paid under an exercised renewal option, a determination which the Court
of Appeals affirmed on appeal. The trier of fact in Eastern Associates,
however, failed to make specific findings whether a broker's commission
on renewal rents was customary and whether the property owner actually
knew or should have been presumed to know of that custom,' 9 despite
the presentation of testimony that the usual real estate broker's commis-
sion in Baltimore City did in fact include a percentage of the rents under
a lease renewal.20 Nonetheless, these cases are consistent in establishing
that the award of customary commission under section 14-105 may include
13. Id. at 50-51, 332 A.2d at 629. See Nily Realty, Inc. v. Wood, 272 Md. 589,
598, 325 A.2d 730, 736 (1974) ("A real estate broker is employed not to expend time
and effort but to accomplish a particular result ... .
14. 274 Md. 378, 336 A.2d 765 (1975).
15. Id. at 380, 336 A.2d at 767.
16. Id. at 379, 336 A.2d at 765.
17. Id. at 403, 336 A.2d at 778.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 402, 336 A.2d at 778.
20. Id. at 381-82, 336 A.2d at 767.
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a commission based on rent paid under a renewal option, the exercise of
which is not procured or induced in any way by the broker, so long as
the evidence establishes that payment of such a commission is customary.
It is apparent, however, that the custom may vary with the type of lease
and the geographical market involved, given the emphasis in Eastern
Associates on the practices customary in Baltimore City commercial lease
transactions. 2 1 Substantial evidentiary requirements were placed on the
broker by the court in Eastern Associates, as the broker must meet the
burden of demonstrating to the trier of fact both that the customary com-
mission includes a percentage of rent paid under a renewal option and
that this custom was either actually known or sufficiently notorious to
put the parties on constructive notice. But when that burden is met, as
it presumably was in Steward Village, section 14-105 significantly bene-
fits real estate brokers by providing for recovery of the commission that
would normally be earned, even when no express enforcement agreement
between the parties provides for the payment of such a commission.
The remaining brokers' commissions cases involved express con-
tractual agreements for commissions, and therefore section 14-105 was
inapplicable.2 2 In Berman v. Hall,2 3 a contract for sale contained a broker-
age agreement providing that a commission was "due and payable upon
the settlement of this Contract."'24  The contract was signed, but the
settlement never occurred because the sellers and the purchaser later
executed a mutual release of obligations.25 The broker argued that, not-
withstanding the language of the agreement, the parties intended that
while physical payment of the commission was to be postponed until
settlement, a right to the commission vested when the contract for sale
was executed. Under this construction of the agreement the right to a
commission accrued at the same time as it would under section 14-105;
it was therefore claimed that the statute applied, because the brokerage
agreement did not create a special agreement contrary to the statutory
provision.2 6 The trial court sustained the sellers' demurrer to the decla-
ration, holding that the broker could recover a commission only "if the
sale had been consummated or if the purchaser had defaulted," and finding
that neither had occurred.27 The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on
prior cases which construed nearly identical contract language as requir-
ing a completed settlement as a condition precedent to acquiring a right
21. See id. at 381-82, 403, 336 A.2d at 767, 778.
22. See Prince Georges Properties, Inc. v. Rogers, 275 Md. 582, 595-97, 341 A.2d
804, 811-12 (1975); Berman v. Hall, 275 Md. 434, 437-39, 340 A.2d 251, 253-54
(1975); Chas. H. Steffey, Inc. v. Derr, 275 Md. 121, 126, 338 A.2d 262, 266 (1975).
23. 275 Md. 434, 340 A.2d 251 (1975).
24. Id. at 435, 340 A.2d at 252 (emphasis removed).
25. Id. at 436, 340 A.2d at 252. No allegations were made that the purchaser had
defaulted by breaching the sales contract.
26. Id. at 436-37, 340 A.2d at 252-53.
27. Id. at 436, 340 A.2d at 252.
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to a commission.28 Thus, the court found the statute inapplicable since
there was a "special agreement" within the meaning of section 14-105.
The issue of contract construction addressed in Berman illustrates a
significant problem concerning effective drafting of brokerage agreements.
Courts have generally adopted either of two views in interpreting this
type of qualifying language in sales contracts or brokerage agreements.29
Under the "time" rationale the qualifying words are viewed as referring
only to the time when physical payment will occur ;80 this was the posi-
tion argued by the broker in Berman.31 One commentator has said that
such a view
accord [s] with the rule governing contracts generally: Where a debt
has arisen, liability will not be excused because, without fault of the
creditor and due to happenings beyond his control, the time for pay-
ment, as fixed by the contract, can never arrive.
8 2
On the other hand, the "condition precedent" approach, the view taken
by Maryland courts,8 3 treats the contract as creating a specific event or
condition the occurrence of which is a prerequisite to earning the com-
mission. This rationale is likewise supported by a contract law maxim -
contract ambiguities should be construed against the drafter; thus, any
ambiguity in the payment clause must be resolved against the broker, who
prepared the contract. 4
While most jurisdictions have elected to follow the "condition prece-
dent" approach,38 rigid adherence to that position may yield inequitable
results. For example, under a strict interpretation the seller may be
permitted to deny a commission to the broker even when the seller has
deliberately defaulted.8 6 It is not clear that parties to each brokerage
agreement intend to lock themselves into the rigid position required by
the condition precedent rationale. If the time approach were available
for application, a court would have more leeway to consider the meaning
of the contract language together with the intent of the parties. Cases
such as Berman may indicate that the Court of Appeals is not receptive
to the time rationale, but it should be noted that Berman and the cases
cited therein all concerned language which indicated fairly clearly that
28. Id. at 438-40, 340 A.2d at 254. See, e.g., Casey v. Jones, 275 Md. 203, 205,
339 A.2d 33, 34 (1975) ; Nily Realty, Inc. v. Wood, 272 Md. 589, 595, 325 A.2d 730,
734 (1974); W.C. Pinkard & Co. v. Castlewood, 271 Md. 598, 601, 319 A.2d 123,
124-25 (1974).
29. See generally Wallace, Effect of Qualifying Language in Real Estate Broker's
Commission, Obligations of a Listing Property Owner, 1957 WASH. U.L.Q. 297.
30. See, e.g., Lehroff v. Schwartsky, 2 N.J. Misc. 353, 125 A. 496 (1924).
31. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
32. Wallace, supra note 29, at 304.
33. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
34. See Wallace, Effect of Qualifying Language, supra note 29, at 324; Hamrick
v. Cooper River Lumber Co., 223 S.C. 119, 126, 74 S.E.2d 575, 578 (1953).
35. See Wallace, supra note 29, at 297.
36. See MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 567 (4th ed. 1952).
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no obligation to pay a commission would arise until settlement actually
occurred. 7 In any event, it would seem wise for brokers to draft broker-
age agreements carefully to avoid all ambiguities as to when the right to
receive payment of a commission vests under the agreement. By so
doing, the intent of the parties can better be met, and real estate brokers
can avoid results such as that reached in Berman.
On three occasions during the 1974 Term the Court of Appeals con-
sidered the effect of contract provisions governing the payment of
brokers' commissions when settlement is not consummated because of a
default by the purchaser after a contract for sale has been executed. In
two cases, Chas. H. Steffey, Inc. v. Derr38 and Prince Georges Properties,
Inc. v. Rogers,8 9 the respective listing agreement and contract for sale
provided that in the event of default by the purchaser and a subsequent
declaration by the seller of a forfeiture of the purchaser's deposit, the
broker would be entitled to one-half the deposit as a commission.4" In
both cases the broker procured a purchaser, a contract for sale was exe-
cuted, a deposit was delivered by the purchaser to be held in escrow by
the broker, and the purchaser later failed to make settlement in breach
of the sales contract.
In Steifey the purchasers demanded the return of the deposit, and
the seller likewise demanded the deposit, following an attempt to declare
a forfeiture. 41 Cognizant of its duties under Maryland law42 and the Code
of Ethics of the Real Estate Commission, 43 the broker refused the con-
37. See notes 24 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
38. 275 Md. 121, 338 A.2d 262 (1975).
39. 275 Md. 582, 341 A.2d 804 (1975).
40. Chas. H. Steffey, Inc. v. Derr, 275 Md. 121, 122, 338 A2d 262, 264 (1975);
Prince Georges Properties, Inc. v. Rogers, 275 Md. 582, 584, 341 A.2d 804, 805 (1975).
41. 275 Md. at 122, 338 A.2d at 264.
42. MD. ANN. CODE art 56, § 227A (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides in part:
(a) In any case in which a licensee hereunder is entrusted with, or receives
and accepts, or otherwise holds, deposit moneys or other trust moneys, of
whatever kind or nature, or instruments representing the same, concerning trans-
actions involving real estate within the State of Maryland, such moneys or instru-
ments, in the absence of proper written instructions to the contrary, shall be
expeditiously deposited in [a bank account] maintained by the broker as a separate
account for funds belonging to others, and said funds shall be retained in such
account until the transaction involved is consummated or terminated, or until
proper written instructions have been received by the broker directing the with-
drawal and other disposition of such funds, at which time all such funds shall be
promptly and fully accounted for by the broker....
43. The Code of Ethics of the Real Estate Commission of Maryland, art. 9
(1976) provides:
In accepting employment as an agent, the licensee shall protect and promote
the interests of the client. This obligation of absolute fidelity to the client's in-
terest is primary, but it does not relieve the licensee from his statutory obligations
towards the other parties to the transaction.
A similar provision of this code was in force at the time of the Steffey decision. See
275 Md. at 127-28, 338 A.2d at 267.
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flicting demands, retained the deposit in escrow, and filed an action for
declaratory relief, later amended to include a request for damages, in an
attempt either to satisfy payment of its commission out of the escrow
deposit or to recover a judgment against the purchasers or the seller for
compensation for its services. 44 Demurrers to the broker's declarations
were sustained on the grounds that no cause of action entitling the broker
to relief had been stated.45 The purchasers then acquired a court order
requiring the broker to return the full amount of the deposit to them.
The broker subsequently filed suit against the seller for recovery of a
commission. The trial court found that the purchaser had defaulted and
the seller had attempted to declare a forfeiture, but that the broker had
prevented the forfeiture by its failure to turn over the deposit to the
seller upon demand. 46 This refusal, the court concluded, was a breach
of the broker's fiduciary duty and constituted a waiver of the right to a
commission. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the judgment for
the seller and awarded the broker a commission equal to one-half the
deposit.47 The court held that under the existing statutory and regula-
tory provisions, the broker acted in a reasonable manner when, faced
with conflicting claims to the deposit, it retained the deposit in escrow
and petitioned a court for instructions, 48 and that in returning the deposit
to the purchaser the broker was properly complying with a court order.49
In contrast to the circumstances in Steffey, the seller in Prince Georges
Properties took no action to forfeit the deposit after settlement arrange-
ments failed, and the broker returned the deposit to the purchaser on its
own initiative.50 The broker then sued the seller for a commission based
upon a percentage of the sale price as set forth in the contract for sale.
The trial court found that the purchaser had defaulted and that the
broker's return of the deposit to the purchaser without the consent of the
seller amounted to a waiver of the right to demand a commission from
the seller.51 The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that by return-
ing the deposit without instructions from the seller the broker terminated
any rights to possession it had in the deposit and thus waived its right
to a commission "by surrendering up the only fund out of which it could
be allowed its commission. '52
44. 275 Md. at 123-24, 338 A.2d at 264-65.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 124-25, 338 A.2d at 265.
47. Id. at 129, 338 A.2d at 267.
48. Id. at 128, 338 A.2d at 267. The court distinguished the rule in Goss v.
Hill, 219 Md. 304, 149 A.2d 10 (1959), where the court determined that a broker's
actions in returning a deposit to a purchaser without the seller's consent had not
been reasonable.
49. 275 Md. at 128-29, 338 A.2d at 267.
50. 275 Md. at 585-86, 341 A.2d at 806.
51. Id. at 587, 341 A.2d at 807.
52. Id. at 594, 341 A.2d at 811. See Chasanow v. Willcox, 220 Md. 171, 176-77,
151 A.2d 748, 751 (1959); Goss v. Hill, 219 Md. 304, 308-09, 149 A.2d 10, 12 (1959).
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The lessons of Steifey and Prince Georges Properties are clear. In
order for a broker to recover a commission in compensation for services
rendered when settlement is never consummated, the broker must be care-
ful in dealing with the deposit it holds in escrow so as to assure that its
actions do not constitute a waiver of any right to a commission. More-
over, under such provisions as were at issue in Steifey and Prince Georges
Properties, it is apparent that the broker's right, to a commission col-
lected out of an escrow deposit following a purchaser's default is entirely
dependent upon a declaration of forfeiture by. the seller.
Some discussion of precisely what is required to constitute a for-
feiture was offered by the Court of Appeals in Casey v. Jones,53 where
the brokerage agreement provision considered was identical to that in
Prince Georges Properties.4 The purchaser signed a sales contract and
deposited a check with the broker. However, when the purchaser became
disenchanted and decided to withdraw from the deal, he refused to make
good on the check, which had been returned after presentation by the
broker due to an insufficiency of funds. 55 The broker then brought suit
against the purchaser, seeking to obtain the commission he believed
would have been due out of the deposit. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court judgment denying the broker a commission, holding, first,
that because no settlement was consummated the broker's right to a full
commission under the contract did not accrue,56 and, secondly, that the
broker had no right to a commission out of the deposit check since the
sellers had not actually declared a forfeiture, a condition precedent to the
broker establishing any ownership rights in the deposit.
57
The Casey court relied on established principles that forfeiture must
be by express declaration of the seller, and that mere default or breach
by the purchaser does not constitute an operative forfeiture. 58 There is
considerable justification for construing forfeiture provisions in this
manner. As one commentator has phrased the argument, "[T]he usual
language is that, in accordance with general contract principles, the listing
agreement is to be construed against the maker (almost always the
broker) . . . ."59 Viewed in this light, the parties are merely being held
to the terms of their contractual agreement. The paradox is that while
forfeiture provisions were obviously intended to ensure brokers some
compensation for their efforts when transactions which they have arranged
fall through, the effect has been to raise a bar to recovery when a seller
refuses to elect a forfeiture. Thus, a broker is in a worse position than
he would have been in had there been no special agreement, as then he
53. 275 Md. 203, 339 A.2d 33 (1975).
54. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
55. 275 Md. at 204, 339 A.2d at 34.
56. Id. at 205, 339 A.2d at 34.
57. Id. at 206-07, 339 A.2d at 35.
58. Id. See, e.g., Chasanow v. Willcox, 220 Md. 171, 151 A.2d 748 (1959).
59. Wallace, supra note 29, at 301 n.13.
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could have relied on the provisions of section 14-105. This problem could
be remedied by a simple language change in drafting the forfeiture pro-
vision. The agreement might provide, for example, that forfeiture will
occur automatically on default by the purchaser.60 One writer, in propos-
ing alternative sources of recovery for the broker by means of additional
contractual provisions, has observed that "[b]rokers have exacted con-
siderably worse terms from sellers on many occasions .... ,,61 One can
hypothesize that sellers might object to automatic forfeitures, but in most
instances, at least at the outset of the transaction, a seller who voluntarily
employs a broker should also be willing to assure the broker reasonable
compensation for services rendered. Moreover, forfeiture would generally
appear to be the most satisfactory and efficient means for the seller to
recover whatever damages are suffered as a result of a purchaser's default.
It is surprising, therefore, that there apparently have been few attempts by
brokers at redrafting these provisions in terms more favorable to brokers.
60. See, e.g., Huber v. Gershman, 300 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. 1957) (seller could not
waive earnest money that "automatically" became forfeited upon default until the sum
due the broker under the contract was paid).




During the September Term, 1974, the Court of Appeals decided
three cases involving significant evidentiary issues. In Smith v. State,*
the court examined the circumstances in which extrinsic evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement was admissible for impeachment. The court, in
Harrison v. State,** considered whether the privilege protecting confiden-
tial attorney-client communications could be waived by a witness on cross-
examination. Finally, in Patterson v. State,*** the court ruled on the
discretionary power of a trial court to call and examine witnesses and
focused on the circumstances in which such a procedure could properly be
invoked.
Smith v. State1
Defendant Smith was convicted of the second degree murder of her
former husband. In defense she had attempted to show at trial that the
shooting had been accidental; however, this theory was contradicted by
the testimony of the two investigating policemen.2 On cross-examination,
one of the policemen, Officer Brown, was asked whether he recalled in-
forming an investigator for the Public Defender, Watkins, that the victim
had said in a hospital interview that the shooting was an accident. While
Brown remembered a telephone conversation with Watkins, he said that
he did not recall telling him about the alleged hospital statement by the
decedent.3 At the conclusion of its case-in-chief, the defense proffered
Watkins' testimony in order to impeach Officer Brown's credibility by a
prior inconsistent statement. The trial judge sustained the state's objection
to the proffer and ruled that the proffered testimony was double hearsay
and inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because the alleged state-
ment by the victim to Brown did not qualify under the dying declaration
exception to the hearsay rule.4 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the
conviction, reiterating the settled rule barring impeachment by extrinsic
* 273 Md. 152, 328 A.2d 274 (1974).
** 276 Md. 122, 345 A.2d 830 (1975).
*** 275 Md. 563, 342 A.2d 660 (1975).
1. 273 Md. 152, 328 A.2d 274 (1974).
2. The policeman testified that at the time of the incident the defendant freely
admitted that the shooting had been intentional. Id. at 154, 328 A.2d at 276.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 160-61, 328 A.2d at 279. At the time the alleged statement was made,
the decedent, despite his critical condition, clearly expected to live and was not con-
scious that death was near or certain. Id. at 156-57, 328 A.2d at 277. His statement
therefore was not a dying declaration. See Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 551, 171 A.2d
699, 703-04 (1961) ; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 282 (2d ed. 1972) ; 5 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1430-52 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
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evidence on a collateral matter.5 Following the leading case of Attorney
General v. Hitchcock,6 the court ruled that impeachment was permissible
only when the evidence contained in the prior inconsistent statement would
have been admissible for a purpose other than impeachment. The court
concluded that the proffered testimony in Smith, inadmissible as direct
evidence because of the hearsay rule, concerned a collateral matter and thus
had properly been excluded.7
The Court of Appeals reversed. In an opinion by Judge Levine, the
court endorsed the general rule against collateral impeachment as stated
by the Court of Special Appeals.8 The court, however, rejected Hitchcock
and held that the correct test for determining when a statement concerned
a collateral matter was
whether the fact as to which the error is predicated is relevant inde-
pendently of the contradiction; and not whether the evidence would
be independently admissible in terms of satisfying all the rules of
evidence.9
The court concluded that the victim's alleged statement was highly relevant
independent of the contradiction'0 and therefore admissible under the
formulated test, and ruled that the trial judge had erred in excluding the
proffered testimony."' In a dissenting opinion joined in by Judge O'Donnell,
Judge Smith disagreed with the majority, feeling that any statement that
could not be admitted as direct, substantive evidence was, by definition,
collateral and therefore unavailable for purposes of impeachment.12 The
dissent therefore would have upheld the trial judge's refusal to accept the
proffer.' 8
5. Smith v. State, 20 Md. App. 254, 257-58, 315 A.2d 76, 78 (1974). See, e.g.,
Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 776
(1943) ; Harris v. State, 237 Md. 299, 302, 206 A.2d 254, 256 (1965) ; Howard v. State,
234 Md. 410, 199 A.2d 611 (1964) ; Kantor v. Ash, 215 Md. 285, 137 A.2d 661 (1958) ;
Sanders v. State, 1 Md. App. 630, 640, 232 A.2d 555, 561 (1967); McCoRmIcx, supra
note 4, §§ 36, 47; 3A J. WIGMoRE, EVMENCE § .1023 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Note,
Impeachment of Witnesses on Collateral Matters, 45 Ky. L.J. 332 (1956-1957).
6. 154 Eng. Rep. 38 (Ex. 1847). See also Ewing v. United States, 135 F2d
633 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 776 (1943) ; McCoRMICK, supra note 4,
§ 36; 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1020.
7. 20 Md. App. at 260, 315 A.2d at 79-80.
8. 273 Md. at 161, 328 A.2d at 280.
9. Id. at 162, 328 A.2d at 280 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 163, 328 A.2d at 280; see Note, Impeachment of Witnesses on Collateral
Matters, 45 Ky. L.J. 332, 338 (1956-1957), which states the Smith holding in a
slightly different fashion: "If the matter to be contradicted is such that a timely
objection to its relevancy should have been sustained, it is collateral, and contradiction
may not be allowed."
11. 273 Md. at 163, 328 A.2d at 280.




Prior to Smith no Maryland appellate court had defined the term
"collateral" specifically in the context of impeachment ;14 however, only
when the subject matter of the excluded testimony was not relevant to any
issue in the case had the Court of Appeals refused to permit impeachment
by a prior inconsistent statement.15 And, as the Smith court noted with
respect to jurisdictions applying the Hitchcock test,16 each time proffered
evidence was excluded it was because the facts were not independently
relevant.
The majority would apply Hitchcock only where the evidence con-
tained in the out-of-court statement was not independently relevant.' 7
Exclusion of such evidence furthers the primary policy reasons behind
exclusion' 8 by preventing the loss of time, unfair surprise to the witness,
and confusion of issues that usually accompany the introduction of irrele-
vant evidence.' 9 Yet the court reasoned that a mechanistic application of
Hitchcock20 was inappropriate where, as in Smith, the inadmissibility of
the prior statement rested on a ground other than irrelevancy. In such a
circumstance, "different considerations govern"21 the admissibility of the
proffered testimony because the underlying objectives of the rule against
collateral impeachment already are satisfied. Taking into account the
fundamental purposes of the rule against impeachment on a collateral
matter,2 2 the Smith court weighed the strong probative force that evidence
14. Id. at 159-60, 328 A.2d at 279. For an early review of the Maryland authori-
ties, see Kauffman, Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Maryland, 7
MD. L. REv. 118, 133 n.68 (1943).
15. See 273 Md. at 158-59, 328 A.2d at 278, citing Howard v. State, 234 Md.
410, 199 A.2d 611 (1964) ; Quimby v. Greenhawk, 166 Md. 335, 345, 171 A. 59, 63(1934). For other examples of decisions excluding a prior inconsistent statement
on grounds of irrelevancy, see Baltimore Transit Co. v. State ex rel. Castranda, 194
Md. 421, 71 A.2d 442 (1950); Consolidated Beef & Provision Co. v. Witt & Co., 184
Md. 105, 112, 40 A.2d 295, 298 (1944) ; Baltimore City Pass. Ry. v. Tanner, 90 Md.
315, 320, 45 A. 188, 189 (1900). The Smith court viewed these decisions as fore-
shadowing the relevancy test it established in Smith. 273 Md. at 162, 328 A.2d at
280. See Kauffman, supra note 14, at 133 rL68.
16. The court indicated that Hitchcock is the majority rule in the United States.
273 Md. at 160, 328 A2d at 279. But while the decision is accepted as controlling in
most of the jurisdictions which follow a specific rule as to impeachment on a collateral
matter, perhaps a majority of states do not apply any particular test, but rather define
what is collateral on a case-by-case basis. See Note, Impeachment of Witnesses, supra
note 10, at 333; cf. Slough, Impeachment of Witnesses: Common Law Principles and
Modern Trends, 34 IND. L.J. 1, 17 & n.73.
17. 273 Md. at 162, 328 A.2d at 280.
18. See, e.g., MCCoRMICK, supra note 4, § 47; 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5,§§ 1001, 1002, 1019; Hale, Impeachment of Witnesses by Prior Inconsistent State-
ments, 10 S. CA. L. Rxv. 135, 163-64 (1937).
19. See 273 Md. at 162, 328 A.2d at 280.
20. Such an application would clearly exclude the testimony proffered in Smith.
See Smith v. State, 20 Md. App. 254, 260, 315 A.2d 76, 79-80 (1974).
21. 273 Md. at 161, 328 A.2d at 280.
22. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
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of the prior inconsistent statement was likely to have in discrediting Brown
against the possibility that admitting such evidence would result in a con-
fusion of issues or unfair surprise to the witness, and concluded that the
proffered testimony should not have been excluded. 23  The majority also
observed that Brown's prior statement was not technically hearsay because
it was not offered to prove the truth of its contents, "but only to impeach
[Brown's] testimony by showing that he made such a statement which
he now denies." 24 Extending this logic, the court found that the victim's
alleged statement to Brown also was not strictly hearsay because it like-
wise was offered solely for the fact that it was made and not to show its
truth.25
In holding that the facts contained in a prior inconsistent statement
need only be independently relevant, the majority appears to be over-
simplifying the rule against collateral impeachment and ignoring several
possible ramifications of abandoning Hitchcock and its requirement of
independent admissibility. The court reasoned that impeachment evidence
is considered by the jury solely for purposes of assessing witness credi-
bility; therefore, whether the evidence contained in the prior statement2"
is otherwise admissible is inconsequential because only the fact that the
statement was made is at issue. 27 This rationale rests largely on an assump-
tion that an instruction to the jury on the limited purpose of impeachment
evidence offers adequate protection against the danger of the evidence
being considered by the jury for its truth.28 Most courts and commentators
agree, however, that limiting instructions of this kind are rarely effective -
a jury often will give substantive evidentiary value to an impeaching state-
ment theoretically aimed only at credibility.29 Knowing that a jury fre-
23. 273 Md. at 162, 328 A.2d at 280.
24. Id. at 161, 328 A.2d at 279. See McCoRMICK, supra note 4, § 251; Kaufman,
supra note 14, at 133 n.68; 43 Miss. L.J. 122, 124 (1972). Cf. Smith v. Branscome,
251 Md. 582, 590, 248 A.2d 455, 461 (1968); Sun Cab Co. v. Cusick, 209 Md. 354,
361-62, 121 A.2d 188, 191 (1956).
25. 273 Md. at 161, 328 A.2d at 279.
26. In this instance the alleged statement by Brown to Watkins was the prior
statement.
27. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
28. The Smith court did not mention the necessity of a jury instruction on the
limited use of impeachment evidence, but such instructions are generally given. See 4
MD. L. REV. 193, 200 (1940), citing Mason v. Poulson, 43 Md. 161 (1875). Failure to
give such an instruction may constitute reversible error. See McCoRMIcK, supra
note 4, § 251 n.62; Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Wit-
nesses, 52 CORNELL LQ. 239, 249 (1967). Admonishing the jury to consider the
testimony solely for purposes of impeachment is the only method available to prevent
the jury from giving the evidence substantive weight. See Bartley v. United States,
319 F.2d 717, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1963); MCCORMICK, The Turncoat Witness: Previous
Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEXAS L. REv. 573, 580 (1947).
29. See, e.g., United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 979 (1964); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 556 (1932) ; Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
268 U.S. 706 (1925); Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of
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quently disregards a limiting instruction, an attorney can attempt to
introduce an extrajudicial statement, ostensibly as impeachment evidence,
in the hope that the statement will be considered by the jury for its truth. 0
Given these considerations, it is arguable that a prior inconsistent state-
ment should be received for impeachment only when the facts contained
in the statement satisfy the test of independent admissibility. Admitting
prior statements which themselves contain hearsay that a party could not
successfully offer in another context may, as the dissent argued, encourage
a party to circumvent the rules of evidence. 81 If a limiting instruction
is ineffective and the impeaching evidence is considered on the merits, the
extrajudicial statement poses an added danger because of its unreliability
as hearsay.82
There are, nevertheless, countervailing considerations. An attack on
the credibility of a witness by proof that he has made a statement on
another occasion inconsistent with his present testimony is probably the
most effective and frequently employed means of impeachment.3 3 In a
typical case,34 an impeaching statement will be admitted despite the danger
that it will be considered by the jury for its truth. This danger is tolerated
Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 239, 249 (1967); McCormick, The Turncoat Witness:
Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEXAS L. REv. 573, 580 (1947);
Note. Prior Statement of One's Own Witness to Counteract Surprise Testimony:
Hearsay and Impeachment Under the "Damage" Test, 62 YALE L.J. 650, 652-53
(1953) ; cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129-36 (1968). See also Broeder,
The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744 (1959) ; Note, The
Limiting Instruction - Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REv. 264 (1966).
Dean McCormick wrote:
Such an instruction . . . is a mere verbal ritual. The distinction [between con-
sidering the impeaching evidence as relating solely to credibility and as going to
the substantive issues in the case] is not one that most jurors would understand.
If they could understand it, it seems doubtful that they would attempt to follow
it. . . [T]rial judges seem to consider the instructions a futile gesture.
McCormick, supra, at 580.
30. Note, Prior Statements of One's Own Witness to Counteract Surprise Testi-
inony: Hearsay and Impeachment Under the "Damage" Test, 62 YALE L.J. 650, 653
(1953).
31. Judge Smith warned that:
[t]he precedent . . .opens the door for ingenious counsel by a clever question on
cross-examination of a state's witness to suggest the whole defense and then ...
bolster that defense in the minds of the jury by evidence of no probative value.
The majority's ruling ... seriously undermines the rules of evidence.
273 Md. at 166, 328 A.2d at 282.
32. Cf. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 246, at 586.
33. Id. at § 33.
34. While Smith involves two levels of hearsay - the victim's alleged remark
to Brown, and the statement by Brown to Watkins - most impeachment by prior
inconsistent statement involves a single out-of-court statement made by the witness-




because, in most instances,"5 it is thought to be outweighed by the value of
the evidence for impeachment. Hence, courts endorse the use of limiting
instructions even though they are perhaps incapable of preventing a jury
from giving substantive weight to impeaching evidence; they provide a
method of bypassing the exclusionary rules of evidence where to do so,
on balance, advances the search for truth.86 While Watkins' proffered
testimony would clearly have been inadmissible as double hearsay if offered
for a purpose other than impeachment, the Smith court found that the
strong probative force of the proffered testimony in discrediting Brown
outweighed the danger that the jury might give it substantive evidentiary
value. There was certainly a possibility that the jury would consider
Brown's statement to Watkins for its truth, 7 but that danger is common
to all out-of-court statements regardless of form.
The result in Smith is to relax the rule against collateral impeachment
by admitting for impeachment a prior inconsistent statement containing
relevant but otherwise inadmissible evidence; however, it is unclear to what
extent Smith departs from the Hitchcock standard, as the court failed to
mark adequately the new boundary between collateral and noncollateral
facts. There are two possible interpretations of the Smith holding. Specific
language in the opinion indicates that the majority may have intended to
establish a simple relevancy test.88 Impeachment under such a standard
would be permitted whenever the fact contained in the statement has any
evidentiary value independent of the contradiction. While relevancy should
certainly be a prime consideration, 9 a test based solely on a requirement
that the statement be independently probative would be excessively broad.
As the relationship of the impeaching evidence to the central issues of a
case becomes attenuated, the force of the prior statement in discrediting the
witness weakens, but the administrative trial burdens - confusion of
issues, undue time consumption, unfair surprise - become increasingly
onerous. After a point, the admission of the prior statement might be
35. For a circumstance in which the danger of misuse may be too great, see text
accompanying note 52 infra.
36. See 'Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285
U.S. 556 (1932).
37. The dissent suggested that the defense hoped the jury would take the victim's
statement for its truth. See 273 Md. at 164, 328 A.2d at 281. It would certainly be
difficult for the jury to discount completely the decedent's alleged remark once it
had been brought to its attention.
38. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
39. In the vast majority of cases, consideration of a statement's independent
relevancy will be dispositive. See notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text supra. Courts
and commentators clearly view the relevancy requirement as the primary factor in
defining the term collateral in its impeachment context. See, e.g., Hampton v. United
States, 318 A.2d 598, 601 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Mangrum, 98 Ariz. 279,
285-86, 403 P.2d 925, 929-30 (1965); State v. Kouzounas, 137 Me. 198, 17 A.2d 147
(1941); MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 36; Kaufman, supra note 14, at 133; Ladd,
supra note 28, at 253; Slough, supra note 16, at 17; Note, supra note 10, at 338-39.
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counterproductive, defeating the policies the rule against collateral im-
peachment was designed to serve.4 0 The Smith court adds to the con-
fusion when it indicates that "different considerations govern" the use of
extrinsic evidence that is independently relevant but not independently
admissible, yet then proceeds to test the proffered evidence against the
same policy considerations it previously said were satisfied by independently
relevant evidence.41
Closer examination, however, reveals that a second view of the court's
holding is possible, one which utilizes a balancing process. Before conclud-
ing that the proffered testimony was admissible to impeach, the majority
weighed the probative force of the prior inconsistent statement in dis-
crediting Brown against the possibility that admission would cause con-
fusion of the issues, undue consumption of time, or unfair surprise to the
witness. Thus, it is conceivable that the court will allow impeachment only
when, in addition to meeting an independent relevancy requirement, the
probative value of the statement for impeachment is determined, in the
discretion of the trial judge, to outweigh the administrative burdens that
would result from admitting the statement. 42 Applying this two-step test
to the Smith facts, the court's conclusion to permit impeachment seems
proper. Officer Brown's prior inconsistent statement was independently
relevant and of considerable value in impeaching his testimony,4 3 while
the administrative trial burdens to be weighed against the strong probative
value for impeachment were minimal. The prior statement focused on the
primary issue of the case - whether the shooting was accidental - and
thus would not lead to confusion of the issues. Moreover, the risk of
unfairly surprising Brown was small, because he undoubtedly was aware
that defense counsel might question him about the victim's alleged hospital
statement. Finally, little time would be consumed by taking Watkins'
testimony.44
Regardless of which test was actually intended, the Court of Appeals
failed in Smith to mention one factor that may be significant in other situa-
tions. It is noteworthy that the proffered evidence was offered by a de-
fendant who sought to impeach a prosecution witness by a prior inconsistent
statement that contained exculpatory evidence decidedly favorable to her
defense. The significance of this factor is underscored by two recent cases
from other jurisdictions in which impeachment was disallowed because the
40. See text accompanying notes 18 & 19 supra.
41. See notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra.
42. The Hitchcock standard is inflexible in its requirement of complete inde-
pendent admissibility. The proposed Smith test, however, is consistent with Dean
McCormick's view that the "elaborate system of rules regulating the practice and
scope of impeachment should be applied with less strictness and . . . simplified by
confining the control less to rules and more to judicial discretion." MCCORMICK, supra
note 4, § 34, at 67.




prior statement was introduced by the prosecution and was prejudicial to
the defendant. In Commonwealth v. Crews45 the defendant's girl friend
told police that she had heard the defendant admit his guilt. She later
claimed she had been coerced into making the statement and indicated that
she would not testify against the defendant at trial. Called as a court
witness, 46 she denied having heard the defendant make any self-incriminat-
ing remarks; the prosecution then introduced for impeachment a prior
statement she had made to a third party inconsistent with her trial testimony.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that because evidence
of the witness' prior inconsistent statement was hearsay and therefore
inadmissible on the merits,47 it was error to allow the prosecution to "bring
to the knowledge of the jury through the back door that which it was pre-
cluded from bringing in through the front door; namely, the damaging
contents of her prior inconsistent statements. ' 48 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts took a similar view in Commonwealth v. Ferrara.49
In reversing a manslaughter conviction, the court held that the prosecution
could not impeach its own witness by proof of a prior inconsistent statement
that would have been inadmissible if offered on the merits because it con-
tained evidence of the witness' opinion as to the defendant's guilt.50 The
court also ruled that a limiting instruction did not offer the defendant suffi-
cient protection against the highly prejudicial effect of such a statement.5 1
It is clear from these two cases that a prior inconsistent statement
may be independently relevant under Smith, yet be so prejudicial to a
criminal defendant that it should nevertheless be excluded when offered
for purposes of impeachment. When the statement contains damaging evi-
dence that would not otherwise be admissible, the danger that the jury
will consider the statement for its truth weighs more heavily in the balance
than the admitted usefulness of the statement for impeachment :52 "the
risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow [limiting] instructions is so
great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. ' 53
45. 429 Pa. 16, 239 A.2d 350 (1968).
46. For a discussion of the court witness rule, see this issue at 399-404.
47. 429 Pa. at 23, 239 A.2d at 354.
48. Id., quoting from Commonwealth v. Di Pasquale, 424 Pa. 500, 504, 230 A.2d
449, 450 (1967). See Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 248-53, 133 A.2d 187,
195 (1957).
49. 330 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. 1975).
50. The court stated that there was no evidence that the witness witnessed the
shooting; therefore, if the "content of [her] allegedly inconsistent statement . . .
had been offered substantively at the trial . . . it would have been an expression
of an inadmissible inference on her part. . . ." Id. at 845.
51. Id. at 845; cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
52. This is the reverse of the normal situation where the danger is tolerated be-
cause of the greater value of the evidence for impeachment. See text at notes 34-36
supra.
53. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).
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Prosecution use of extrajudicial statements for impeachment may also
infringe upon a defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses
against him5 4 so as to require exclusion. 55 Although there were no con-
stitutional impediments to the admission of the prior inconsistent state-
ments in Crews or Ferrara,56 a statement containing more than a single
level of hearsay may raise confrontation problems. The confrontation
clause appears to require that the first declarant57 be available to testify
as to whether he made the statement attributed to him.58 If the declarant
is totally unavailable for cross-examination by the defendant and if his
statement does not come within any hearsay exception, the introduction of
an incriminating prior inconsistent statement, while theoretically limited
to impeachment use and therefore not technically hearsay, could result in
a denial of the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him
should the jury consider the statement for the truth of its contents.59 The
majority opinion in Smith, however, does not explicitly indicate that the
court would exclude a prior inconsistent statement were the facts reversed:
that is, were the prosecution to attempt to impeach a witness by a prior
inconsistent statement that would be inadmissible double hearsay if offered
on the merits.
The result in Smith seems proper even though the court may not
have fully taken into account considerations beyond the independent rele-
vance of the proffered testimony. If the majority opinion is viewed as
simply requiring that the proffered testimony have independent probative
54. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI provides in pertinent part that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the -right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." The confrontation clause was made applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). For a good
review of Supreme Court decisions since Pointer, see Comment, The Hearsay Rule
and the Right to Confrontation: State's Leeway in Formulating Evidentiary Rules,
40 FORDHAm L. REv. 595 (1972).
55. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) ; Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415 (1965); Comment, Hearsay, The Confrontation Guarantee and Related
Problems, 30 LA. L. Rtv. 651, 660 (1970) ; Comment, Federal Confrontation: A Not
Very Clear Say on Hearsay, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 366, 377-78 n.55 (1966).
56. In both cases the prior inconsistent statement consisted of only one level
of hearsay - the alleged statement by the defendant to his girl friend in Crews
qualifying as an admission - and the declarant was, by hypothesis, present and
available for cross-examination by the defendant.
57. The second declarant will always be present and available for cross-examina-
tion since he is the witness who is being impeached.
58. See Comment, supra note 55, at 614-15.
59. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) ; Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415 (1965). In most, if not all, instances, the out-of-court statement can be
excluded on the ground that it is so highly prejudicial to the defendant that the
danger that the jury will take the statement for its truth outweighs the value of the
statement for impeachment. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra. Nevertheless,
there may be situations where although the impeaching statement is not so prejudicial
as to require its exclusion on such a ground, it still should be excluded because
it would deny the defendant his right to confrontation.
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value, the test is difficult to justify.60 It is more likely that the court has,
in addition, adopted a second requirement: that the trial judge balance the
probative force of the impeaching evidence against the likelihood of issue
confusion, time wastage, and unfair surprise and, in the exercise of his
discretion admit only prior inconsistent statements whose evidentiary value
outweighs these administrative trial burdens. In a situation such as pre-
sented in Smith, where it is the defendant who seeks to introduce impeach-
ing evidence, a prior inconsistent statement satisfying these two require-
ments should be admissible. But such a test may be troublesome in other
impeachment situations, especially those that would require consideration
of a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses
against him.
60. See text following note 39 supra.
Harrison v. State'
The defendant was indicted after he allegedly robbed and shot a man
to death. Following arraignment, he was placed in a holding cell in the
Baltimore City Jail with several other prisoners, including William Strait,
a purported eyewitness to the murder who positively identified Harrison
at trial as the killer. 2 To impeach Strait's testimony Harrison testified
that during their brief confinement together Strait admitted that his
accusations against Harrison were false and that he knew the identity of
the actual assailant. When the trial judge asked Harrison to explain the
absence of further conversations, the defendant stated that he had been
unable to talk to Strait after they were removed from the holding cell
because each was placed in a different section of the jail. He added that
he had "told [his] lawyer all about it."8 On cross-examination Harrison
was asked, without objection, whether he had ever informed his first
attorney4 of the conversation with Strait, and he answered that he had.5
When called in rebuttal, Strait refuted Harrison's story and stated that
when he had been deposed the defendant's attorney had not questioned
him about the alleged conversation.0 The defendant's former counsel
then testified, 7 over strenuous objection that defendant's attorney-client
privilege was being violated, that Harrison had not informed him of the
conversation with Strait.8 The defendant was subsequently convicted
of first degree murder 9 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court
of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction.' 0 It found that Harrison had
waived by implication the protection of the attorney-client privilege by
1. 276 Md. 122, 345 A.2d 830 (1975).
2. Strait was being held as a state's witness in default of bail pursuant to MD.
R.P. 732. 276 Md. at 125 n.3, 345 A.2d at 833 n.3.
3. 276 Md. at 129, 345 A.2d at 835.
4. Harrison was represented at trial by a court-appointed public defender after
his first counsel struck his appearance. Id. at 128 & n.10, 345 A.2d at 834 & n.10.
5. Id. at 129-30, 345 A.2d at 835.
6. Strait admitted that he had been in a holding cell with Harrison, but denied
that he had talked to him alone or made any statement to him. Id. at 128, 345 A.2d
at 834.
7. The prosecution was allowed to reopen its case in order to call the attorney. Id.
8. The trial judge held that although communications with counsel were privi-
leged, the absence of communication was not. Finding support for this distinction in
Morris v. State, 4 Md. App. 252, 242 A.2d 559 (1968), he ruled that testimony by
Harrison's attorney was admissible because it did not deal with " 'the disclosure of a
communication as such [but was] ...merely testimony that no such communication
was ever made between the client and the attorney.'" 276 Md. at 130, 345 A.2d at 835.
The Court of Appeals rejected the reasoning of the trial judge, and concluded that the
holding in Morris did not support a "distinction concerning what is within or with-
out a 'conversation.'" Id. at 152, 345 A.2d at 847.
9. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (1976).
10. Harrison v. State, No. 904 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., Sept. 3, 1974) (per curiam).
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testifying about the conversation on direct examination and then ad-
mitting on cross-examination that he had informed his former counsel
of its existence."
The Court of Appeals reversed.12 In an opinion by Judge O'Donnell,
the majority held that Harrison did not waive by implication his privilege
against disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications1 simply
by admitting in response to a question on cross-examination that he had
told his former lawyer about the conversation with Strait.' 4 The court
determined that it therefore was prejudicial error for the trial court to
allow Harrison's previous attorney to testify about confidential com-
munications. The majority stated that waiver could not be implied simply
from the fact that the defendant took the stand and waived his privilege
against self-incrimination.15 It noted that it would be unfair to permit
the prosecution to force the defendant to admit the existence of a priv-
ileged communication that related to the subject matter of his direct
testimony, and then to allow the prosecution to call the attorney to con-
tradict the defendant; by disclosing privileged matters in this manner
the defendant could not be said to have "distinct[ly] and unequivocal [ly]"
11. Id. Alternatively, the Court of Special Appeals stated that the alleged con-
versation at the jail between the defendant and Strait, even if in fact communicated
by the defendant to his attorney, was communicated not in confidence but rather for
the express purpose of making it public at trial. Id. The state, however, abandoned
this argument before the Court of Appeals. 276 Md. at 136, 345 A.2d at 838-39.
12. 276 Md. at 158, 345 A.2d at 850. Judge Smith filed a dissenting opinion in
which Chief Judge Murphy concurred in part. Id. The majority also found reversible
error in the admission of evidence of Harrison's alleged possession of marijuana at
the time of his arrest twenty days after the homicide. The court stated that because
the prosecution failed to show that this evidence was in any way related to the crime
charged, its admission was prejudicial to the defendant and denied him a fair trial.
Id. at 153-58, 345 A.2d at 847-50.
13. MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 9-108 (1974) states that "[a] person
may not be compelled to testify in violation of the attorney-client privilege." The
section is a codification of well-settled common law doctrine. See, e.g., Huester v.
Clements, 252 Md. 641, 250 A.2d 855 (1969) ; Shawmut Mining Co. v. Padgett, 132
Md. 397, 104 A. 40 (1918) ; Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602, 71 A. 1058 (1909) ; Fulton v.
Maccracken, 18 Md. 528 (1862) ; Morris v. State, 4 Md. App. 252, 242 A.2d 559 (1968).
14. 276 Md. at 152, 345 A.2d at 847.
15. Id. at 143-44, 345 A.2d at 842-43, citing People v. Moore, 42 App. Div. 2d
268, 346 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1973). This view is taken by a majority of courts. See C.
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 93 (2d ed. 1972); 3 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 561 (13th ed. 1973). In People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 459-60, 126
N.E.2d 559, 562 (1955) (citations omitted), the New York Court of Appeals stated that
[iun logic and reason a distinction should be made between the waiver deemed to
have been made when the defendant witness is interrogated on the issue of his
guilt and the rules of evidence relating to privileged communications between him-
self and his attorney, the disclosure of which would serve to assure the prosecu-
tor a verdict of guilt.
See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2327, at 637 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 16 MINN. L.
REV. 818, 823-24 (1932).
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intended to waive the privilege.1 6 Finally, the court felt that to imply
a waiver in such a circumstance would undercut the essential policy of the
attorney-client privilege - encouraging clients freely to consult with and
confide in their attorneys17 - because a client would be less likely to be
candid if he thought his attorney might be compelled to disclose theretofore
privileged information once the client took the stand.18
The Court of Appeals noted that a witness who voluntarily testifies
at trial about specific communications with his lawyer is generally held
to have waived by implication the privilege of confidentiality. 9 The ma-
jority conceded that in applying this rule the commentators generally make
no distinction between testimony given on direct and on cross-examination. 20
But the court also observed that in most cases waiver has occurred as a
result of voluntary disclosure of privileged communications on direct
examination. The majority found that Harrison did not waive his right
to invoke an attorney-client privilege by virtue of his response - "I told
my lawyer all about it"21 - to the trial court's question concerning his
inability to converse further with Strait. Harrison's answer, the court
reasoned, was ambiguous, 22 and it was "a general statement which did not
disclose, or purport to disclose what words were used - or what the
conversation was - nothing which was confidential was thereby re-
vealed. '23 While waiver has on occasion been implied on cross-examina-
tion,24 the majority indicated that Harrison's simple, affirmative answer
16. 276 Md. at 145, 152, 345 A.2d at 843, 847, quoting from Tate v. Tate's Execu-
tor, 75 Va. 522, 533 (1881) ; cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. See McCoRMICK, supra note 15, § 87; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 2291.
18. 276 Md. at 145, 345 A.2d at 843, quoting from Tate v. Tate's Executor, 75
Va. 522, 533 (1881).
19. The privilege is waived as to all communications with the attorney on the
same subject. 276 Md. at 136-37, 345 A.2d at 839, citing. McCoRMICK, supra note 15,
§ 93; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 2327; 3 WHARTON'S, supra note 15, § 561; Annot.,
51 A.L.R.2d 521, 529-37 (1957).
20. 276 Md. at 137, 345 A.2d at 839; see McCoRMIcK, supra note 15, § 93, at
194 n.15, 195. Dean McCormick thought that absent a showing that a client was sur-
prised or misled, the usual rule of waiver, see note 31 and accompanying text infra,
should be enforced on cross-examination, and he viewed as unsupportable the decisions
distinguishing between direct and cross-examination. Id. at 195.
21. 276 Md. at 129, 345 A.2d at 835 (emphasis removed).
22. The court argued that although the statement could be construed to mean
that Harrison had informed his lawyer of both the alleged Strait conversation and his
inability to talk further with him at the jail, the answer could as easily be interpreted
as indicating only that he told his lawyer that he had been unable to talk to Strait
because they had been placed in different cell blocks. Id. at 150-51, 345 A.2d at 846.
23. Id. at 151, 345 A.2d at 846, citing People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 444,
277 P.2d 94, 99 (1954).
24. 276 Md. at 138-39, 345 A.2d at 840, citing Steen v. First Nat'l Bank, 298 F.
36, 41-42 (8th Cir. 1924) (at preliminary hearing client testified on cross-examination
to numerous statements made to and conversations with his attorney); Pinson v.
Campbell, 124 Mo. App. 260, 101 S.W. 621 (1907) (witness disclosed on cross-
examination all discussions with an attorney with respect to instituting criminal
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to the question posed lacked the substantive detail of the declosures in
those cases.25 Thus, the court apparently found Harrison to be factually
distinguishable.
The Harrison court contended, moreover, that the "better-reasoned
cases" supported the view that a defendant does not waive by implication
his attorney-client privilege by testifying about privileged conversations
on cross-examination, regardless of the detail of the testimony.2 6 The
majority placed special reliance on People v. Kor,27 a California case hold-
ing that when a defendant divulged privileged communications in direct
response to questions on cross-examination, such disclosures were in-
voluntary and could not form the basis of a claim that he intended to
waive the protection of the attorney-client privilege.28 Because Harrison
admitted telling his first lawyer about the alleged conversation with Strait
only during questioning by the prosecution on cross-examination, the
majority reasoned that the disclosure was involuntary and that a waiver
by implication had not occurred. The Court of Appeals considered it
significant that the court in Kor had refused to accept as a ground for
implying a waiver the argument that the attorney-client privilege should
cease whenever it is thought the client is using the privilege to conceal
the truth.2 9 The Harrison court implicitly recognized that the defendant's
story about his conversation with Strait could have been viewed as a pure
fabrication. But it agreed with the Kor court that to find a waiver in such
a circumstance would leave the privilege devoid of practical meaning be-
cause the truth of any client's testimony can be, and usually is, brought into
question.80
prosecution); Raleigh & C.R.R. v. Jones, 104 S.C. 332, 88 S.E. 896 (1916) (client
testified extensively about communications with his lawyer). The detailed disclosures
in these cases were apparently given voluntarily, despite being made on cross-examina-
tion. See Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 521, 526-29 (1957).
25. 276 Md. at 152, 345 A.2d at 847.
26. Id. at 140, 345 A.2d at 840-41, citing People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436,
277 P.2d 94 (1954) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Parker, 65 Fla. 543, 62 So. 589 (1913) ;
Kaufman v. Rosenshine, 97 App. Div. 514, 90 N.Y.S. 205 (1904), aff'd, 183 N.Y. 562,
76 N.E. 1098 (1906) ; State v. James, 34 S.C. 49, 12 S.E. 657 (1891) ; Tate v. Tate's
Executor, 75 Va. 522, 533 (1881). Contra, Gen'l Accident, Fire & Life Ins. Corp. v.
Savage, 35 F.2d 587, 592 (8th Cir. 1929); Steen v. First Nat'l Bank, 298 F. 36, 43
(8th Cir. 1924); Pinson v. Campbell, 124 Mo. App. 260, 101 S.W. 621 (1907).
27. 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 277 P.2d 94 (1954).
28. Id. at 445, 277 P.2d at 100. The defendant in Kor testified on direct examina-
tion that he told his lawyer "what had happened and how it happened." On cross-
examination he was asked several questions about specific communications with his
counsel, to which he responded without objection. Several commentators have criticized
the Kor holding. See McCoRmICK, supra note 15, § 93, at 194 n.15; Note, Attorney-
Client Privilege in California, 10 STAN. L. REv. 297, 315 (1959) ; 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
573 (1955). But see Gardner, Principles of Waiver, Attorney-Client Privilege, 35
CALIF. ST. B.J. 262, 265 n.6 (1960).
29. 276 Md. at 142, 345 A.2d at 841-42.
30. Id.; see notes 46-47 and accompanying text infra.
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While a witness generally waives the attorney-client privilege by
implication if he does not immediately claim the privilege when testimony
touching upon confidential communications is offered, 31 the Harrison court
was unwilling to conclude that a waiver occurred when the defendant
did not refuse to answer the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination
and his counsel failed to interpose an objection.3 2 The court noted that
because a prejudicial inference could arise from a claim of privilege, such
a claim might be as damaging to the defendant as would be a waiver.8 3
Indeed, in several instances courts have found prejudicial error where a
trial court merely allowed a party to question a witness on cross-examination
about confidential communications made to a lawyer.3 4 The Harrison
court interpreted these cases as buttressing its contention that an objection
itself would have been prejudicial because, if sustained, it would have
conveyed to the jury the impression that the attorney would have contra-
dicted the witness had he been allowed to testify. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the involuntary and non-substantive nature of Harrison's
responses on cross-examination, the possibility that he was surprised or
misled by the questions posed,85 and the extreme importance of protecting
the confidentiality arising from the attorney-client relationship combined
to compel its finding that Harrison did not waive by implication the pro-
tection of the attorney-client privilege.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Smith stated that it was "abundantly
plain" that a waiver of the privilege had occurred by implication when
Harrison failed to invoke its protection and admitted telling his former
lawyer about the alleged conversation with Strait. 6 Judge Smith rejected
the distinction drawn by the majority between direct and cross-examination,
and argued that the waiver was no less effective or voluntary because it took
place on cross-examination. Relying on dictum in Shawmut Mining Co. v.
Padgett,37 the dissent contended that it was unfair to allow Harrison first
to disclose the existence of the confidential communications and then to
withhold the substance of those communications, and that by permitting
31. See MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 93; 16 MINN. L. REv. 818, 825 (1932).
32. 276 Md. at 148, 345 A.2d at 845; see Burgess v. Sims Drug Co., 114 Iowa 275,
280-81, 86 N.W. 307, 309 (1901). But see note 20 supra.
33. 276 Md. at 150, 345 A.2d at 846; see Gardner, supra note 28, at 268. See also
MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 76.
34. See Rienzo v. Santangelo, 160 Conn. 391, 396, 279 A.2d 565, 567 (1971);
McConnell v. City of Osage, 80 Iowa 293, 45 N.W. 550 (1890).
35. See note 20 supra.
36. 276 Md. at 159, 345 A.2d at 850; accord, Steen v. First Nat'l Bank, 298 F. 36,
43 (8th Cir. 1924); Pinson v. Campbell, 124 Mo. App. 260, 101 S.W. 621 (1907);
Raleigh & C.R.R. v. Jones, 104 S.C. 332, 88 S.E. 896, 898 (1916) ; see note 20 supra.
37. 132 Md. 397, 104 A. 40 (1918). The Shawinut court observed that "while the
privilege is for the protection of the client, he may waive the privilege, and this may be
done by implication, for instance, he can not be allowed, after disclosing as much as he
pleases to withhold the remainder." Id. at 404, 104 A. at 43 (emphasis added).
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him to do so the majority had turned the attorney-client privilege from a
"shield... into a sword."' 8
This reasoning is unacceptable. It is difficult to ignore, as the dissent
did, the critical difference between direct examination and cross-examination
in the waiver context. When a witness reveals on direct examination the
substance of a privileged discussion with his lawyer and implies that the
attorney will corroborate his testimony, the opposing party should be
permitted to test the witness' truthfulness by calling the attorney to the
stand. One can logically assume that a witness who discloses a significant
part of a privileged communication in his direct testimony does so volun-
tarily; even if he does not intend to waive the protection of the privilege
it would be unfair to allow him to insist on the privilege after he has used
a partial disclosure to his advantage.89 But common sense and policy
considerations dictate a different result when the disclosure comes in re-
sponse to a question on cross-examination. There the witness has little
control over how much of his privileged communications are disclosed, for
the amount revealed will depend largely on the questions posed by the
cross-examiner.4 0 It is difficult to interpret his responses - especially non-
substantive answers 41 - as a purposeful attempt to gain an advantage
from the attorney-client privilege by employing his lawyer as an unseen
corroborating witness. It would therefore be unfair to allow the opposing
party to call an attorney as a witness in order to prevent that attorney's
present or former client from using the privilege as a sword when in fact
the party could prevent the client from gaining such a supposed advantage42
by not raising the point in the first place. 43
38. 276 Md. at 159-60, 345 A.2d at 851; see Note, Attorney-Client Privilege in
California, 10 STAN. L. REv. 297, 315 (1958).
39. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 93.
40. The witness has little choice but to object to the question or give a yes or no
answer. If the cross-examiner's question goes into great detail about a specific com-
munication, and the witness admits making such a communication, the amount of privi-
leged matter disclosed still depends on the question and not on the witness' response.
41. Of course, if the witness volunteers a response that clearly goes beyond what
is necessary to answer the question thus providing a substantive and detailed dis-
closure of privileged communications, he may be held to have waived by implication
the protection of the privilege. His disclosure would then be voluntary, and it would
be unfair to allow him to insist on the privilege after he has made a partial disclosure.
See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra. The majority in Harrison clearly did
not establish a rigid rule barring waiver by implication on cross-examination, but
merely concluded that such a waiver could not be implied when the responses were
simple and nonsubstantive.
42. It appears unlikely that Harrison's story, in the absence of his lawyer's im-
peachment testimony, actually gave him an unfair advantage. The jury could judge
his credibility effectively in light of Strait's rebuttal testimony that he had never made
the statements Harrison attributed to him and had not been asked about any such
remarks when he was deposed. See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
43. A party might be required to take the answer given if it saw fit to inquire
into privileged communications on cross-examination of the witness, by analogy to
the rule against collateral impeachment. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 273 Md. 152, 328
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In addition, a finding of waiver in the Harrison circumstances would
have serious policy implications. If a lawyer could be called as a witness
following cross-examination of his client, the latter might be reluctant 44
to discuss his case frankly with counsel, and might not be willing to risk
taking the stand for fear that his lawyer might then be compelled to testify
against him.4 5 The Harrison dissent apparently believed that the benefits
gained from the full disclosure of pertinent facts outweighed the damage
done to the attorney-client privilege.46  But given the adverse impact a
finding of waiver would have on the privilege in general, and given that
in Harrison the attorney's testimony probably was not necessary to prevent
a miscarriage of justice, 47 the mere fact that exclusion might tend to place
Harrison's story of his alleged conversation with Strait in a false light
before the jury does not seem a sufficiently compelling reason for implying
a waiver.
In Harrison the Court of Appeals has departed from the usual waiver
rule and adopted a position criticized by commentators and rejected by
many courts. But the majority justifiably is reluctant to force a defendant
to make Hobson's choice between responding on cross-examination to a
question infringing upon privileged attorney-client communications, thereby
waiving the privilege, and refusing to respond, thereby suffering an adverse
inference from the claim of privilege. In providing a witness with the
option4 8 of responding without elaboration to the question without being
held to have waived the privilege voluntarily, the court is supported both
A.2d 274 (1974), discussed in this issue at 381-90. There is dicta in the majority
opinion to support this view. See 276 Md. at 148, 345 A.2d at 845, quoting Burgess v.
Sims Drug Co., 114 Iowa 275, 280-81, 86 N.W. 307, 309 (1901) ; see Gardner, supra
note 23, at 268.
44. Dean McCormick has noted that the tendency of a client when giving his
story to counsel to omit all that which he suspects might be unfavorable to him, is a
matter of everyday professional observation. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 87, at 176.
45. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
46. This argument was rejected by the majority. See notes 29-30 and accom-
panying text supra.
47. See note 42 supra. Dean McCormick has suggested that
[t)he present privilege against disclosure of [privileged] communications in
judicial proceedings should be made subject to the exception that the trial judge
may require a particular disclosure if he finds that it is necessary in the adminis-
tration of justice. Notwithstanding such a change, the present reluctance of
lawyers to call an opposing counsel for routine examination on his client's case
would continue as a restraining influence. The duty to the client of secrecy would
still be recognized and protected in the ordinary course, but the lawyer's duty as
an officer of the court to lend his aid in the last resort to prevent a miscarriage
of justice would be given the primacy which a true balancing of the two interests
would seem to demand.
MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 87, at 177.
48. The majority opinion does not preclude the alternative of objecting to a ques-
tion that might infringe upon privileged communications.
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by logic and by policy. In refusing to allow the privilege to be "whittled
away by means of specious argument that it has been waived," 49 the
Harrison court has adopted a preferable alternative to rigid application of
the standard waiver rule, in a context where a more flexible approach
seems necessary.
49. People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 447, 277 P.2d 94, 100 (1954) (con-
curring opinion).
Patterson v. State1
Defendant Patterson was convicted of the second degree murder of
her husband. Her mother, the only eyewitness to the homicide, gave
contradictory accounts of the incident before trial.2 She was called as the
court's witness at the prosecution's request, because the state could not
vouch for her veracity$ and had alleged the possibility of a miscarriage of
justice should she fail to testify.4 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the conviction, rejecting Patterson's argument that the trial court had
abused its discretion.5 On certiorari, the Court of Appeals held that under
the circumstances the trial judge had not abused his discretion by calling
the defendant's mother for direct examination by the court and cross-
examination by both the prosecution and the defense.
The Court of Appeals observed that the discretionary authority of a
trial court in a criminal prosecution to call a witness on its own motion
or at the request of one of the parties is recognized in all jurisdictions
where the question has been raised.6 Even though no prior Maryland
decision had ruled on the point,7 the court regarded the rule as well-settled,8
and therefore focused on the exercise of judicial authority under the
Patterson facts. The procedure clearly was invoked in response to the
voucher rule, which presumes in theory that a party guarantees to the
trier of fact the veracity of the witnesses it calls.9 In application, the
1. 275 Md. 563, 342 A.2d 660 (1975).
2. Id. at 565-67, 342 A.2d at 662-63.
3. For a discussion of the voucher rule see note 9 and accompanying text infra.
4. The state filed a motion for appropriate relief under MD. R.P. 725(a), which
requires that all pre-trial defenses and objections be raised by either a motion to
dismiss or a motion for appropriate relief.
5. Patterson v. State, 22 Md. App. 13, 321 A.2d 544 (1974).
6. 275 Md. at 568, 342 A2d at 664; see Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 538 (1959).
7. Id. at 568, 342 A.2d at 663-64. In Wilson v. State, 20 Md. App. 318, 315 A.2d
788 (1974), the trial court allowed three eyewitnesses to a shooting to testify as court
witnesses on motion by the prosecution after finding that they had been intimidated
and the state could not vouch for their veracity. Although the ruling was not at issue
on appeal, the Court of Special Appeals approved the court witness procedure in
dictum, recognized the authority of a trial judge to call and examine witnesses in his
discretion and of his own accord under "appropriate circumstances." Id. at 321 n.1,
315 A.2d at 790 n.1.
8. The defendant conceded the authority of the court to call its own witnesses.
275 Md. at 570, 342 A.2d at 664-65.
9. Id. at 570, 342 A.2d at 665. See Proctor Elec. Co. v. Zink, 217 Md. 22, 32,
141 A.2d 721, 726 (1958); Murphy v. State, 120 Md. 229, 87 A. 811 (1913); Smith
v. Briscoe, 65 Md. 561, 5 A. 334 (1886). See generally C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 38
(2d ed. 1972); Kauffman, Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Mary-
land, 7 MD. L. REv. 118, 120 (1943); Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness -
New Developments, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 69, 76-79 (1936).
The basis for the voucher rule has been regarded as more historical than
logical. See McCoRMicx, supra, § 38, at 75; Ladd, supra at 77; 4 MD. L. REv. 193,
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rule prevents a party from impeaching its own witness, absent proof
either of surprise, with subsequent damage from the witness' testimony,
or of the witness' hostility.10 The prosecution in Patterson declined to
vouch for the veracity of the defendant's mother because of material
variations between her oral statement to investigating officers on the night
of the incident, her subsequent testimony before the grand jury, and her
statement to defense counsel." Because the state was well aware of the
witness' conflicting accounts of the homicide, it could not have claimed
that surprise necessary to overcome the effect of the voucher rule.' 2 The
Court of Appeals therefore rejected Patterson's contention that the prose-
195 (1940). Its origin has been traced to medieval England where witnesses were
not called to testify to the cointroverted facts, but were regarded as partisan "oath-
helpers" who swore that based upon their general knowledge of the litigant's char-
acter, his contention or claim was valid and just. Ladd, supra, at 69-70. The rule has
been criticized as irrational, archaic, and potentially destructive of the truth-gathering
process in the context of a modern system of adversary trials. See Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295-97 (1972) ; MCCORMICK, supra, § 38, Kauffman, supra,
at 120; Ladd, supra, at 77-78. In Chambers the Supreme Court was particularly
critical of the voucher rule:
Whatever validity the "voucher" rule may have once enjoyed, and apart from
whatever usefulness it retains today in civil trial process, it bears little present
relationship to the realities of the criminal process. It might have been logical
for the early common law to require a party to vouch for the credibility of wit-
nesses he brought before the jury to affirm his veracity. Having selected them
especially for that purpose, the party might reasonably be expected to stand firmly
behind their testimony. But in modern criminal trials, defendants are rarely able
to select their witnesses: they must take them where they find them.
410 U.S. at 296. See Hauser, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 11 OHIO ST. L.J. 364,
368 (1950). Chambers has been viewed as providing added impetus to the "long stand-
ing condemnation of the 'voucher rule.'" Patterson v. State, 22 Md. App. 13, 19 n.2,
321 A.2d 544, 547 n.2 (1974). The Federal Rules of Evidence abolish the voucher
rule in the federal courts: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling him." FED. R. EVID. 607. The same result is reached
by statute in several states. See, e.g., CALIF. Evm. CODE § 785 (West 1968) ; Iu..
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 60 (Smith-Hurd 1968) ; MAss. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23 (1974).
10. See, e.g., Rinard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 269 Md. 1, 304 A.2d 252;
Proctor Elec. Co. v. Zink, 217 Md. 22, 32, 141 A.2d 721, 726 (1958); State ex el.
Chenoweth v. Baltimore Contracting Co., 177 Md. 1, 6 A.2d 625 (1939), noted in
4 MD. L. REv. 193 (1940); Patapsco Loan Co. v. Hobbs, 134 Md. 222, 229, 106 A.
619, 622 (1919). Baltimore & O.R.R. v. State, 107 Md. 642, 659, 69 A. 439, 445
(1908); Smith v. Briscoe, 65 Md. 561, 5 A. 334 (1886); Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
State, 41 Md. 268, 295 (1875). See generally McCoRMICK, supra note 9, § 38; Hauser,
Impeaching One's Own Witness, supra note 9; Ladd, supra note 9; Comment,
Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 VA. L. REv. 996 (1963). For early discussions
of the rule against impeaching one's own witness as applied in Maryland, see Kauffman,
supra note 9, and 4 MD. L. REv. 193 (1940).
11. 275 Md. at 565-67, 342 A.2d at 662-63.
12. Id. at 572, 342 A.2d at 666; see Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200 (5th
Cir. 1938); 4 MD. L. REv. 193, 198-99 (1940). In addition, the prosecutor probably
would have been unable to show that the witness' testimony was damaging or preju-
dicial to its case. Cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hermann, 154 Md. 171, 140 A. 64 (1938).
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cution could have called her mother and used the "tradition options" to
impeach her.13 The court further observed that impeachment, even if
an available option, was an extremely limited remedy: the prior incon-
sistent statements would have been admissible only to impeach the witness'
credibility, not as substantive evidence.14
The Patterson court observed that in a substantial number of cases
decided on similar facts, appellate courts had found no abuse of discretion
by trial judges who had invoked their authority to call witnesses.15 The
witness called was usually an eyewitness 16 or one in possession of particu-
larly relevant evidence.1 7 In most instances the prosecution had refused to
vouch for the witness' veracity, 18 and in nearly all cases the witness was
13. 275 Md. at 572, 342 A.2d at 666.
14. Id. at 572-73, 342 A.2d at 666. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 723 Md. 152, 161,
328 A.2d 274, 280 (1974), discussed in this issue at 381-90; Green v. State, 243 Md. 154,
220 A.2d 544 (1966); Sun Cab Co. v. Cusick, 209 Md. 354, 361-63, 121 A.2d 188, 191
(1956); West v. Belle Isle Cab Co., 203 Md. 244, 255, 100 A2d 17, 21 (1953).
Maryland follows the traditional, majority view that prior inconsistent statements are
not admissible as substantive evidence. See Green v. State, 243 Md. 154, 157, 220
A.2d 544, 546 (1966); MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 251. It is generally thought that
the surprise and damage requirements guard against possible misuse of the impeach-
ment privilege by a counsel who, aware that a witness will give unfavorable testi-
mony, nevertheless calls that witness in order to introduce the prior inconsistent
statement in the hope that the jury will consider it as substantive evidence. See
MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 38; Note, Prior Statements of One's Own Witness to
Counteract Surprise Testimony: Hearsay and Impeachment Under the "Damage"
Test, 62 YALE L.J. 650, 653 (1953). Under this analysis, impeachment is permitted
only where the party's interest in neutralizing unexpected testimony outweighs the
danger that the jury will consider the content of the impeaching statement as evidence
on the merits. See 4 MD. L. REv. 193, 197 (1940); Note, Prior Statements, supra
at 653. Some courts and commentators, however, have urged that prior statements
of a party's own witness be admitted affirmatively as well as for impeachment. See,
e.g., DiCaolo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied,
268 U.S. 706 (1925); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969); Thomas
v. State, 186 Md. 446, 47 A.2d 43 (1946); State v. Jolly, 112 Mont. 352, 355, 16 P.2d
686, 688 (1941); Letendre v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 518, 289
N.Y.S.2d 183, 236 N.E.2d 467 (1968) ; Vance v. State, 190 Tenn. 521, 230 S.W.2d 987,
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 988 (1950); McCoRMICK, supra note 9, § 251, at 601-04;
3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018, at 996 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HAav. L. REV. 177, 192-96
(1948); McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive
Evidence, 25 TEXAs L. REV. 573 (1947).
15. 275 Md. at 573, 342 A.2d at 666.
16. See, e.g., Olive v. State, 121 Fla. 48, 179 So. 811 (1938) ; People v. Banks,
7 Ill. 2d 119, 129 N.E.2d 759 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 915 (1956).
17. See, e.g., People v. Hinderhan, 405 Ill. 435, 91 N.E.2d 430 (1950) (witness
at scene of crime shortly after defendant took indecent liberties with a minor child) ;
People v. Routt, 100 Ill. App. 2d 388, 241 N.E.2d 206 (1968) (witness possessed
material and relevant knowledge of homicide).
18. See, e.g., Olive v. State, 131 Fla. 548, 179 So. 811 (1938) ; People v. Banks,
7 Ill. 2d 119, 129 N.E.2d 759 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 915 (1956); People v.
Peterson, 364 Ill. 80, 4 N.E.2d 37 (1936); People v. Dascola, 322 Ill. 473, 153
N.E. 710 (1926).
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either a relative, companion, or close associate of the defendant.' 9 Many
courts had exercised their power to call witnesses when it was alleged
that a miscarriage of justice would result from the failure of the witness to
testify.20 Drawing on these precedents, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the trial court had ample support for its ruling.21
The Patterson court rejected the defendant's claim that the trial
judge had erred procedurally by examining the witness before, instead
of after, the close of the state's case-in-chief. It stressed that the judge
had been "scrupulously careful to preserve an attitude of impartiality" 22 in
limiting his interrogation to fact-eliciting questions. The court could find
no judicial authority to support the defendant's view that the judge's role
as impartial arbiter was diminished in the eyes of the jury by the timing
of the examination.23  On the contrary, the court found the procedure
followed by the trial court to be "judicially most fair." It argued that
calling the witness prior to the close of the state's case-in-chief avoided a
possible directed verdict and a resultant miscarriage of justice.24 More-
over, calling the defendant's mother after the prosecution had rested and
19. See, e.g., Kissic v. State, 266 Ala. 71, 94 So. 2d 202 (1957) (sister of de-
fendant, ex-wife of deceased) ; Daugherty v. State, 154 Fla. 308, 17 So. 2d 290 (1944)
(brother); Olive v. State, 131 Fla. 548, 179 So. 811 (1938) (close associate) ; People
v. Banks, 7 Ill. 2d 119, 129 N.E.2d 759 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 915 (1956)
(fiance); People v. Hinderhan, 405 Ill. 435, 91 N.E.2d 430 (1950) (wife).
20. See, e.g., People v. Banks, 7 Ill. 2d 119, 129 N.E.2d 759 (1955), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 915 (1956); People v. Bennett, 413 Ill. 601, 110 N.E.2d 175 (1953) ; People
v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, 197 N.E. 849 (1935).
21. 275 Md. at 578, 342 A.2d at 669.
22. Id. at 580, 342 A.2d at 670. The state's motion to have the defendant's mother
called as the court's witness was made after the jury had been excused for its luncheon
recess. The jury was not informed of the state's refusal to vouch for her credibility
or that she was called as the court's witness. Examining the judge's questions, the
Court of Appeals found "no suggestion of unfairness or [partiality] .. . nor from
any of them ... any semblance of an opinion concerning the appellant's guilt or inno-
cence." Id. The court warned, however, that a trial judge, in questioning a court
witness, must
guard against giving the jury any impression that the court was of the opinion
that defendant was guilty. The opinion of the judge, on account of his position
and the respect and confidence reposed in him and his learning and assumed
impartiality is likely to have great weight with the jury, and such fact of necessity
requires impartial conduct on his part.
Id. at 579, 342 A.2d at 669-70, quoting from Gomila v. United'States, 146 F2d 372,
374 (5th Cir. 1944).
23. 275 Md. at 581, 342 A.2d at 670-71. As the court observed, in each of the
cited cases involving similar circumstances, see notes 16-20 supra, the testimony of
the court witness was given before the close of the prosecution's case. Id. at 581, 342
A.2d at 671.
24. 275 Md. at 581, 342 A.2d at 671. The state may have been unable to intro-
duce legally sufficient evidence on the basis of which the jury could find the defendant




the defendant had already testified might have unfairly emphasized the
conflicts in their testimony.
2 5
In embracing the concept of court witnesses, the Patterson decision
is unexceptional: it merely confirms explicitly a dictum from a recent
Court of Special Appeals decision 26 and adds Maryland to the substantial
list of states adopting the rule.27 Given the existing evidentiary framework
in Maryland that requires a party to vouch for its witnesses, generally
prohibits that party from impeaching them, and proscribes the substantive
use of impeachment evidence, the power of the court to call witnesses
improves the adversary system by admitting highly relevant evidence that
otherwise would be excluded.2 8  While the Court of Appeals had little
difficulty approving the specific exercise of this judicial authority, there
is dicta in Patterson that indicates the trial judge's discretionary power
to call witnesses may extend well beyond the Patterson facts. The court
intimated that the discretion was not limited to the calling of eyewitnesses,
but extended to non-eyewitnesses as well. This would be a liberal position
for which there is little judicial support.2 9 In addition, the court implied
that a judge could call a witness although neither party had requested him
to do so, and stated that use of the procedure was not conditioned on a
refusal by one of the parties to vouch for the veracity of the witness.80
The Patterson court showed awareness that the court witness proce-
dure is useful in avoiding the ban against impeaching one's own witness.5 1
But it recognized that the rule's primary utility is in making available to
the trier of fact testimony that might significantly influence a verdict.
While revealing a willingness to apply the court witness concept in a
25. 275 Md. at 581, 342 A.2d at 671.
26. See note 7 supra.
27. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
28. See notes 10-14 and accompanying text supra; Comment, Impeaching One's
Own Witness, 49 VA. L. REv. 996, 1016 (1963). The same result achieved through
use of the court witness procedure could be accomplished by allowing a party to
impeach his own witness and receiving the impeaching evidence on the merits. See
note 14 supra. The advantage of the court witness procedure is in limiting the sub-
stantive use of the prior inconsistent statements to situations where the need for giving
the jury essential information about the crime outweighs the danger that the prior
statement will prove unreliable. Cf. Note, Prior Statements, supra note 14, at 658-59.
29. 275 Md. at 575, 342 A.2d at 667. See Comment, Impeaching One's Own
Witness, supra note 28, at 1015-16 n.17. Obviously, however, in order to be called as
the court's witness the individual must possess relevant and material information
that would not otherwise be available to the trier of fact. Eyewitnesses usually
possess unique information that in the interest of justice should not normally be
excluded, while few non-eyewitnesses possess such vital information. The court
witness procedure therefore will nearly always involve the former. The practice of
calling a non-eyewitness as a court witness is apparently followed only in Illinois.
Ste, e.g., People v. Siciliano, 4 Ill. 2d 581, 123 N.E.2d 725 (1955) ; People v. Hinder-
han, 405 Ill. 435, 91 N.E.2d 430 (1950).
30. 275 Md. at 575, 342 A.2d at 668; see FED. R. EvID. 614(a).
31. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
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variety of factual contexts, the court stressed that "a trial judge should
call a witness as a 'court witness' only when the adversary system fails to
produce the necessary facts and a miscarriage of justice would likely
result."8 2 The decision to call a court witness clearly must rest in the
sound discretion of the trial judge. He can best gauge the importance of
the offered testimony and assess the probability that exclusion will result
in a miscarriage of justice. The Patterson court unquestionably was cor-
rect in finding that there existed a "strong likelihood" that such a mis-
carriage of justice would result from the failure of Patterson's mother to
testify as a court witness. The jury would have been severely handicapped
in their quest for a just verdict without her testimony and prior statements.
The Court of Appeals has indicated in Patterson that it will take a flexible
attitude toward the court witness doctrine. Following the traditional view
that vests broad discretion in the trial judge to call witnesses when party
presentation is incomplete,88 the court apparently will allow liberal use of
court witnesses to avoid restrictive applications of the voucher rule or the
ban against substantive use of impeachment evidence.
32. 275 Md. at 577, 342 A.2d at 669 (emphasis in original). The Patterson court
appears to be following the Illinois practice of limiting the calling of court witnesses
to cases where it is shown that there might otherwise be a miscarriage of justice.
See, e.g., People v. Moriarity, 33 Ill. 2d 606, 213 N.E.2d 516 (1966).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Brandt, 196 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1952); Young v.
United States, 107 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 1939) ; State v. Hines, 270 Minn. 30, 40-41,
133 N.W.2d 371, 378 (1964); Commonwealth v. Crews, 429 Pa. 16, 22-23, 239 A.2d
350, 353 (1968); McCoRMICK, supra note 9, § 8; FED. R. EvID. 607.
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During the September Term, 1974, the Court of Appeals decided two
cases that involved juvenile law issues. In Wiggins v. State* the court
considered the circumstances under which retroactive application of a con-
stitutional decision is proper, and In re Spalding** the court considered
the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
to a child in need of supervision proceeding.
Wiggins v. State'
In Wiggins v. State the Court of Appeals considered whether the
holding in Long v. Robinson2 should be applied retroactively in Maryland
state courts. Long had invalidated on equal protection grounds portions
of the Maryland Annotated Code3 and the Public Local Laws of Baltimore
City4 whereby an accused under the age of eighteen was treated as a
juvenile3 offender everywhere in the state except in Baltimore City, where
only those under the age of sixteen were treated as juveniles. The Court
of Appeals held in Wiggins that Long would not be applied retroactively
in Maryland.
Wiggins was convicted on six counts of burglary in two trials during
1960 and 1961 in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City.0 He was under
eighteen years of age when the burglaries were committed but was tried
as an adult offender in regular criminal proceedings3 Although the Mary-
land Juvenile Causes Act defined a juvenile as a person under the age of
eighteen,8 at the time of Wiggins' trial Baltimore City was exempted from
the age requirements of the Act9 and had established sixteen as the
juvenile age limit.' 0 Under the Act, juvenile courts had original and exclu-
sive jurisdiction over juveniles alleged to be delinquent," but the juvenile
court judge could waive jurisdiction and order the juvenile held for regular
* 275 Md. 689, 344 A.2d 80 (1975).
** 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975).
1. 275 Md. 689, 344 A.2d 80 (1975).
2. 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971).
3. Ch. 797, § 48U, [1945] Laws of Md.
4. Ch. 818, § 420B, [1943] Laws of Md.
5. The term "juvenile" is used throughout this Note to indicate a person whose
age brings him within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The Juvenile Causes Act
uses the term "child" to identify these persons. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PRo. CODE ANN.
§§ 3-801 (c), 3-804 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
6. 275 Md. at 691, 344 A.2d at 81.
7. Id. at 691, 344 A.2d at 81-82.
8. Ch. 797, § 48B, [1945] Laws of Md.
9. Ch. 797, § 48U, [1945] Laws of Md. Also exempted from the age requirement
of the Act by this provision were Allegany, Montgomery and Washington Counties.
10. Ch. 818, § 420B, [1943] Laws of Md.
11. Ch. 797, § 48C, [1945] Laws of Md.
(405)
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criminal proceedings.' 2 Because Wiggins' crimes were committed within
Baltimore City, trial on those charges arising after his sixteenth birthday
took place directly in criminal court without the requirement of a waiver by
a juvenile court.' 8
In Long v. Robinson,14 decided nine years after Wiggins was con-
victed, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland held
unconstitutional those provisions of the Maryland Juvenile Causes Act and
the Public Local Laws of Baltimore City that excluded Baltimore City
from the otherwise uniform definition of a juvenile in Maryland as a
person under eighteen years of age. Finding the provisions "arbitrary,
unreasonably discriminatory, and not related to any legitimate state ob-
jective," the court held them to be in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.15 The court ordered all persons aged
sixteen and seventeen who had been arrested in Baltimore and were
awaiting trial as adults turned over to juvenile authorities with their
records expunged;36 thus, those juveniles could not be tried in criminal
proceedings without a waiver hearing. Subsequent to the Long decision,
Wiggins filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City to
have his convictions declared null, his record expunged, and any civil dis-
abilities suffered as a result of his convictions removed. 17 The trial court
ruled that Long should not be applied retroactively and therefore denied
relief,' 8 a judgment which was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals.' 9
The Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting,2 0 likewise declined
to apply Long retroactively, 21 thus disagreeing with the decision in Woodall
v. Pettibone22 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The Wiggins majority determined that the rule announced in Long did
not fit within any of the three circumstances the Supreme Court has
12. Ch. 797, § 48D, [1945] Laws of Md.
13. In the three counties exempted from the age requirement of the Juvenile
Causes Act, see note 5 supra, a juvenile was defined as a person under the age of
eighteen by separate acts of the General Assembly. See Ch. 151, [1955] Laws of Md.;
Ch. 976, [1945] Laws of Md.; Ch. 526, [1941] Laws of Md.
14. 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971).
15. Id. at 28.
16. Id. at 30-31.
17. Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 692, 344 A.2d 80, 82 (1975). Wiggins no
longer was incarcerated, id. at 691, 344 A.2d at 81. Had his case been decided in
juvenile court rather than criminal court, he would not have been found guilty of a
crime and, therefore, would have no criminal record. Instead, he would have been
adjudged a delinquent. Delinquents do not receive criminal records and are not sub-
ject to civil disabilities such as loss of the right to vote. See MD. CTs. & JUD. PRO.
CODE ANN. § 3-824 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
18. 275 Md. at 692, 344 A.2d at 82.
19. Wiggins v. State, 22 Md. App. 291, 324 A.2d 172 (1974).
20. Judge Eldridge filed a dissenting opinion in which Judge Levine concurred.
275 Md. at 717, 344 A.2d at 95.
21. Id. at 716, 344 A.2d at 95.
22. 465 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).
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recognized as mandating retroactive application of a constitutional deci-
sion :23 where the old rule affected the integrity of the fact-finding process, 24
where no trial was constitutionally permissible, 25 or where the punishment
imposed was not constitutionally permissible. 26 The court then analyzed
the Long holding under the balancing test announced in Linkletter v.
Walker,27 which, in the court's view, governed all remaining retroactivity
cases.28 The three factors to be balanced under the Linkletter test are the
purpose of the new rule, the reliance placed on the old rule, and the effect
of retroactive application on the administration of justice.29 Defining the
purpose of the Long holding as to ensure that "thenceforth all individuals
in Maryland under the age of 18 years would be dealt with on the same
basis," 30 the court considered this factor together with the justifiable
reliance by the state on the old rule8 ' and the burden on the administration
of justice that retroactive application of Long would cause.3 2 The Wiggins
court concluded that under the Linkletter test Long should be applied
prospectively in Maryland state courts.83
Judge Eldridge, in dissent, read the Supreme Court cases on retro-
activity somewhat differently. While he agreed that the Linkletter three-
pronged balancing test governs most retroactivity questions, 3 4 he differed
from the majority with respect to identifying the circumstances that man-
date retroactive application of a decision without reference to the test.
He found that a threshold inquiry must be made to determine whether
the ruling at issue declared a new principle of constitutional law or merely
applied settled principles to a particular situation; retroactive application
would be mandated unless a new rule had been announced.3 5 In Judge
Eldridge's view, Long did not announce a new principle of constitutional
law and therefore retroactive application was required.3 6 In the alternative,
he argued that because under the Long decision Wiggins would not initially
23. 275 Md. at 701-10, 344 A.2d at 87-92.
24. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971).
25. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 437 n.1 (1970).
26. See, e.g., Walker v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 936 (1972) (memorandum decision
applying retroactively Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
27. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
28. 275 Md. at 701, 344 A.2d at 87.
29. 381 U.S. at 636.
30. 275 Md. at 710-11, 344 A.2d at 92.
31. Id. at 712, 344 A2d at 93.
32. Id. at 714-15, 344 A.2d at 94-95.
33. Id. at 716, 344 A.2d at 95.
34. Id. at 718, 344 A.2d at 96.
35. Id. at 719, 344 A.2d at 96.
36. Judge Eldridge believed that because Long was decided by rational basis equal
protection analysis, no new principle of law was announced. He pointed out that
Maryland has long required a rational basis for territorial classifications. Id. at 729-32,
344 A.2d at 102-04. Most of his discussion was devoted to establishing the existence
of a new rule threshold test. Id. at 719-24, 344 A.2d 97-102. The majority discussed
neither the existence nor the applicability to the Long holding of such a test.
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have been subject to criminal prosecution and punishment as an adult, retro-
active application was mandated.3 7 Moreover, even if the balancing test
were appropriate, Judge Eldridge disagreed with the majority's result. He
considered the purpose of Long to be directly concerned with the fairness
of verdicts and sentences, with one purpose of juvenile proceedings being
to remove the taint of criminality from juvenile offenders. Observing that
the purpose prong is the most important of the three, Judge Eldridge
concluded that the purposes of the rule announced in Long favored retro-
active application and outweighed what he considered unreasonable state
reliance on the old rule and a minimal impact on the administration of
justice.38
In Woodall v. Pettibone3 9 the Fourth Circuit adopted yet another
approach to determining whether Lo'ng should be applied retroactively.
The Woodall court stated that "the basic factor considered in deciding
whether to apply a decision retroactively has been the effect [the former
practice] might have had on the accuracy of the guilt-determining process
in prior trials."'40 At a waiver proceeding in juvenile court, an accused
may endeavor to show that he would benefit from rehabilitative treatment
as a juvenile and that he therefore should not be waived into criminal
court.4 1 Characterizing waiver proceedings as "the only opportunity an
accused has to plead the defense of his diminished responsibility as a
juvenile,"42 the Fourth Circuit held that denying this "defense" to sixteen
and seventeen year-olds in Baltimore, while allowing it everywhere else
in Maryland, was so unfair as to "render unreliable the guilty verdicts
obtained." 43 Hence, retroactive application of Long was required.
44
Modern retroactivity doctrine in criminal litigation began with the
Supreme Court's consideration in Linkletter v. Walker45 of the retro-
active application of Mapp v. Ohio.46 Mapp held that evidence seized in
37. Id. at 732-37, 344 A.2d at 104-07.
38. Id. at 737-41, 344 A.2d at 107-09.
39. 465 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).
40. Id. at 51.
41. See Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1970).
42. 465 F.2d at 52, quoting Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169, 177 (4th
Cir. 1970).
43. 465 F.2d at 52.
44. Id. A fourth analysis of essentially the same problem is presented in Radcliff
v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1975).
Radcliff gave retroactive effect to Lamb v. Brown, 465 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972),
which invalidated on equal protection grounds an Oklahoma statute defining a juvenile
as a woman under the age of eighteen or a man under the age of sixteen. Radcliff
was decided on a balancing test analysis with the purpose of Lamb identified as to
end sex discrimination in juvenile proceedings. 509 F.2d at 1095. This purpose was
held to be concerned with basic fairness and essential justice, thus requiring retro-
active application, particularly in the absence of evidence that such a result would
have a severe impact on the administration of justice. 509 F.2d at 1095-96. Radcliff
and Woodall are discussed in 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 1057 (1975).
45. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
46. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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violation of the fourth amendment must be excluded in state criminal
prosecutions. The Linkletter Court analyzed prior retroactivity doctrine47
and found that in appropriate cases a rule could be given prospective
application.48 A three-pronged balancing test 49 was proposed to aid in
determining the propriety of prospective application.5" Applying the test
to the Mapp decision, the Court held that prospective application was
proper. 51
Although the Linkletter balancing test was formulated in the context
of the retroactivity problem presented by an exclusionary rule decision,
the test has been applied in other contexts.52 The Supreme Court has
recognized, however, that the test is inappropriate when certain non-
procedural guarantees are at issue. Furman v. Georgia,53 striking down
specific state death penalty statutes as unconstitutional, was given retro-
active application without reference to the Linkletter test,5 4 thus indicating
that a decision holding a particular punishment unconstitutional must be
given retroactive application. 55 A second exception is exemplified by
Waller v. Florida,5 6 barring on double jeopardy grounds a state prosecution
subsequent to a municipal prosecution for the same act. Waller was ap-
plied retroactively without reliance on the balancing test on the ground
that a decision that serves to prevent the occurrence of a trial must be given
retroactive application.57 Examples of a third exception are Marchetti v.
United States5" and Grosso v. United States,5 9 which precluded criminal
prosecutions of gamblers who properly asserted their fifth amendment
privileges against self-incrimination as a reason for failure to comply with
th6 disclosure provisions of the gambling tax law. 60 In applying Marchetti
and Grosso retroactively without relying on the balancing test,6' the
47. 381 U.S. at 622-29.
48. Id. at 628.
49. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
50. Id. at 636.
51. Id. at 636-40. See generally Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term -
Foreward: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law,
79 HaRv. L. REv. 56 (1965).
52. See, e.g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973) (jurisdiction of military
courts); De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (sixth amendment right to jury
trial applicable to states) ; Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (prosecutor
forbidden to comment on defendant's failure to testify). See also Note, Retroactizdty
of Criminal Procedure Decisions, 55 IOWA L. REv. 1309 (1970).
53. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
54. See, e.g., Walker v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 936 (1972) (memorandum decision).
55. See Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 508-09 (1973).
56. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
57. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 508-11 (1973). See also Note, Retroactivity,
4 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REv. 521, 526-28 (1974).
58. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
59. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
60. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4401, 4411, 4412 (1971).
61. Marchetti and Grosso were given retuoactive effect in United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
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Supreme Court indicated that a decision declaring specific conduct con-
stitutionally immune from punishment must be applied retroactively.6 2
Although these three exceptions are clear, the Court has suggested that
it is unable to formulate a comprehensive explanation why some cases
are not governed by the balancing test.68
Prior to the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Peltier,6 4 it seemed clear that as a prerequisite to prospective application
a decision must have announced a new principle of constitutional law. 65
Most Supreme Court decisions that have been applied prospectively have
overruled previous decisions of the Court, thereby clearly creating new
rules.6 6 While a precise test for deciding whether a particular decision
announced a new rule has never been formulated, it was evident that a
sharp break with clear precedent was required.67 The determination
whether a new rule had been announced was made as a threshold inquiry.68
The continued viability of the threshold new rule test is questionable,
however, after Peltier. The issue in Peltier was whether to give retroactive
effect to the holding in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States69 that a war-
rantless automobile search by border patrol agents, conducted twenty-five
miles from the Mexican border and without probable cause, violated the
fourth amendment. The Peltier Court, in refusing to apply Almeida-
Sanchez retroactively under a balancing test analysis,70 failed to discuss
the threshold new rule test. Dissenting, Justice Brennan accused the
majority of thereby discarding the test.71 He argued that the Almeida-
Sanchez holding did not represent a sharp break from prior Supreme
Court decisions, and in fact merely reaffirmed longstanding precedent. 72
62. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724
(1971). See also Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 508-09 (1973).
63. 409 U.S. at 509.
64. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
65. See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) ("First, the
decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied . . . or by deciding
an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed .... ") ;
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 496 (1968) ("There
is, of course, no reason to confront [prospectivity] unless we have before us a situation
in which there was a clearly defined judicial doctrine . . . overruled in favor of a new
rule .... "). See generally Note, Constitutional Law - Retroactivity - Application
of the "New Rule" Threshold Test Before Determining the Retroactivity of Almeida-
Sanchez, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 586 (1975).
66. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 547-48 n.5 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
67. See 53 TEXAs L. REV., supra note 65, at 589-90.
68. See id. at 589.
69. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
70. See 422 U.S. at 537-42.
71. Id. at 547. Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall. Justice Douglas
wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 543.
72. Almeida-Sanchez was the first roving border patrol case to be heard by the
Supreme Court. 422 U.S. at 541-42. Nonetheless, Justice Brennan argued that
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Justice Brennan therefore contended that prospective application should
not even have been considered. The majority of the Court, however, held
that because the arresting officers had acted in good faith reliance upon a
validly enacted statute73 that had been supported by decisions in three
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, 74 the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule would not be served by applying the Aineida-Sanchez
holding retroactively. 75 Because the majority did not discuss the applica-
tion of the threshold new rule test to the circumstances in Peltier it is
unclear whether the test actually was discarded as Justice Brennan sug-
gested. Possibly the Court intended to create an exception for exclusionary
rule cases, based on the special nature of the exclusionary rule. Thus,
Peltier may reflect only the Court's refusal to apply the exclusionary rule
unless a clear deterrent purpose will be served, leaving the threshold new
rule test intact in other areas.
Wiggins presents a difficult retroactivity issue. Assuming that the
threshold new rule test remains viable outside the exclusionary rule
context, the initial step in retroactivity analysis must be to determine
whether the holding in question announced a new rule of constitutional
law, and would thus qualify for prospective application. The Wiggins dis-
sent argued that Long merely applied settled principles of constitutional
law to the facts of the case and found the statutes in question unconstitu-
tional because there was no rational basis for the discrimination against
youths arrested in Baltimore City.70 Judge Eldridge concluded that be-
Alneida-Sanches was merely a reaffirmation of previous Supreme Court holdings.
Id. at 547. Indeed, the Almeida-Sanchez Court seemed to recognize that it was not
making new law, as it cited Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), for the
proposition that "[a]utomobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the
search." 413 U.S. at 269 (1973).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (3) (1971).
74. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 540 n.8 (1975), citing United
States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Almeida-Sanchez,
452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); United States v. Miranda,
426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1970); Roa-Rodriquez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th
Cir. 1969); Kelly v. United States, 197 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1952).
75. 422 U.S. at 542.
76. The test for invalidating legislatively drawn territorial classifications is stated
in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911): "The equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . avoids what is done only when it is
without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary." In Long the district
court concluded:
Whatever may have been the original justification for the exclusion of sixteen
and seventeen year olds arrested in Baltimore City from the scope of the Juvenile
[Causes] Act, the uncontroverted evidence is that such basis no longer exists,
and the exception is arbitrary, unreasonably discriminatory, and not related to any
legitimate State objective.
316 F. Supp. at 28.
It was stressed in Long that the place of arrest, rather than the place of
residence, determined whether a youth was subject to the Baltimore City definition
of a juvenile. Id. at 26-30. Arguably, such a system could never be sustained against
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cause no new principle of constitutional law had been announced, retro-
active application of Long was required. 77 However, it would seem that
Long did announce a new principle. The Supreme Court in the past had
been reluctant to strike down intrastate territorial classification schemes
on equal protection grounds. 78 While not announcing a new standard of
equal protection analysis, the Long court reached a novel result in light
of this precedent. Further, the system condemned in Long did not face
an equal protection challenge until more than twenty years after its in-
ception, persuasive evidence that the system was not generally considered
unconstitutional. Finally, the constitutionality of the system was upheld
in Graves v. State,79 a 1967 decision of the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, and the first case in which the system was attacked. Although
Graves had no value as precedent because it was unreported,8 0 it nonetheless
adds weight to the other factors, supporting the conclusion that the system
condemned in Long would have been upheld as constitutional over most of
its history. Thus, retroactive application of Long could not be mandated
under the threshold new rule test even assuming that the test has survived
Peltier.
The next step in the Wiggins retroactivity analysis is to determine
whether the Long holding fits within a recognized exception to the
Linkletter balancing test approach. The punishment exception is inappli-
an equal protection challenge, as the place of arrest is largely fortuitous. No essential
difference among juveniles, necessary to constitute a rational basis for the system, can
be postulated that leads some to arrest in the city and others to arrest in the counties.
Responding to this argument, the Wiggins majority noted, as a justification for the
statutes, that the General Assembly probably believed that the vast majority of crimes
committed in Baltimore City were committed by residents of the city, with a similar
situation prevalent in the counties. The majority further noted that the General
Assembly regarded Baltimore City youths as reaching adult maturity earlier than
their county peers. 275 Md. at 711 & n.5, 344 A.2d at 92 & n.5. However, the Long
decision rested on the lack of any difference between city and county youths, see 316
F. Supp. at 27-28. It was therefore not necessary for the Long court to decide
whether, if there were a difference, the statutes were nonetheless invalid because the
place of arrest, and not the arrestee's residence, was determinative.
77. 275 Md. at 732, 344 A.2d at 104.
78. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), in which the Supreme
Court upheld against an equal protection challenge a Maryland statute permitting
retail sales on Sunday of certain items in one county, while disallowing it in others. The
Court stated: "With particular reference to the State of Maryland, we have noted
that the prescription of different substantive offenses in different counties is generally
a matter for legislative discretion. We find no invidious discrimination here." Id.
at 247. See Horowitz and Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in
Public Education and Public Assistance Programs From Place to Place Within a State,
15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 787, 793-97 (1968) ; Note, Strengthening Equal Protection Analy-
sis in Maryland: Territorial Classification and In Re Trader, 35 MD. L. REv. 312,
325-30 (1975).
79. No. 201 (Md. Ct. Sp. App., decided July 21, 1967). But see State v. Gregori,
318 Mo. 998, 2 S.W.2d 747 (1924) (state law setting age limit for juvenile court
jurisdiction at seventeen in some counties and eighteen in others held unconstitutional).
80. See MD. R.P. 1092(b).
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cable. Although, as the dissent observed,81 Long was concerned with the
manner in which criminal punishment was imposed on Baltimore City
youths, it did not announce an absolute ban on the punishment of sixteen
and seventeen year-olds as adult criminals. Even those youths granted
relief under Long could be punished as adults provided that the juvenile
court waived jurisdiction. Because it neither held a particular form of
punishment unconstitutional nor ensured that a particular punishment
would no longer be imposed, Long does not fit within the punishment
exception to the balancing test analysis. For similar reasons the "no trial"
exception is inapplicable. The Wiggins dissent noted that under Long,
Wiggins would not have been initially subject to criminal trial.82 Yet,
unlike the double jeopardy decisions that created the exception, 3 retro-
active application of Long would not serve as an absolute ban on criminal
trials because the possibility of waiver would still exist. Moreover, the
double jeopardy decisions that were applied retroactively held that the per-
sons involved should not have been subject to any prosecution regarding the
issues previously litigated.84 Under Long, juveniles arrested in Baltimore
City are either waived, and prosecuted in criminal court, or not waived,
and proceeded against in juvenile court. In either event a juvenile faces
a form of prosecution, thereby distinguishing Long from the cases com-
posing the "no trial" exception to the balancing test analysis.85 Finally,
Long did not declare any conduct to be constitutionally protected, and
therefore does not fit within the "conduct immune from punishment"
exception. 6
Because no recognized exception is applicable, the retroactivity of
Long should properly be determined under a balancing test analysis. The
first consideration is whether the major purpose of Long was to overcome
an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding
function and raises serious doubts about the accuracy of past guilty ver-
dicts. The Supreme Court has held that neither good faith reliance nor
severe impact on the administration of justice is sufficient to compel
prospective application of such a decision 7 Both the Wiggins dissent 8
and the Fourth Circuit in Woodall 9 attempted to fit Long into the line
81. 275 Md. at 737, 344 A.2d at 106-07.
82. Id.
83. See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
84. See, e.g., Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 395 n.6 (1970), which was applied
retroactively in Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973). -See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 437 n.1 (1970); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
85. Cf. Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 679 (1973). (decision restricting jurisdic-
tion of military courts in favor of jurisdiction in civilian courts applied prospectively).
86. Compare Long v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970), with, e.g.,
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), and United States v. United States
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
87. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 & n.6 (1971).
88. 275 Md. at 738-39, 344 A.2d at 107-08.
89. 465 F.2d at 51-52.
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of cases applied retroactively on this basis. These cases have been described
as concerning the "integrity of the fact-finding process." 90 The Wiggins
dissent argued that this concept was broader than "whether or not the
defendant engaged in a particular action" ;91 instead, Judge Eldridge would
have extended the concept to include the unfairness of subjecting Wiggins
to a criminal trial without a waiver hearing.92 But the "integrity of the
fact-finding process" label is misleading: this line of retroactivity cases
all involved the accuracy with which the specific facts of a case were
determined at trial.93 The Fourth Circuit held that Long should be
applied retroactively on the ground that pre-Long guilty verdicts were
unreliable, although conceding that the accuracy of the fact-finling process
was not impaired.94 Both the Wiggins dissent and the Woodall court gave a
broader scope to the "integrity of the fact-finding process" cases than
appears warranted. 95 Because Wiggins was tried in criminal court, the
fact-finding process may well have been more carefully conducted than it
90. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967).
91. 275 Md. at 739, 344 A.2d at 108.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., cases cited in Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 n.6
(1971). The Wiggins dissent cited three cases in support of its position that the
"integrity of the fact-finding process" is a broader concept than mere accuracy in
determining facts: Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971); McConnell v.
Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968); and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 275
Md. at 739, 344 A.2d at 108. However, these decisions do not support the dissent's
position. Mackey held that retroactive application of Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), should be limited
to prior prosecutions for failure to file a gambling tax return. See notes 58-62 and
accompanying text supra. Marchetti and Grosso held that a person could not be
compelled to file a gambling tax return. However, if a person had done so and been
convicted of income tax evasion with the return used as evidence against him, Mackey
held that the person so convicted should be denied retroactive application of Marchetti
and Grosso because the introduction of the return was both probative and relevant
and produced no doubts "about the accuracy of the guilty verdict." Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971). Thus, Mackey was decided on accuracy of the fact-
finding process grounds.
McConnell applied Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), retroactively.
Mempa required that felony defendants be afforded counsel at post-trial proceedings
for revocation of probation and imposition of deferred sentence. Retroactive applica-
tion was required because of counsel's role in marshalling facts and evidence of
mitigating circumstances and in presenting the defendant's case. McConnell v. Rhay,
393 U.S. 2, 4 (1968). Accuracy in the fact-finding process was, therefore, the primary
element necessitating retroactive application.
Witherspoon held that a sentence of death could not be carried out if
veniremen had been excluded from the jury imposing the sentence because of their
general objections to the death penalty. The Court held that such a jury was in-
capable of exercising neutral judgment. 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968). The opinion stated
that it was to be applied retroactively, 391 U.S. at 523 n.22. Although the Court spoke
in terms of "integrity," id., it seems clear that accuracy was an important element.
94. 465 F.2d at 52.
95. Contra 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 1057, 1065-67 (1975).
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would have been in juvenile court.96 Hence, the major purpose of Long
was not to correct an aspect of the criminal trial that impaired its fact-
finding function.
The Long court did not state the purpose for its decision. The
Wiggins majority identified the purpose of Long as insuring that "thence-
forth all individuals in Maryland under the age of 18 years would be dealt
with on the same basis."97 It is question begging, however, to define the
purpose of a holding in terms that limit it to future applicability, when the
issue is retroactivity. Yet the broad purpose of every equal protection
decision, and indeed the purpose of the equal protection clause itself, is
to ensure equal treatment. Retroactive application of Long would serve to
effectuate equal treatment for Wiggins in so far as he would lose his
criminal record and civil disabilities, the indicia of his earlier unequal
treatment. But in ordering the relief which it did, the Long court was
also effectuating the purposes of the Maryland Juvenile Causes Act.98 The
Long court essentially applied the Act to those persons who previously
were unconstitutionally denied its application. It would seem that if the
purposes of the statute would be served by retroactive application of Long,
then the purpose of Long would also be served thereby. Because Wiggins
was not a juvenile facing proceedings at the time of his suit, only one
of the purposes stated in the statute, "[t]o remove from children commit-
ting delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal
behavior,"99 would be served by retroactive application of Long. None-
theless, because one substantial purpose of the statute, as well as the
96. See Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 709-10, 344 A.2d 80, 91-92 (1975).
97. Id. at 710-11, 344 A.2d at 92.
98. MD. CTs. & JuD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-802 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides the
purposes of the Juvenile Causes Act:
(a) The purposes of this subtitle are:
(1) To provide for the care, protection and wholesome mental and physi-
cal development of children coming within the provisions of this
subtitle; and to provide for a program of treatment, training, and
rehabilitation consistent with the child's best interests and the pro-
tection of the public interest;
(2) To remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of
criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior;
(3) To conserve and strengthen the child's family ties and to separate a
child from his parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the
interest of public safety;
(4) If necessary to remove a child from his home, to secure for him
custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that
which should have been given by his parents;
(5) To provide judicial procedures for carrying out the provisions of
this subtitle.
(b) This subtitle shall be liberally construed to effectuate these purposes.
The language of the statute was substantially the same at the time of the Long
decision. See ch. 432, § 2, [1969] Laws of Md.
99. MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-802 (a) (2) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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purpose of the equal protection clause (to ensure equal treatment), can
be served by retroactive application of Long, the purpose prong of the
balancing test weighs in favor of retroactivity.
The reliance prong, however, weighs in favor of prospective application
of Long. As discussed above, 100 there are strong indications that the
system condemned in Long would have been upheld as constitutional over
most of its history. It was reasonable, therefore, for the state to have relied
on the constitutionality of its system.
There is some question about the extent to which retroactive appli-
cation of Long would burden the administration of justice. The Wiggins
majority, in apparent reference to Franklin v. State,10 1 stated that even
if it were now determined at a waiver hearing that a person would originally
have been waived into criminal court, a new trial would be necessary. 0 2
In Franklin the Court of Appeals held that Baltimore City juveniles who
were tried without a waiver hearing, and whose appeals were not yet finally
determined on May 15, 1969, the effective date of Long, must be given
waiver hearings and new trials.10 3 The court reasoned that because Long
established that sixteen and seventeen year-old Baltimore City youths were
juveniles, and because the legislature had intended that waiver hearings
precede trials for juveniles, criminal courts had no jurisdiction to try
juveniles without a prior waiver hearing. 0 4 It seems doubtful, however,
that the legislature intended that there be no jurisdiction to try sixteen and
seventeen year-olds in Baltimore without a prior waiver hearing in the
event waiver hearings for those youths somehow became required. The
legislature undoubtedly never considered the question, and in fact did not
originally intend for these juveniles to have waiver hearings at all. The
Franklin court's interpretation of the jurisdictional ramifications of Long
on the Juvenile Causes Act thus seems questionable. New trials would
serve no purpose in the circumstances presented in Wiggins except to
further burden the administration of justice.'05 The burden prong of the
balancing test should be calculated without including new trials as a neces-
sary element. All that would seem necessary is a determination whether
the juvenile would have been waived. If so, he would not be entitled to
expungement.
Burdens that would be imposed by retroactive application of Ldng
include the expense and inconvenience of conducting waiver hearings,
which would necessitate combing police and court files for evidence bearing
on the issue of waiver, and the expense and inconvenience of expunging
100. See text and accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
101. 264 Md. 62, 285 A.2d 616 (1972).
102. 275 Md. at 714-15, 344 A.2d at 94.
103. 264 Md. at 69, 285 A.2d at 619.
104. Id. at 67, 285 A.2d at 618.
105. The Fourth Circuit in Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F2d 169, 178 (4th Cir.
1970), did not find new trials to be necessary in an analogous situation.
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the records of those persons whom it is determined would not have been
waived. The majority and dissenting opinions in Wiggins differed over
whether this burden was substantial. The majority felt that it was, calling
the files "countless."'1 °6 The dissent, however, pointed out that all the
files are in one clerk's office and termed the burden involved in examining
them not insuperable' 0 7 It should also be noted that retroactive application
would not create the possibility of freeing many guilty persons from jail,
because very few persons convicted under the pre-Long system are presently
incarcerated. 0 8
The Supreme Court has indicated that the purpose prong is the
most important element of the balancing test.10 9 In fact, in no case has
the purpose prong clearly indicated retroactivity yet been outweighed by
the other two prongs.110 In Wiggins the purpose prong weighs heavily
in favor of retroactivity, and it is not offset by reasonable state reliance
and a not insurmountable burden on the administration of justice. Thus,
the balance in Wiggins calls for retroactive application of Long.
106. 275 Md. at 715, 344 A.2d at 94.
107. Id. at 741, 344 A.2d at 109.
108. Id.
109. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 249, 251 (1969).
110. See !Nbte, Retroactivity, supra note 52, at 1322-24.
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In Re Spalding'
In In re Gault2 the Supreme Court invoked the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment to confer on juveniles in state delinquency pro-
ceedings3 significant federal constitutional rights, including the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. 4 Subsequent to Gault, Maryland
developed a new response to juvenile misconduct designed to complement
the existing mechanisms of juvenile delinquency proceedings 5 and, in very
serious cases, adult criminal proceedings.6 The introduction of a new
category, the child in need of supervision (CINS), 7 was intended to allow
1. 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975).
2. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. Gault was expressly limited to proceedings to determine "delinquency" where
the consequence of that determination might be commitment of the juvenile to a state
institution. Id. at 13.
4. "No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Gault Court stated: "We conclude that
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of
juveniles as it is with respect to adults." 387 U.S. at 55. Those constitutional guaran-
tees extended to juveniles by Gault consisted of adequate notice of the charges, id. at
31-34, the right to counsel, id. at 34-42, the privilege against self-incrimination, id. at
42-55, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, id. at 56-57.
5. Pursuant to MD. CTs. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-804(a) (Cum. Supp.
1975), the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over a child alleged to be delinquent.
Section 3-801 (c) defines a "child" as a person under eighteen years of age. A delin-
quent act is defined in section 3-801 (i) as an act "which would be a crime if com-
mitted by an adult," and in section 3-801 (j) a delinquent child is defined as one who
"has committed a delinquent act and requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation."
These sections do not differ materially from Ch. 432, [1969] Laws of Md., which was
in effect at the time of the Spalding hearing.
6. In accordance with MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-817(a) (Cum.
Supp. 1975), the juvenile court may waive its exclusive jurisdiction with respect to a
petition alleging delinquency of a child fifteen years or older, or a child not yet
fifteen years old who is charged with an act that would be punishable by death or life
imprisonment if committed by an adult. Section 3-817(d) lists the factors which thejuvenile court must consider in determining whether jurisdiction should be waived.
Section 3-807 removes the bar on criminal prosecution of a child within the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court if jurisdiction has been waived, while section 3-804(d)
enumerates various instances where the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction
over a child.
7. The CINS category was created in 1969 pursuant to Ch. 432, [1969] Laws
of Md., and presently is defined in MD. CTs. & JUD. PRo. CODE ANN. § 3-801(e)
(Cum. Supp. 1975):
"Child in need of supervision" is a child who needs guidance, treatment, or re-
habilitation because
(1) He is required by law to attend school and is habitually truant; or
(2) He is habitually disobedient, ungovernable, and beyond the control of the
person having custody of him without substantial fault on the part of that
person; or
(3) He deports himself so as to injure or endanger himself or others; or
(4) He has committed an offense applicable only to children.
The definitional language at the time of the Spalding CINS hearing was not substan-
tially different. See Ch. 432, [1969] Laws of Md.
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the state to deal with less serious forms of misconduct formerly handled
in delinquency proceedings, thereby avoiding the harsh consequences that
often follow an adjudication of delinquency.8 In In re Spalding9 the Mary-
land Court of Appeals concluded that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, made applicable to delinquency proceedings by Gault, should not be
further extended to a CINS proceeding. 10
Spalding, then thirteen years old, was brought before a juvenile master
on February 1, 1973, pursuant to a petition of the Department of Juvenile
Services charging that she was a "delinquent child" and a child "in need
of supervision."" The petition alleged that
on 1-31-73 . . . an investigation by the Baltimore County Police
Department revealed that the respondent had consumed controlled
and prohibitive [sic] narcotics and engaged in acts of sexual inter-
course and sexual perversion with an unknown number of male and
female adults for a period of more than one year. The respondent is
ungovernable and beyond the control of her parent, deports herself
in such a manner as to be a danger to herself and others and is in need
of care and treatment. 12
The petition was based on statements made to the police by Spalding and
another child who was similarly charged. Spalding's mother had brought
her to the police station in response to a telephone call from an officer who
was investigating a complaint brought by the parents of the other child.
The children there described a year long series of early morning parties
at which they had been given narcotic pills and had engaged in various
sexual activities with adults. Spalding stated that she put sleeping pills,
supplied by one of the adults, into her mother's coffee and thus was able
to attend the parties without her mother's knowledge.' 3 The juvenile
master at the adjudicatory hearing found both children to be in need of
8. Prior to 1969, the definition of delinquency covered most of the misconduct
now included in the CINS definition. See Ch. 797, § 48B, [1945] Laws of Md. The
Court of Special Appeals explained the rationale for the change in In re Carter,
20 Md. App. 633, 653, 318 A.2d 269, 281 (1974) :
It is evident, we think, that an important purpose of the legislative revision of the
juvenile code was to insulate certain forms of juvenile misconduct from the con-
sequences of an adjudication of delinquency as described in Gault. The creation
of the category of CINS reflects a studied design of the legislature to insure
that treatment of children guilty of misconduct peculiarly reflecting the propensi-
ties and susceptibilities of youth, will acquire none of the institutional, quasi-penal
features of treatment that in Gault's view had been the main difference between
the theory and the practice of the juvenile court system.
9. 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975).
10. Id. at 709, 332 A.2d at 257.
11. Id. at 693-94, 332 A.2d at 248.
12. The petition is quoted as it appears in the opinion of the Court of Special
Appeals, In re Carter, 20 Md. App. 633, 636, 318 A.2d 269, 271 (1974).
13. 273 Md. at 692-93, 332 A.2d at 247-48. The girls had engaged in sexual
relations with a number of adults, both male and female. The adults subsequently
were prosecuted for statutory rape or perverted practices.
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supervision, but he did not find them delinquent. 14 At a disposition hearing
before a different juvenile master on March 7, 1973, both girls were
committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Services. 15
Upon the filing of exceptions to the master's decision by the juveniles,
the Circuit Court of Baltimore County, sitting as a Juvenile Court, heard
both cases de novo on May 3, 1973.16 Over objection, the written and
oral statements made by Spalding to the police were admitted into evidence
against her; cross-examination of the officer who had taken the statements,
with respect to either their voluntariness or the issuance of Miranda
warnings,17 was not permitted. Spalding was then called by the state as
a witness and was compelled to testify over her counsel's strenuous
objection.'8 At the conclusion of the hearing the court determined that
Spalding and the other girl were children in need of supervision, and
both were committed to the Department of Juvenile Services for placement
in foster homes.' 9 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit
Court decision.20
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the privilege against self-
incrimination and other federal constitutional guarantees that accompany
ordinary criminal proceedings did not apply in Spalding's case. 21 The
court found in Gault and its progeny 22 a two-pronged test for determining
when the safeguards of the criminal process are applicable to juvenile
proceedings. First, the juvenile must be charged with an act that would
be a crime if committed by an adult; and second, he must face the possi-
bility of commitment to a state institution.23 The Court of Appeals
14. Id. at 693-94, 332 A.2d at 248. The delinquency charge in the petition was
apparently dropped at this point. See id. at 694 n.4, 332 A.2d at 248 n.4.
15. Id. at 694-95, 332 A.2d at 249.
16. Id. at 695, 332 A.2d at 249. MD. R.P. 908 permits juvenile masters to hear
such cases as are assigned by the court. If exceptions are filed a de novo hearing
before a judge is required.
17. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires that prior to police ques-
tioning, an individual in custody must be warned that there is a right to remain silent,
that anything said can be used against him in a court of law, that there is a right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if an attorney can not be afforded one will be
appointed, upon request, prior to questioning.
18. 273 Md. at 695-97, 332 A.2d at 249-50.
19. Id. at 698, 332 A.2d at 250.
20. In re Carter, 20 Md. App. 633, 318 A.2d 269 (1974). The Carter girl was
released to her parents followi,ig the Court of Special Appeals decision and did not
appeal further. In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 698 n.6, 332 A.2d 246, 250 n.6 (1975).
21. 273 Md. at 704-05, 709, 332 A.2d at 254, 256-57.
22. See Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970).
23. The Gault Court limited its consideration to delinquency proceedings that
could result in the juvenile being committed to a state institution. 387 U.S. at 13.
Gault was charged with committing an act which would have been a crime if com-
mitted by an adult. Id. at 29. In Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972),
which applied retroactively the holding in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof
beyond reasonable doubt required in the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency hearing),
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determined that Spalding was merely a "victim" of sex crimes committed
by adults and that she had been charged only with being "ungovernable. '24
The court therefore concluded that she had not been charged with an act
that would be a crime if committed by an adult. 25 Because the first prong
of the test was not satisfied, the court held that the privilege against self-
incrimination did not apply to Spalding's CINS proceeding. 26 The court
found it unnecessary to consider whether Spalding faced commitment to a
"state institution," a determination that would have satisfied the second
prong of the test.27
The reasoning by which the Court of Appeals determined that the
circumstances in Spalding did not meet the first prong of the Gault test
is questionable. On close analysis the Spalding facts seem to fall within
both the language and the policy of Gault. The term "charged" is crucial in
this regard: What acts was Spalding "charged" with committing, and
where should one look to ascertain the acts "charged"? The Court of
Appeals reasoned that
with the elimination of the delinquency "charge" . . . the claims of
alleged "criminal" conduct, on which it was premised, vanished with it.
What remained was the single allegation that appellant ". . . is un-
governable and beyond the control of her parent, deports herself in
such a manner as to be a danger to herself and others and is in need of
care and treatment." From that time forward, at least, appellant was
not charged in this proceeding with any acts which would constitute
a crime if committed by an adult.28
The court looked only to the conclusions expressed in the petition to find
the acts charged,2 9 apparently treating the petition as it would an indict-
the Court stated that the Winship holding applied to any juvenile "charged with an
act that would be a crime if committed by an adult." 407 U.S. at 203. The combina-
tion of the Gault, Winship, and Ivan holdings thus results in the two-pronged test
recognized by the Court of Appeals. See 273 Md. at 702-03, 332 A.2d at 252-53;
Williams v. Director, 276 Md. 272, 299-301, 347 A.2d 179, 193-95 (1975). See also
In re Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Iowa 1972).
24. 273 Md. at 708-09, 332 A2d at 256-57. "Ungovernable" is used herein to
represent the following language from the petition in Spalding: "ungovernable and
beyond the control of her parent, deports herself in such a manner as to be a danger
to herself and others and is in need of care and treatment." See text accompanying
note 12 supra.
25. 273 Md. at 708-09, 332 A.2d at 256-57.
26. Id. at 709, 332 A.2d at 257.
27. Judge Eldridge, in a vigorous dissent, accused the majority of making the
labels "victim" and "CINS" determinative. In his view, Spalding satisfied both
prongs of the Gault test and consequently was entitled to the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Id. at 709-16, 332 A.2d at 257-60.
28. Id. at 709, 332 A.2d at 256-57.
29. The petition also contained allegations of perverted sexual activities and
consumption of narcotics. See text accompanying note 12 supra. The court did not
mention these allegations in the summary paragraph at the conclusion of its opinion.
See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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ment, which must contain "the specific offense with which the defendant
is charged." 30 However, the court may have misapplied the Gault test by
looking solely to the conclusions contained in the petition; in determining
that Spalding was charged only with being ungovernable, the court did not
identify correctly the acts charged.
The Gault Court found the privilege against self-incrimination and
other constitutional safeguards applicable to Gault's case even though it
was unclear from the petition whether Gault was charged with acts that
would have been criminal if committed by an adult. The petition stated
that Gault was under the age of eighteen and in need of the protection of the
court, and concluded that "said minor is a delinquent minor."' As de-
fined in Arizona at that time, a delinquent minor included a minor who
had violated a law of the state, was uncontrolled by his parents, was
habitually truant, or had deported himself so as to endanger the morals
of himself or others.8 2 At the hearing conducted pursuant to the petition,
the state ateempted to prove that Gault had made a lewd telephone call,8 3
a violation of state law,3 4 and that he was therefore a delinquent minor
under the appropriate statutory provision. Under the language of the same
petition the state could have attempted to prove that Gault disobeyed his
parents by staying out late on several occasions, and that he was therefore
delinquent under another section of the statute because he was not con-
trolled by his parents. Assuming that no Arizona law prohibited an adult
from staying out late, it would seem that the Supreme Court could not
have determined whether Gault was charged with acts that would have
been criminal if committed by an adult by looking only to the petition. In
considering what acts Gault was charged with committing, the Supreme
Court focused on the specific factual allegations that the state had at-
tempted to prove at the hearing.3 5 The specific factual allegations under-
lying the conclusion of delinquency expressed in the petition thus constitute
the acts charged for purposes of the Gault test.36
In Spalding, as in Gault, it cannot be determined solely from the
language of the petition whether criminal or non-criminal activity was
involved. While the allegations of perverted practices and consumption of
narcotics could constitute acts which would be crimes if committed by an
adult, 87 the Court of Appeals ignored these allegations. In the summary
paragraph of its opinion the court stated that Spalding was charged only
with being "ungovernable," and concluded that she therefore had not
30. MD. R.P. 712.
31. 387 U.S. at 5.
32. Ch. 80, § 2, [1941] Ariz. Sess. Laws (repealed 1970).
33. See 387 U.S. at 5-9.
34. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-377 (1956), provides that a person using obscene
language in the presence or hearing of a woman or child is guilty of a misdemeanor.
35. See 387 U.S. at 5-9, 29.
36. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 534-37 (1971).
37. See notes 40-43 and accompanying text infra.
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been charged with "criminal" acts.38 Yet ungovernable behavior could as
easily include armed robbery as it could staying out late against parental
orders.39 Consistent with Gault and its progeny, the Spalding court should
have looked to the specific factual allegations underlying the petition, those
which the state later attempted to prove at the hearing, in order to
determine the acts charged for purposes of the first prong of the Gault
test.
The state attempted to prove that Spalding had engaged in perverted
sexual practices. The specific acts she was charged with committing in-
cluded participation in sexual activities with women.40 It is apparent that
those acts would have been criminal under Maryland law if committed by
an adult.41 The state also attempted to prove that Spalding drugged her
mother with a narcotic given to her by one of the adults involved in the
parties.42 It is a crime for an adult to possess or administer to another
any controlled narcotic.48 Based on these factual allegations, which appear
to have been the only specific instances of "ungovernability" at issue in
Spalding's CINS proceeding, 44 it seems clear that the first prong of the
Gault test was satisfied. The Spalding court, however, held that the test
was not satisfied, advancing seemingly inconsistent rationales.
The court applied the Gault test to the charge that Spalding was
"ungovernable" 45 and held that ungovernability was not an act that would
38. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
39. That armed robbery is also a delinquent act, see note 5 supra, does not
mean that it cannot fit within the statutory language defining CINS behavior. See
note 7 supra.
40. See Joint Record Extract at 29-30, [Records and Briefs], In re Spalding,
273 Md. 690 (1975).
41. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1976). Because all the adults who en-
gaged in the perverted practices with Spalding were prosecuted, it is likely that were
she an adult Spalding also would have been prosecuted. Although the court referred
to Spalding as a victim, only her age seems to distinguish her situation from that of
the prosecuted adults. As the term normally is used in the context of a prosecution
for perverted practices, "victim" denotes one who did not consent to the act. See, e.g.,
Saldivera v. State, 217 Md. 412, 420, 143 A.2d 70, 74-75 (1958). At no stage of the
proceedings was a specific finding made that Spalding did not consent to participating
in sexual activities with the adults, and it would seem anomolous for her to be
adjudged a CINS on the basis of acts which she committed involuntarily. See
note 7 supra.
42. Spalding apparently admitted to these allegations in her statements to the
police on January 31, 1973. See 273 Md. at 693, 332 A2d at 248. Her statements
were subsequently introduced into evidence by the state at the CINS hearing before
the Juvenile Court. Id. at 695-96, 332 A.2d at 249.
43. Although the name of the drug Spalding used is not mentioned in the record,
the petition alleged that she had consumed prohibited narcotics, see text accompany-
ing note 12 supra. These pills apparently were of the same type given to her to use
at home. See 273 Md. at 692-93, 332 A.2d at 248. Assuming the petition was correct
in describing the drug as a controlled narcotic, then under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 287 (1976), it would have been a crime for her to "possess or administer" them.
44. See 273 Md. at 711-12, 332 A.2d at 258 (dissenting opinion).
45. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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be a crime if committed by an adult. As noted above, however, either
criminal or non-criminal acts may be considered ungovernable behavior.
In looking only to the conclusion that a juvenile is ungovernable and in
ignoring the underlying acts which contribute to that conclusion, the
Spalding court's application of the Gault test fails to distinguish between
those juveniles who have committed criminal acts and those who have
not. Under this approach, neither group satisfies the test and Gault rights
are denied in both situations. This application allows the state to cir-
cumvent the requirements of Gault by proceeding under a CINS petition,
no matter how "criminal" the acts underlying the petition actually are.
The Supreme Court noted in Gault that the availability of the protection
against self-incrimination should not turn on whether a proceeding is
labeled "civil," as many juvenile proceedings were and still are, or "crimi-
al."'46 Likewise, the "delinquency" or "ungovernability" labels should not be
determinative, yet the application of the Gault test by the Spalding court,
in focusing on the conclusion in the petition that the child was ungovernable
rather than on the allegations underlying such a conclusion, allows the
availability of Gault constitutional rights to turn in part on the use of
conclusory labels by the state.
47
In addition to holding that Spalding was not charged with any acts
that would be criminal if committed by an adult, the court also seemed to
conclude that she had not committed any criminal acts. There is some
inconsistency in even considering the nature of Spalding's participation
in the sex and drug activities: given the court's conclusion that Spalding
was charged only with being ungovernable, and not with any acts that
would satisfy the Gault test, it would appear unnecessary to also consider
the specific factual allegations which in the court's view, were not the acts
46. See 387 U.S. at 49-50.
47. The court implied that, had the allegation of delinquency not been dropped,
see note 14 supra, the Gault test might have been met. 273 Md. at 709, 332 A.2d
at 256-57.
The Court of Appeals itself observed that labels should not determine the
availability of constitutional guarantees, see id. at 703, 332 A.2d at 253, although lan-
guage at the conclusion of the opinion appears to indicate otherwise. See text accom-
panying note 28 supra. The role of labels was considered in In re H., 5 Cal. App. 3d
781, 85 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Ct. App. 1970), where a juvenile accused of beating another
child to death confessed under circumstances which violated the rule of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The juvenile originally was charged under the
California equivalent to the Maryland delinquency statute, see note 5 supra, and the
confession therefore would have been inadmissible under Gault. See 387 U.S. at 55,
56 & n.97. However, the petition was amended and the juvenile was charged under
the California equivalent to CINS. See note 7 supra. The judge then admitted the
confession into evidence, apparently on the theory that Gault did not apply in that
proceeding. The appellate court held this reversible error, stating, "The courts may
not alter or eliminate constitutional rights of a minor in such a manner." 5 Cal. App.
3d at 791, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 365. See also In re R., 274 Cal. App. 2d 749, 79 Cal. Rptr.




charged. Yet Spalding's participation in these activities was considered
and it was determined that she was a "victim" in the context of the events
described. 48 The court concluded that she therefore had not committed any
acts that would be criminal if committed by an adult,49 reasoning that
because it would not be criminal for an adult to be the victim of a sex or
drug crime, 50 the state's attempts to show that Spalding was the victim of
sex and drug crimes did not amount to allegations of criminal acts. Ap-
parently the court used the term "victim" to indicate that Spalding lacked
mens rea, and for that reason was not guilty of "criminal" participation
in the illegal activities, as her acts clearly would have been crimes if com-
mitted by an adult who had the mens rea required for conviction of the
crimes discussed above.5 1
The court's "victim" analysis appears unsound. The CINS category
was created to allow the treatment of children "guilty of misconduct
peculiarly reflecting the propensities and susceptibilities of youth. '52 In
finding Spalding to be a CINS, by implication the court did not consider
entirely innocent her participation in the illegal sex and drug activities.
It is anomalous to consider Spalding sufficiently culpable to be found guilty
of misconduct in a CINS proceeding based on her use of narcotics and
participation in perverted practices, and yet to hold that she was not
sufficiently culpable to have been found guilty of the crimes of perverted
practices and possession of narcotics had she been an adult. The victim
of sexual mistreatment would hardly seem guilty of misconduct, while one
whose misconduct consisted of committing acts which are illegal would
seem to have committed a crime. The only significant results of Spalding's
victim status were that she was adjudged a CINS instead of a delinquent 53
and that she was denied Gault constitutional guarantees. Under the
Spalding court's analysis the state can circumvent the requirements of
Gault in any proceeding against a juvenile who has engaged in criminal
behavior with adults. 54 The juvenile can be labeled a victim of the adults,
CINS proceedings can be instituted, and the juvenile thus can be found to
have committed the criminal acts involved without receiving the safeguards
48. See 273 Md. at 708-09, 332 A.2d at 256.
49. The court referred to an "absence of suggested criminality" on Spalding's
part and found no unexplained allegations of delinquency in the record. Id. at 708-09,
332 A.2d at 256-57.
50. But cf. Nutter v. State, 8 Md. App. 635, 644-45, 262 A.2d 80, 86-87 (1970).
51. See notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra.
52. 273 Md. at 700, 332 A.2d at 252, quoting from In re Carter, 20 Md. App. 633,
653, 318 A.2d 269, 281 (1974).
53. The court stated that "since [Spalding] was, in fact, a victim, the charge of
'delinquency' in the petition must be regarded as simply an unexplained anomaly."
273 Md. at 708, 332 A.2d at 256.
54. A Baltimore newspaper recently reported the arrest of six persons on
charges stemming from alleged sexual relations with children. A sixteen year old
male, apparently associated with the six, was being held as a possible CINS. See The
Evening Sun (Baltimore), June 16, 1976, § C, at 1, col. 6.
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required by Gault. Speaking in terms of fifth amendment protections, the
Supreme Court addressed this situation in Gault:
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment
all statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to
"criminal" involvement .... To hold otherwise would be to disregard
substance because of the feeble enticement of the "civil" label-of-
convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings. 65
Similarly, to hold that Spalding's statements were not protected by the
fifth amendment in the CINS proceeding because she was charged with
acts which, because of her mental state, constituted only misconduct and
not criminal involvement, seems again to be disregarding substance in
favor of the "victim" label attached to her.
Because the Spalding court held that the first prong of the Gault
test was not satisfied, it did not consider whether under the second prong
Spalding faced possible commitment to a state institution. 6 It is clear that
this prong would have been satisfied under the law in effect at the time
of Spalding's proceedings, because a juvenile court judge was authorized
to commit
any child in need of supervision ...to the custody of the Secretary
of Health and Mental Hygiene, or to any public or private institution
or agency other than the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
or to the custody of a person selected by said judge.57
Limitations on this broad authority provided that no CINS child could
be placed in an institution "designed or operated for the benefit of delin-
quent children."5 18 However, exceptions to this limitation existed so that
it was possible for CINS children to be confined in such institutions. 59
Under these exceptions Spalding clearly faced possible commitment to a
state institution, thus satisfying the second prong of the Gault test.
A harder question concerns the application of the second prong of
the Gault test to future CINS proceedings in Maryland. Since the time
of the Spalding hearing, the Maryland Code has been amended to prohibit
55. 387 U.S. at 49-50.
56. See 273 Md. at 709, 332 A.2d at 257.
57. Ch. 480, [1971] Laws of Md. (repealed 1975).
58. Chs. 515, 616, [1971] Laws of Md., amending ch. 432, [1969) Laws of Md.
59. Ch. 515, [1971] Laws of Md., amending ch. 432, [1969] Laws of Md.,
provided that the limitation on confining CINS children in institutions or other
facilities designed or operated for the benefit of delinquent children would not apply
to facilities designated by the State Department of Juvenile Services of the Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene. Ch. 616, [1971] Laws of Md., amending ch. 432,
[1969] Laws of Md., provided that a CINS child
shall not be detained in a jail or other facility intended or used for the detention
of adults charged with criminal offenses or for children adjudicated or alleged to
be delinquent unless (1) adequate facilities have not been established, and (2)
it appears to the satisfaction of the court or other person designated by the court
that public safety and protection reasonably require such detention.
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absolutely the commitment of CINS children either to penal institutions
used for the confinement of adults charged with or convicted of crimes or
to facilities used for the confinement of delinquent children.60 Yet the
Code does allow CINS children to be committed to the custody of the
Juvenile Services Administration, to a local Department of Social Services,
to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, or to a public or licensed
private agency.61 The issue in applying the second prong of the Gault test
to present CINS proceedings in Maryland is whether, in light of existing
limitations on the places to which a CINS child may be committed, there
is a commitment involving a possible deprivation of liberty sufficient to
trigger the Gault constitutional safeguards. 62
The negative aspects of life in an institution for delinquents that were
cited in the Gault opinion as restraints on a juvenile's liberty included forced
physical confinement, separation from parents and friends, and enforced
association with other juveniles confined for anything "from waywardness
to rape and homicide."'63 Only the latter consideration has been remedied
significantly by the limitations on CINS commitments in Maryland. A
CINS child no longer can be institutionalized with delinquent children,
thus helping to shield CINS children from forced association with delin-
quent children confined for more serious offenses.6 4 There is no statutory
prohibition, however, against either forced physical confinement or separa-
tion from parents and friends in institutional surroundings. These aspects
of juvenile liberty remain in jeopardy in a CINS proceeding.
Further, a stigma attaches when a child is adjudged a CINS that
certainly impinges on a juvenile's liberty to the extent that it may make
future employment difficult to obtain.65 The fact of adjudication, regardless
whether the juvenile is institutionalized, creates this stigma, and it is
therefore outside the liberty considerations measured by the second prong
of the Gault test; however, it still should be weighed in determining whether
a juvenile has a sufficient liberty interest at stake in a CINS proceeding to
require Gault constitutional safeguards. While the current Code limits
the places to which a CINS child may be committed, a child still faces
possible institutionalization and stigmatization, and the liberty interest at
stake would seem sufficient to require the same constitutional safeguards
afforded delinquent children. The only apparent distinction in Maryland
60. MD. CTS. & JuD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-823 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
61. Id. § 3-820 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
62. Although "commit" is defined in the Code as "to transfer legal custody," see
MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE AxN. § 3 - 8 01(g) (Cum. Supp. 1975), the pertinent Gault
standard of "commitment to a state institution" is used to signify a deprivation of
liberty sufficient to require constitutional safeguards in the proceeding in which the
liberty is at stake, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1967).
63. 387 U.S. at 27.
64. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
65. See Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383,
1401-02 & n.116 (1974).
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between an adjudication of CINS and a adjudication of delinquency in
terms of infringement on liberty is that commitment is to different kinds
of institutions.66
Spalding appears to have been improperly decided on the first prong
of the Gault test.67 In the process, the court has created routes that would
allow the state to avoid the requirements of Gault in CINS proceedings.
Under Spalding the state can bring CINS proceedings against a juvenile
who has committed an act that would be a crime if committed by an
adult and yet not afford the child constitutional protections, either by
charging him only with being ungovernable or by labeling him a victim.
Further, by deciding Spalding solely on the basis of the first prong of the
Gault test, the court avoided the difficult issue posed under the second
prong of Gault.
66. See In re Carter, 20 Md. App. 633, 653, 318 A.2d 269, 281 (1974) ("[C]or-
rection and rehabilitation [of a CINS child] are designed to take place in an
environment - of the group home, the foster home, or like unit - which duplicates as
nearly as possible the intimacy, closeness and wholesomeness of the natural family
environment."). That atmosphere may be different from a training school, but the
question is whether the juvenile has lost his liberty. Whether committed to a foster
home, a group home, or a similar unit, the juvenile nonetheless is confined in a state
institution away from his home, parents, and friends.
67. Perhaps the Court of Appeals' refusal to apply the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination in a CINS proceeding reflects the court's doubt about the
soundness of the Gault holding. If application of Gault principles to Spalding required
an expansion of the Gault holding, then doubts about Gault's soundness would justify
a refusal to extend it. However, application of the fifth amendment privilege in
Spalding would not have required an expansion of Gault, as evidenced by the Spalding
court's failure to meaningfully distinguish the two cases.
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I. CHALLENGING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A SEARCH
A criminal defendant has an established fourth amendment' right to
challenge a search or arrest made pursuant to a warrant on the ground that
the officer who obtained the warrant presented insufficient evidence to
the issuing magistrate to support an independent judicial determination of
the existence of probable cause.2 A similar challenge to the existence of
probable cause is allowed when an officer conducts a warrantless search
or arrest.8 In either case a successful challenge results in exclusion from
the defendant's trial of the fruits of the constitutional violation.4 How-
ever, whether an accused may also contest the lawfulness of the officer's
source of information has not been so clearly determined, and whether
he may further attack the veracity of that information remains largely an
open question. The Maryland Court of Appeals considered these prob-
lems in a series of cases decided during the September Term, 1974.5
A. Search Warrants
In Carter v. State6 the defendant was convicted of possession of heroin
with intent to distribute. The evidence against him consisted of a quantity
of heroin seized from his apartment pursuant to a search warrant. The
warrant had been issued upon an application and accompanying affidavit
of a police officer, based chiefly on information obtained from a "reliable
confidential source of information" which was not further identified. 7
At a pretrial suppression hearing8 counsel for the defendant proffered
evidence that the information used as a basis for the affidavit had been
obtained by illegal electronic surveillance. The proffer was refused and
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925).
Probable cause exists when the known facts and circumstances would warrant a
reasonably prudent person in believing that a particular offense has been committed.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
3. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
4. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 337 A.2d 415 (1975) ; Everhart v. State, 274
Md. 459, 337 A.2d 100 (1975); Waugh v. State, 275 Md. 22, 338 A.2d 268 (1975).
6. 274 Md. 411, 337 A.2d 415 (1975).
7. Id. at 413-19, 337 A.2d at 417-20.
8. See MD. R.P. 729.
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the motion to suppress denied, the trial judge ruling that the defendant
could not inquire beyond the confines of the affidavit to challenge the
existence of probable cause.9 The ensuing conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Special Appeals,' 0 which held that direct police observations
enumerated in the affidavit" clearly established probable cause and were
"not even arguably the fruits of some poisonous tree.' 2 Furthermore,
even if an unlawful eavesdrop could have been shown, the Court of
Special Appeals considered it questionable whether evidence of such il-
legality would "diminish facially adequate probable cause.'1 3
The Court of Appeals reversed. Besides finding a direct statutory
basis for its decision in sections 2515 and 2518(10)(a) of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,14 the Carter court relied
on constitutional doctrine developed in two lines of Supreme Court deci-
sions. The Court established modern guidelines for electronic eaves-
dropping in three cases decided during the 1960's. 15 These decisions
established that conversation is within the protection of the fourth amend-
ment and the use of electronic devices to capture conversation is a search
within the meaning of the amendment.' 6 A second series of cases de-
veloped the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, defining principles to
be used in determining whether evidence derived from an unconstitutional
arrest or search must be excluded.' 7 The rule which has emerged is that
9. 274 Md. at 419-21, 337 A.2d at 420-21.
10. No. 404 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 14, 1974) (unreported per curiam opinion).
11. These observations consisted of visual surveillance of frequent trips by
Carter from his apartment to another address where he remained only for short
periods of time and similar surveillance of visits by others to Carter's apartment.
The visits were considered by the investigating officers to be occasions for narcotics
deliveries. 274 Md. at 413-19, 337 A.2d at 417-20.
12. No. 404 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 14, 1974) quoted at 274 Md. 422, 337
A.2d at 422.
13. Id.
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). See 274 Md. at 424-29, 337 A.2d at 423-26.
For discussion of this aspect of the Carter decision, see notes 94-98 and accompanying
text infra.
15. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (requiring judicial authorization
for an electronic invasion of the privacy upon which an accused has justifiably relied) ;
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (holding New York's electronic surveil-
lance statute too broad in its sweep to meet fourth amendment requirements);
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (upholding the limited use of a
concealed tape recorder by an informant when court authorization had been obtained
through a detailed factual application.
16. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967).
17. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338 (1939) ; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
After early statements by the Court of Appeals to the effect that the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine was not applicable to the states, see, e.g., Mefford v.
State, 235 Md. 497, 511, 201 A.2d 824, 831 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 937 (1965),
the court now recognizes that the doctrine is of constitutional origin and is applicable
to state prosecutions. Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459, 480-81 n.4, 337 A.2d 100, 112
rn4 (1975). See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
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"'knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by
it' simply because it is used derivatively,"' 8 unless the connection between
the primary illegality and the use of the knowledge has "become so atten-
uated as to dissipate the taint."' 9 The Carter court concluded from these
two lines of cases that
if any conversation of Carter or any conversation overheard upon his
premises . . . was subjected to a "search and seizure" by the use of
any wire tap or eavesdropping device, in violation of his rights under
the Fourth Amendment, . . . any information garnered as "fruits" of
such primary illegality and "come upon" by the "exploitation" of
that illegality cannot . . . be used as derivative evidence for an appli-
cation for a search and seizure warrant .... 20
The court held, therefore, that Carter was entitled to present evidence
of an allegedly illegal eavesdrop in an attempt to show that such illegality
tainted the facts set forth in the affidavit; if such taint were shown, the
evidence seized under the search warrant would have to be suppressed. 21
In Everhart v. State22 the court made it clear that the Carter decision
could stand solely on constitutional grounds. Narcotics and narcotics
paraphernalia seized from the defendant's residence pursuant to a search
warrant were used as evidence to convict him of maintaining a common
nuisance and possessing marijuana. The warrant was issued on the basis
of an affidavit which alleged that police officers had visited the farmhouse
which Everhart leased and "obtained" narcotics that had been reported
stolen.2 3 At a pretrial suppression hearing Everhart contended that the
18. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), quoting from Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
19. INardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
20. 274 Md. at 438-39, 337 A.2d at 431. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 177 (1969) (If police make an illegal search, "[n]othing seen or found
on the premises may legally form the basis for an arrest or search warrant or for
testimony at the homeowner's trial, since the prosecution would be using the fruits
of a Fourth Amendment violation.").
21. 274 Md. at 438-40, 337 A.2d at 431-32. Unlike the Court of Special Appeals,
the Court of Appeals did not conclude that there was sufficient untainted information
in the affidavit to establish probable cause. Id. at 442-43, 337 A.2d at 433. The court
ruled that its holding in Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 289 A.2d 575 (1972), required a
new trial rather than a restricted remand for an evidentiary hearing. 274 Md. at 443,
337 A.2d at 433-34.
22. 274 Md. 459, 337 A.2d 100 (1975).
23. Id. at 462-63, 337 A.2d at 102-03. Two other allegations were based on
information obtained from an informant: that the informant had previously visited
the farm in an effort to purchase heroin, and that another resident of the farmhouse
had sold heroin to a known drug user. The Court of Appeals found these allegations
insufficient to establish probable cause. The first was held to be "per se factually
innocuous," raising "no more than a suspicion or possibility." Id. at 473, 337 A.2d
at 108. The second allegation was found lacking in that it failed to indicate the
informant's "basis of knowledge" for the claim, as required by Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964). 274 Md. at 474, 337 A.2d at 109.
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narcotics to which the affidavit referred had been obtained by an illegal
search and seizure and that such evidence could not be used to support
the existence of probable cause for a search warrant. 24 A motion to sup-
press was denied on the ground that the application as a whole contained
ample facts to establish probable cause.25 The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed without reaching the issue of possible taint resulting from the
allegedly illegal search.2 6 The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, hold-
ing that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, as applied in Carter,
controlled. If the information set forth in the affidavit
was come upon or derived as a result of an illegal search and seizure,
such primary illegality - in the absence of evidence of attenuation
or a source independent of such "taint" - precludes the use of such
derivative evidence from being a valid basis for establishing the exist-
ence of probable cause, under the doctrine of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree."'27
Because the court was unable to determine from the record whether an
illegal search had in fact occurred,28 the case was remanded for a new
trial in order to afford Everhart an opportunity to establish the alleged
illegality.
2 9
24. 274 at 463-64, 337 A.2d at 103.
25. Id. at 466-67, 337 A.2d at 104-05.
26. 20 Md. App. 71, 315 A.2d 80 (1974). The Court of Special Appeals found
that the taint issue had not been procedurally preserved for judicial review, construing
the record as demonstrating that the defendant acquiesced in the ruling of the trial
judge. Id. at 78-80, 315 A.2d at 86-87. The Court of Appeals held that the lower
court had misconstrued the record and that the ruling was properly reviewable under
MD. R.P. 729(g) (2) : "A pre-trial ruling, denying a motion or petition to suppress,
exclude or return property seized, shall in any event be reviewable on appeal to the
appropriate appellate court or on a hearing on a motion for a new trial." 274 Md.
at 470-72, 337 A.2d at 107-08.
27. 274 Md. at 480, 337 A.2d at 112.
28. During Everhart's trial it was shown that the warrantless search in question
had been conducted by two officers who, upon approaching the farmhouse, noticed a
number of trash bags outside, opened one, and found narcotics. Id. at 469, 337 A.2d at
106. The Court of Appeals held that on remand it would be necessary to determine
whether the seized items were abandoned property, and hence not within the protection
of the fourth amendment, or were in a location and of such a nature as to fall within
the zone where Everhart had a "legitimate expectation of privacy." Id. at 483, 337
A.2d at 114; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
29. 274 Md. at 483, 337 A.2d at 114. The Everhart court decided that the proper
manner for a criminal defendant to challenge evidence obtained under a warrant
which was issued on the basis of an allegedly illegal search is by a motion to suppress
made under Maryland Rule 729; thus, an illegal search is not a ground for dismissal
of an indictment even where the indictment was based on tainted evidence. Id. at 486-87,
337 A.2d at 116. The court thereby abandoned its holding in State v. Siegel, 266 Md.
256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972) (sustaining dismissal of an indictment because of an invalid
order authorizing electronic surveillance), in favor of the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966) (exclusion of evidence is
an adequate remedy for violations of constitutional rights, whereas barring prosecution
altogether is too drastic an interference with the public interest in seeing the guilty
432 [VOL. 36
1976] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 433
The trial courts in Carter and Everhart each relied on the "four
corners" rule as a basis for their decisions that a defendant, in challenging
the legality of a search, could not inquire beyond the confines (four corners)
of an affidavit that demonstrated facially adequate probable cause.80 The
rule, as stated in Smith v. State81 and consistently followed since that
decision, 32 is that "consideration of the showing of probable cause should
be confined solely to the affidavit itself, and the truth of the alleged
grounds stated in the affidavit cannot be controverted . . . ."3 The sec-
ond phrase of the statement may be read as qualifying the first, thereby
limiting operation of the rule to cases involving challenges to truth; the
Court of Appeals has applied the rule only in such circumstances. How-
ever, the scope of the rule apparently had been broadened by lower courts,
as in Carter and Everhart, to prohibit attacks on the source of an affiant's
information as well.84 While the Carter and Everhart decisions held
impermissible this extension of the four corners rule to cases involving
brought to justice). See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45 (1975)
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 60 (1972).
Carter and Everhart establish procedural guidelines for suppression hearings
held under Maryland Rule 729. In order to inquire beyond the face of an affidavit
when challenging the legality of the source of the information set forth therein, a
defendant must support his motion to suppress with "precise and specific factual
averments and not conclusory allegations." Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459, 488,
337 A.2d 100, 117 (1975). The defendant is then entitled to an adversary proceeding
at which he may cross-examine appropriate officials. Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411,
443-44, 337 A.2d 415, 434 (1975). If he goes forward with evidence to establish
that the source of the information was an illegal search, the burden then shifts to
the prosecution to show that the facts alleged in the affidavit were discovered in-
dependently or that the connection between the illegality and the use of the illegally
obtained information had become "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Id. at 443,
337 A.2d at 434; see Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969);
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). In cases involving electronic
eavesdropping, the prosecution must disclose to the defendant the intercept logs and
all materials and records of those overheard conversations which it was not entitled
to use against him. Carter v. State, supra at 443, 337 A.2d at 434; see Alderman
v. United States, supra at 183. Disclosed conversations must include any in which
the defendant participated, or which took place on his premises, or with respect to
which he otherwise has standing as an "aggrieved person." Carter v. State, supra
at 443, 337 A.2d at 434; see Alderman v. United States, supra at 176; 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(11) (1970).
30. Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 439-40, 337 A.2d 415, 432 (1975); Everhart
v. State, 274 Md. 459, 478-79, 337 A.2d 100, 111 (1975).
31. 191 Md. 329, 62 A.2d 287 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 925 (1949).
32. See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 244 Md. 488, 224 A.2d 111 (1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1024 (1967) ; Tischler v. State, 206 Md. 386, 111 A.2d 655 (1955) ; Harris v.
State, 203 Md. 165, 99 A.2d 725 (1953).
33. 191 Md. at 335, 62 A.2d at 289.
34. One situation to which the four corners rule has been held not to apply is
that of a challenge based on an allegation that the named affiant did not in fact
swear to the affidavit. Smith v. State, 191 Md. 329, 336, 62 A.2d 287, 289-90 (1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 925 (1949).
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the legality of the source, the Court of Appeals maintained that the rule,
properly limited to challenges to truth, retained viability. 35
However, to hold that an accused may challenge the legality of the
source of information contained in an affidavit but may not challenge the
truth86 of that information may lead to anomalous results. For example,
if the defendant in Carter had alleged not that the "reliable confidential
source" named in the affidavit was a wiretap,37 but rather that no source
existed at all, he would not have been permitted to inquire beyond the
four corners of the affidavit. Furthermore, questions of source and truth
frequently merge; if the source in Carter were indeed a wiretap, not
identifying it as such was a deception on the part of the affiant.35 A false-
hood may be employed to conceal a prior illegal search; it may happen
that a search previously unknown to the defendant will be revealed only
upon a challenge to a known misrepresentation. An additional concern
is that an announced rule permitting challenges to affidavits based on
illegal sources but not to those containing falsehoods may, while deterring
the former, further encourage the latter. Either type of official misconduct
seems offensive to fundamental notions of fairness and judicial integrity.3 9
35. Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 440, 337 A.2d 415, 432 (1975) ; Everhart v.
State, 274 Md. 459, 478-79, 337 A.2d 100, 111 (1975).
36. Courts and writers considering the question would permit challenges to certain
categories of unintentional misstatements, if material to the showing of probable
cause, as well as to intentional falsehoods, whether material or not. See, e.g., United
States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 1973) (reckless material mis-
statement) ; United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1973) cert. denied,
423 U.S. 844 (1975) (any material misstatements) ; Kipperman, Inaccurate Search
Warrants as a Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REv. 825, 831-33 (1971)
(negligent material misstatements) ; Comment, The Outwardly Sufficient Search
Warrant: What If It's False?, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 96, 139-46 (1971) (any material
misstatements). Given that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is the deter-
rence of official misconduct, see, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3048 (1976),
there would appear to be little justification for excluding evidence when an affidavit
contains innocent misstatements. Suppressing evidence obtained as a product of
inaccuracies stated negligently or recklessly may, however, serve to encourage more
carefully drawn affidavits, thus perhaps justifying application of the exclusionary rule.
37. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
38. Carter did assert in his motion to suppress that a "deception" had been prac-
ticed upon the issuing court. The Court of Appeals, however, found the "principal
thrust" of his argument to be that the facts in the affidavit were derived from an illegal
source, and therefore disregarded Carter's alternative claim of deception. Carter v.
State, 274 Md. 411, 440, 337 A.2d 415, 432 (1975).
39. Indeed, courts that do permit challenges to the veracity of an affidavit
apparently consider the inclusion of perjured statements to be, in a sense, a more
serious act of governmental wrongdoing than the presentation of information obtained
from an unlawful search. It is universally recognized that when an affidavit is based
at least in part on an unlawful search, only those statements tainted by the illegality
must be excised; if untainted information sufficient to establish probable cause re-
mains, the warrant is upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888, 894
(5th Cir. 1974); James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
United States v. Sterling, 369 F.2d 799, 802 (3d Cir. 1966); Chin Kay v. United
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To allow searches to be authorized on the basis of false affidavits
raises substantial fourth amendment concerns. The problem differs from
that raised in Carter and Everhart, where the focus was on fourth amend-
ment violations occasioned by searches which allegedly preceded appli-
cations for warrants. There, the major concern was to deter the initial
unconstitutional acts; it was found, under the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine, that deterrence could only be effectuated by the suppression
of all evidence derived, through subsequent warrant-authorized searches,
from those initial violations. 40 Where the truth of an affidavit is chal-
lenged, attention should shift from the intrinsic nature of the initial act of
state officers to the ultimate effect of that act on the warrant-issuing
process. Making false statements in an affidavit is not by itself an uncon-
stitutional act, but the problem of the overall effect on fourth amendment
guarantees remains.
The fourth amendment commands that in order for a warrant to issue
there must be a factual showing from which a neutral and detached
magistrate can make an independent determination of the existence of
probable cause.41 It has been said that "the obvious assumption is that
there will be a truthful showing, ' 42 and indeed, the assumption of truth-
fulness seems basic to the warrant procedure. It is doubtful whether it
can be said that a magistrate truly made an independent determination
when the facts upon which his decision was based were false - i.e., it is
questionable whether a determination based on misrepresentations is really
a determination at all. A magistrate may not, of course, rely on conclu-
sory allegations to decide the existence of probable cause ;43 neither should
he rely on false allegations. In either case there is interference with what
should be an independent decisionmaking process. Permitting searches
authorized on the basis of false affidavits to go unchallenged essentially
subverts the fourth amendment warrant requirement. If a warrant may
be issued on the basis of a false affidavit, there is little reason for requiring
that a warrant be obtained; the basic determination would already have
been made by "the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
States, 311 F.2d 317, 321-22 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 442,
337 A.2d 415, 433 (1975). However, if an affidavit contains any perjured statement,
even if nonessential to the showing of probable cause, the warrant is rendered totally
invalid. See, e.g., United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 1974) ; United
States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888, 894 (5th Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Carmichael, 489
F.2d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 1973).
40. See notes 20 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
41. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
42. United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see
Forkosch, The Constitutional Right to Challenge the Content of Affidavits in Warrants
Issued Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 Omo ST. L.J. 297, 305-07 (1973). Addi-
tional support for this premise has been found in the history of the warrant require-
ment. Id. at 314-29.
43. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112-16 (1964); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
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ferreting out crime."'4 4 As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit recently stated in permitting challenges to the veracity of
affidavits :
A contrary rule would leave the warrant requirement embodied in
the fourth amendment open to circumvention by overzealous officials
willing to make erroneous affidavits in the hope that the resultant
search or arrest will yield conclusive proof of criminal conduct. The
warrant procedure operates on the assumption that statements in the
affidavit presented to the issuing magistrate are at least an accurate
representation of what the affiant knows though possibly inadequate
to show probable cause. It would quickly deteriorate into a meaningless
formality were we to approve searches or arrests based upon mis-
representation or incorrect factual statements. Thus when an affidavit
contains inaccurate statements which materially affect its showing of
probable cause, any warrant based upon it is rendered invalid. 45
Nevertheless, the four corners rule, although abandoned by most
federal circuits46 and frequently criticized by commentators, 47 continues
to be followed by numerous states.48 The reasons given in justification of
the rule are less than satisfying. One argument often advanced in support
of the rule is that judging the truth of the information in an affidavit is
a matter for the judicial officer who issued the warrant; his determination
affords sufficient protection to the accused, and to permit a subsequent
44. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
45. United States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 1973).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1975) ; United States v.
Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Marihart, 492 F.2d 897
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 827 (1974) ; United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d
983, 987-90 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664, 667-72 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 844 (1975) ; United States v. Gonzalez, 488 F.2d 833,
836-38 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1972);
King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398, 400 n.4 (4th Cir. 1960) (dictum). But see
United States v. Wong, 470 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1972).
47. See, e.g., Grano, A Dilemma For Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search
Warrants and the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405, 411-27; Kipper-
man, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing Evidence,
84 HARv. L. REv. 825 (1971) ; Mascolo, Impeaching the Credibility of Affidavits for
Search Warrants: Piercing the Presumption of Validity, 44 CONN. B.J. 9 (1970);
Comment, Controverting Probable Cause in Facially Sufficient Affidavits, 63 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 41 (1972); Comment, The Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant: What
If It's False?, U.C.L.A.L. REv. 96 (1971).
48. See, e.g., People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 258 N.E.2d 341, cert. denied, 410 U.S.
945 (1973) ; Caslin v. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1973) ; State v. Petillo,
61 N.J. 165, 293 A.2d 649 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973); Southard v.
State, 297 P.2d 585 (Okla. Crim. 1956); Owens v. State, 399 S.W.2d 507 (Tenn.
1965) ; Phenix v. State, 488 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Crim. 1973). But see, e.g., State v.
Davenport, 510 P.2d 78 (Alas. 1973) ; Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501
P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972) (interpreting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1538.5-1540
(West 1970)) ; State v. Boyd, 224 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974) ; People v. Alfinito, 16
N.Y.2d 181, 211 N.E.2d 644, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1965); Commonwealth v. Hall, 451
Pa. 201, 302 A.2d 342 (1973).
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hearing on the issue would detract from his judicial function.4  However,
even assuming the magistrate has a sincere interest in attempting to in-
vestigate the truth of the allegations in an affidavit,5 0 he can seldom make
an effective ex parte inquiry because he generally has no factual basis
for doubting their veracity. In most circumstances only the accused
possesses both the interest and the knowledge necessary to challenge the
truth of the facts alleged in an affidavit; therefore, an investigation made
in his absence cannot effectively uncover falsehoods. Furthermore, review
of a magistrate's determination of veracity detracts no more from his
function than does review of his decision on sufficiency, a review to which
the accused has an established right.51 Fears have been expressed that a
hearing on veracity would approach a trial on the merits52 and that to per-
mit such hearings would place a significant added burden on the criminal
justice system.53 But surely courts possess the competence and flexibility
to resolve such problems; they have already adapted so that they may
consider challenges to the sufficiency of evidence in the affidavit. 54 Ex-
panding such hearings to allow challenges to veracity, while creating some
additional burden, would seem justified given the fourth amendment in-
terests involved. Many of the supposed difficulties could be obviated by
placing an initial burden on the accused to advance specific allegations in
support of his challenge before a hearing is granted. 55 It has also been
suggested that allowing challenges to veracity would lead to disclosure of
the identities of informants who have provided information used in affi-
davits. 58 However, the issue at a suppression hearing would be the
veracity of the affiant, not the veracity of the informant; only deterrence
of false statements by the affiant, the officer of the state, should be sought.5
49. People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 144, 258 N.E.2d 341, 343, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
882 (1970) ; State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 173-74, 293 A.2d 649, 653 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 945 (1973).
50. The amount of scrutiny to which an application for a search warrant is
customarily subjected is open to question. See Grano, A Dilemma For Defense
Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search Warrants and the Possibility of Police Perjury,
1971 U. IL. L.F. 405, 414-15.
51. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
52. State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 177, 293 A.2d 649, 655 (1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 945 (1973).
53. Id.
54. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1973)
United States v. Dunnings, 425 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1002 (1970).
56. People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 145-46, 258 N.E.2d 341, 344, cert. denied, 400
U.S. 882 (1970). McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), held that an accused has no
constitutional right to demand disclosure of an informant's identity.
57. Assurances of the informant's veracity are sought by the tests of Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). A
number of decisions have distinguished between the veracity of the affiant and the
veracity of the informant. See, e.g., Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501
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Although the judge conducting the suppression hearing may have the
discretion to require disclosure of an informant's identity when necessary
to advance the inquiry, it is certainly not clear that such disclosure would
be routinely required.
Another major argument presented in support of the four corners
rule is that a prosecution for perjury is a sufficient deterrent to the making
of false statements in an affidavit.58 However, aside from the fact that
this argument assumes that there ought to be no sanction for uninten-
tional misstatements, 59 the threat of possible prosecution for perjury is
simply not an effective deterrent. A criminal defendant will generally
have little interest in attempting to initiate a perjury prosecution; his
chief concern is, of course, with his own criminal charges, and he does not
personally benefit from prosecution of the officer who allegedly committed
perjury. Problems of convincing prosecutors to conduct investigations and
initiate prosecutions and of establishing proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt also contribute to make perjury convictions highly unlikely.60 Al-
though the value of the exclusionary rule has been the subject of increasing
scrutiny and controversy, as yet there has been no fundamental retreat
from the use of the rule as a deterrent to official wrongdoing.,6 In the
absence of other effective deterrents, resort to the exclusionary rule as a
remedy for false affidavits seems appropriate.
The policy considerations, whatever their validity, that courts have
cited in rejecting challenges to the truth of facts alleged in an affidavit
are equally valid in situations involving the source of the allegations.
When faced with a challenge to the source of an affidavit, a court that
followed the four corners rule would be concerned with the propriety of
reviewing the magistrate's decision, with the potential burden placed on
the judicial system, and with determining an appropriate sanction. In
deciding Carter and Everhart as it did, the Court of Appeals apparently
P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972) ; People v. Arnold, 186 Colo. 372, 527 P.2d 806
(1974) ; State v. Melson, 284 So. 2d 873 (La. 1973) ; State v. Baca, 84 N.M. 513, 505
P.2d 856 (1973).
58. People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 144, 258 N.E.2d 341, 343, cert. denied, 400
U.S. 882 (1970); State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 174, 293 A.2d 649, 654 (1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973). An apparent belief in the efficacy of the perjury sanc-
tion has also been advanced in Maryland decisions. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 191 Md.
329, 339, 62 A.2d 287, 291 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 925 (1949).
59. See note 36 supra.
60. See Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search War-
rants and the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405, 421; Comment,
Controverting Probable Cause in Facially Sufficient Affidavits, 63 J. CRM. L.C. &
P.S. 41, 46 (1972).
61. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976); United States v. Janis,
96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976). In Stone v. Powell the Court, while limiting the jurisdiction
of federal courts to hear fourth amendment claims raised by habeas corpus petitions,




concluded that when the legality of the source of the affidavit is challenged
these policy reasons must yield to other considerations, the fourth amend-
ment requirements embodied in the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.62
Why the policy considerations should not also yield to the fourth amend-
ment concerns raised by false allegations in an affidavit has not been
adequately answered.
The Carter and Everhart decisions, by expressing clearly the rule
that evidence obtained from an illegal search cannot be used as a basis
for a subsequent warrant, should aid in the elimination of a practice
which makes the fourth amendment warrant requirement an empty for-
mality.6 3 No longer will it be permissible in Maryland to legitimize an
illegal search by later obtaining a warrant. It is to be hoped that the
Court of Appeals will continue its development of the law in this difficult
area. A complete reexamination, and perhaps abolition, of the four
corners rule itself would seem desirable.
13. Warrantless Searches
In Waugh v. State64 the Carter-Everhart analysis was extended to a
warrantless arrest and search. A Maryland State Police Officer, Corporal
Pitt, received a telephone message from Detective Schwartz of the Tucson,
Arizona, police department that Waugh would be arriving at Friendship
International Airport (now Baltimore-Washington International Airport)
with two suitcases containing marijuana. Pitt testified at a pretrial sup-
pression hearing that Schwartz had informed him that, acting on the
basis of a tip from a "reliable confidential informant," Schwartz went to
the Tucson airport, observed Waugh's luggage, and smelled what from his
past experience he recognized to be marijuana. He then opened the suit-
cases, observed marijuana, and removed some. Acting on the basis of
this information, Pitt made a warrantless arrest when Waugh arrived at
Friendship; a subsequent search of Waugh's luggage revealed marijuana.65
Waugh's motion to suppress the marijuana was denied. 66 A renewed
motion to suppress made at the start of the trial, based on an allegation
that Schwartz had in actuality smelled a substance such as talcum powder
rather than marijuana, was similarly denied, the trial judge ruling that
62. See notes 17-20 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
63. This rule has been recognized by other courts, including the Supreme Court,
but its constitutional basis has seldom been expressed in detail. See, e.g., Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176-77 (1969); United States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888,
894 (5th Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Nelson, 459 F.2d 884, 888-90 (6th Cir. 1972).
64. 275 Md. 22, 338 A.2d 268 (1975).
65. Id. at 24-25, 338 A.2d at 269-70. During the four hours between receipt of
the information from Schwartz and the defendant's arrival, Pitt determined the
arrival location of Waugh's flight and established surveillance of the baggage claim
area. Id. at 25, 338 A.2d at 270.
66. Id. at 26, 338 A.2d at 270.
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the matter had been conclusively determined at the suppression hearing.67
Pitt's testimony at trial confirmed Waugh's allegation: a subsequent
written report received from Schwartz stated that the only odor he had
smelled was that of a substance such as talcum powder, often used to
conceal the smell of marijuana.68 Nevertheless, the defendant was convicted
of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and his motion for
a new trial was denied, the judge reiterating that he considered himself
bound by the ruling on Waugh's motion to suppress.69 The conviction
was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals.7"
The Court of Appeals reversed. The court made the following as-
sumptions :71 (1) apart from any question of taint arising from a prior
illegal search, the information that Pitt received by telephone from
Schwartz was sufficient on its face to establish probable cause for Waugh's
arrest, and Pitt's warrantless search of the suitcases was constitutionally
permissible either as a search incident to a lawful arrest 72 or as a search
justified by exigent circumstances;73 (2) if Schwartz had probable
67. Id.
68. Id. at 26-27, 338 A.2d at 271.
69. Id. at 27, 338 A.2d at 271.
70. Waugh v. State, 20 Md. App. 682, 318 A.2d 204 (1974).
71. 275 Md. at 29-30, 338 A.2d at 272.
72. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) ; Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
73. It has been recognized since Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925),
that there are limited exigent circumstances where the usual warrant requirement of
the fourth amendment is inapplicable. The exigent circumstances exception has been
applied most often to automobile searches, but some state and lower federal courts
have held that the doctrine also applies to searches of luggage in circumstances where
it is clear that, because of mobility, the opportunity to search will pass if officers must
wait to obtain a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467, 470-71 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974) ; United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d
630, 639 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973) ; United States v. Mehciz,
437 F.2d 145, 147 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971) ; People v. McKinnon,
7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973).
The Court of Appeals applied the Carroll doctrine in England v. State, 274
Md. 264, 334 A.2d 98 (1975), holding a warrantless search of an automobile justified
by exigent circumstances. Police officers discovered the car parked outside the de-
fendant's residence several days after he had been taken into custody. The court
reasoned that because police officers had been searching for the auto for several days,
it must be inferred that they had searched unsuccessfully at the England residence
previously; hence, the discovery in effect was fortuitous. Id. at 268, 334 A.2d at 102.
The car was mobile and accessible to England's confederate, to his family, and to
others. The court concluded that these circumstances met the three criteria necessary
for exigency derived from Carroll and stated in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
51 (1970): the car was movable, one of its former occupants was alerted, and the
car's contents might never have been found again if a warrant were obtained. 274
Md. at 269, 334 A.2d at 103. Thus, the court reasoned, this case fell closer on its facts
to the open highway stop in Carroll than to the situation described in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), where a warrant was held necessary to validate
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cause to believe that the suitcases contained marijuana, his warrantless
search was also constitutional under the exigent circumstances doctrine;
and (3) Schwartz would have had probable cause if he had actually smelled
marijuana.7 4 However, the court concluded that because Schwartz had
not smelled marijuana, he did not have probable cause to search Waugh's
luggage.75 Therefore, the information obtained and subsequently relayed
to Pitt, being fruit of an unconstitutional search, could not, under the
Carter-Everhart rationale, be used by Pitt to establish probable cause
for an arrest and search. The court reasoned that because Pitt had no
other basis for determining that probable cause existed the evidence ob-
tained through his search of the suitcases must be suppressed. 76 The court
held that the trial judge had abused his discretion under Maryland Rule
a search of an automobile immobilized and under observation for some time in a
private driveway. 274 Md. at 270-73, 334 A.2d at 102-03. See also South Dakota v.
Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976) ; Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam) ;
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures
of Automobiles, 87 HAv. L. Rxv. 835 (1974). In Opperman the Court, acknowledging
the inadequacy of the mobility factor as a rationale for decisions upholding inventory
searches of automobiles, stated a new factor: "[T]he expectation of privacy with
respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or
office." 96 S. Ct. at 3096.
74. The detection of narcotic odors by a qualified person is a proper basis for the
existence of probable cause. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948)
(dictum) ; United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467, 470 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 901 (1974); United States v. Lewis, 392 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 891 (1968); United States v. Mullins, 329 F.2d 295, 297 (4th Cir. 1964);
People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 917, 500 P.2d 1097, 1109, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897, 909
(1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
75. The court stated that smelling the odor of an ordinary cosmetic such as talcum
powder from a suitcase does not constitute probable cause to search for marijuana,
despite the fact that such a substance is frequently used as a cover for marijuana,
for it is not uncommon that the suitcases of innocent travelers contain talcum powder.
275 Md. at 33-34, 338 A.2d at 274. Cf. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414
(1969) (existence of two telephones in an apartment is insufficient to establish
probable cause to search a suspected gambling operation).
The court also found that the informant's tip to Schwartz was inadequate to
establish probable cause for his search. 275 Md. at 32-33, 338 A.2d at 274. Apparently,
the only evidence presented by the state regarding the informant consisted of informa-
tion that Schwartz gave to Pitt by telephone and by a subsequent written report.
Schwartz stated only that he had received information from a "reliable confidential
informant" The court was presented neither with information concerning the under-
lying circumstances from which the informant concluded that Waugh was carrying
marijuana nor with any basis for a determination that the informant was credible or
his information reliable. Thus, neither part of the two-prong test set forth in
Spinelli v. United States, supra, and Aguilar v. United States, 378 U.S. 108 (1964),
was satisfied.
76. 275 Md. at 30-32, 388 A.2d at 272-74.
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729(g) (2)77 by not granting a hearing on Waugh's renewed motion to
suppress the evidence.78
The situation in Waugh is distinguishable from that in Carter and
Everhart in two respects. First, Pitt acted without a warrant; the existence
or nonexistence of probable cause was determined solely by him rather
than by a magistrate. Secondly, in contrast to the officers in Carter and
Everhart, Pitt acted completely in good faith; knowledge of the illegality
of Schwartz's prior search came long after Pitt had mistakenly determined
that probable cause for his arrest and search existed. However, as the court
implicitly recognized, these distinctions are not determinative. The Supreme
Court has consistently held that "the standards applicable to the factual
basis supporting the officer's probable-cause assessment at the time of [a]
challenged [warrantless] arrest and search are at least as stringent as the
standards applied with respect to the magistrate's assessment" in a war-
rant situation; less stringent standards would "discourage resort to the
procedures for obtaining a warrant."7 9 That good faith reliance does not
alone justify a warrantless arrest or search was made clear by the Court's
decision in Whitely v. Warden.80 The Court held invalid a warrantless
arrest made by an officer who relied in good faith on a police radio broad-
cast that was based on an arrest warrant when it was subsequently deter-
mined that the complaint made to support the warrant was insufficient
to establish probable cause. While observing that police officers called
upon to aid other officers in executing an arrest warrant are initially
entitled to assume the validity of the warrant, the Court held that where
it is later found that the warrant was not based on probable cause, "an
otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision
of the investigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest."'
Thus, Whitely supports the Waugh court's conclusion that a warrantless
search conducted on the basis of information obtained through a prior
unlawful search is invalid even when the officer conducting the second
search mistakenly believed the prior search to be lawful.8 2
77. MD. R.P. 729(g) (2) provides in pertinent part: "If [a] motion or petition
[to suppress] is denied prior to trial of the criminal case, the pre-trial ruling shall be
binding at the trial unless the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion grants a
hearing de novo on the defendant's renewal of his motion or objection."
78. 275 Md. at 35, 338 A.2d at 275.
79. Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971) ; see United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102, 105-07 (1965) ; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964).
80. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
81. Id. at 568.
82. That Whitely involved reliance on a warrant issued on the basis of insufficient
cause whereas Waugh concerned reliance on information obtained by an unlawful
search is insignificant. The key consideration in each case is that the instigating
officer could not have lawfully arrested or searched the accused.
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II. WIRETAPPING
On two occasions during the September Term, 1974, the Court of
Appeals was confronted with cases 3 requiring interpretation of Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.84 Title III
was enacted as a congressional response to Supreme Court decisions in
Osborn v. United States,5 Berger v. New York,8s and Katz v. United
States,87 and was an effort to protect the privacy of wire and oral com-
munications while delineating the circumstances and conditions under which
interception of such communications would be authorized.88 Title III
permits electronic surveillance by law enforcement officials when judicially
authorized and when conducted in accordance with specified procedures.8 9
Although Supreme Court decisions have interpreted various provisions of
Title 111,90 the question of its constitutionality has not come before the
Court. However, despite severe criticism of Title III by some legal
commentators,9 1 the federal courts of appeals without exception have held
it constitutional.9 2 The Maryland Court of Appeals also has concluded
83. Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975); Carter v. State, 274 Md.
411, 337 A.2d 415 (1975).
84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
85. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
86. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
87. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
88. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968).
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 -(1974) (identity of author-
izing official for wiretap application under 18 U.S.C. §§ 25f8(1) (a), (4) (d)) ; United
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (authorization of wiretap application under 18
U.S.C. § 2516(1)) ; United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S., 143 ('1974) (identification require-
ments of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1) (b) (iv), (4) (a)); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S.
41 (1972) (prohibition by 18 U.S.C. § 2515 of use of illegally obtained wiretap evidence
in a grand jury proceeding) ; United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297 (1972) (18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) and national security surveillances).
91. See, e.g., -Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The
Politics of "Law and Order",- 67 MIcH. L. REv. 455 (1969) ; Spritzer, Electronic
Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Casein' Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REv.
169 (1969). Professor Schwartz contends that Title II: fails to meet the standards
announced in Osborn, Berger, and Katz; while Professor Spritzer argues that no
electronic eavesdropping is constitutionally permissible. Justice Douglas, like Professor
Spritzer, maintained that any electronic surveillance lacks the particularity and dis-
crimination necessary to satisfy fourth amendment requirements. See, e.g., Gelbard
v. United States, 408 U.S: 41, 62 (1972) (concurring obinion) ; Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (concurring opinion); Osboin'v. ,United States, 385 U.S.
323, 340 (1966) (concurring opinion).-
92. Title III has been upheldas constitutional in, United States v. Sklaroff, 506
F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 .(1975);".Ufnited States v. Ramsey, 503
F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, -420 U.S. 932 •(1975)-; United States v. Martinez,
498 F.2d 464 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); United'States v. James,
494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. *1020 (1974) ; United States v.
Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) ; United States
v. Bobo, 477.F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421VU.S. 909 (1975); United
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that Title III is constitutional and has held that it has been implemented
in Maryland.93
In Carter v. State"' the Court of Appeals used two sections of Title III
as an alternative basis for its holding that Carter was entitled to move
to suppress any evidence derivatively obtained from an unlawful wiretap.05
The court found the result to follow directly from sections 251598 and
2518(10) (a), 97 which mandate the suppression not only of the contents
of any conversation intercepted in violation of the Act but also of evi-
dence "derived therefrom."9 8
The Court of Appeals considered certain provisions of Title III in
greater detail in Spease v. State.99 Police officers investigating a narcotics
conspiracy obtained a court order'00 for a wiretap on the home telephone
of defendant Ross, suspected of being a major narcotics dealer. The order
permitted a continuous wiretap for a period of two weeks. Authorization
was given to intercept conversations between Ross and his suppliers or
buyers which related to' business transactions between them. The order
included the statutory directives for minimization"' and service of in-
States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974);
United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918
(1974); and United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 934 (1972). One district court held Title III unconstitutional, but the decision
was reversed on appeal. United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa.
1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
93. State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972). Title III is implemented in
Maryland by MD. CTs. & JuD.- PRo. CoDE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -408 (1974), and MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 125A-D (1976). See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1970).
94. 274 Md. 411, 337 A.2d 415 (1975).
95. Id. at 424-29, 337 A.2d at 423-26. See notes 14-21 and accompanying text
su pra.
96. § 2515 provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be re-
ceived in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee,
or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof
if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
97. § 2518(10)(a) provides in pertinent part:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the
contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived
therefrom, on the grounds that-
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted.
98. Cf. United States v. Giordano,, 416 U.S. 505, 529-33 (1974).
99. 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975).
100. The order was obtained in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) provides in pertinent part:
Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization
to intercept ... shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception
of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter ....
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ventories.10 2 Progress reports were to be made to the court every five
days. 03 Based on information obtained from the wiretap, Ross and
Spease, a codefendant, were convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 104
The convictions were affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals. 05
The two issues before the Court of Appeals had been raised unsuccess-
fully by the defendants at a pretrial suppression hearing. 00 The defendants
contended that the state violated the court's wiretap order and Title III
by failing to minimize the interception of innocent communications as
required by section 2518(5),107 and failing to serve inventories as re-
quired by section 2518(8)(d). 0 8 The second issue was the easier to
resolve. At the suppression hearing Ross testified that he, as a person
named in the wiretap order, did not receive the inventory required by
the order and by section 2518(8)(d). However, the police officer in
charge of the investigation testified that he had personally served Ross
with a search warrant and attached affidavit containing all information
statutorily required to be set forth in the inventory.1° 9 Because Ross
thereby received actual notice of the wiretap within the time period speci-
fied in the court order, the issue before the court was whether strict
compliance with the section 2518(8) (d) inventory requirement was
necessary.
In State v. Siegel" the Court of Appeals, in reversing a conviction
because of a gross failure of a court wiretap order to comply with the
requirements of sections 2518(4)(e) and 2518(5), 111 stated that "[t]he
statute sets up a strict procedure that must be followed and we will not
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (d) provides in part:
Within a reasonable time but not later than ninety days after the filing of an
application for an order of approval under section 2518(7)(b) which is denied
or the termination of the period of an order or extensions thereof, the issuing
or denying judge shall cause to be served, on the persons named in the order
or the application, and such other parties to intercepted communications as the
judge may determine in his discretion that is in the interest of justice, an inventory
which shall include notice of-
(1) the fact of the entry of the order or the application;
(2) the date of the entry and the period of authorized, approved or dis-
approved interception, or the denial of the application; and
(3) the fact that during the period wire or oral communications were or
were not intercepted.
103. 275 Md. at 94-95, 338 A.2d at 288.
104. Id. at 90, 338 A.2d at 286.
105. 21 Md. App. 269, 319 A.2d 560 (1974).
106. 275 Md. at 95-96, 103-04, 338 A.2d at 288-89, 293.
107. See note 101 supra.
108. See note 102 supra.
109. 275 Md. at 103, 338 A.2d at 293.
110. 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972).
111. The wiretap order in question did not contain statements, as required by
sections 2518(4) (e) and 2518(5), that the interception terminate upon attainment of
its authorized objective. Id. at 272-73, 292 A.2d at 95.
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abide any deviation, no matter how slight, from the prescribed path.' 1 2
However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that not "every failure
to comply fully with any requirement provided in Title III would render
the interception of wire or aural communications 'unlawful' ";113 rather,
suppression is required only for violations of provisions which "directly
and substantially implement"'114 the congressional intent to impose limita-
tions on electronic surveillance." 5 The purpose of the inventory require-
ment is to eliminate as much as is practicable the possibility of completely
secret eavesdropping and to grant the subject of a wiretap an opportunity
to seek redress for abuses." 6 The Spease court found this purpose satisfied
when there is notification of the wiretap by means of any document
"reasonably calculated to transmit the required information within the
specified time.""17  When the accused receives actual notice within a
reasonable time period, absent prejudice or deliberate governmental wrong-
doing, failure to comply strictly with the formal specifications of Title III
is not so serious an infraction as to require the drastic remedy of sup-
pression of the wiretap evidence." 8
Spease was in a different position than Ross in that he had not been
named in the wiretap order." 9 Therefore, service of the inventory on him
112. Id. at 274, 292 A.2d at 95.
113. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1974).
114. Id. at 527.
115. Compare United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (suppression re-
quired when a federal wiretap application was authorized by an Assistant Attorney
General other than the one "specially designated" under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)), with
United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974) (suppression not required when the
person authorizing a wiretap was incorrectly identified as an Assistant Attorney
General rather than as the Attorney General). See Donovan v. United States 45
U.S.L.W. 4115, 4121 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1977).
116. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1968).
117. 275 Md. at 106, 338 A.2d at 294..
118. See United States v. Rizzo, 492 F.2d 443, 447 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
944 (1974) ; United States v. Wolk, 466 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1972) ; United States v.
Smith, 463 F.2d 710, 711-12 (10th Cir. 1972) ; United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp.
190, 194 (W.D. Pa. 1971) ; United States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612, 616-17 (E.D.
Pa. 1971). See also United States v. Eastman, 465 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972). See gen-
erally Comment, Post-Authorization Problems in the Use of Wiretaps: Minimization,
Amendment, Sealing, and Inventories, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 92, 145-52 (1975).
119. It was not required that Spease be named because his identity was not "known"
at the time of the application for the order. 275 Md. at 109, 338 A.2d at 296; see
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (b) (iv) (1970).
The Supreme Court recently held that a person is "known" within the
meaning of section 2518(1) (b) (iv), and, therefore, must be named in a wiretap
application, when the government has probable cause to believe that the individual is
engaged in the criminal activity under investigation and expects to intercept his
conversations. United States v. Donovan, 45 U.S.L.W. 4115, 4119 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1977).
The Court further held, however, that an unintentional failure to identify a "known"
person in a wiretap application does not render interception of his conversations
unlawful. Hence, suppression of evidence gathered against individuals "known," but
unnamed in the wiretap application, is not justified, at least absent intentional govern-
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was required only if found, by a discretionary decision of the court, to
be in the "interest of justice.' 20  Spease was represented by the same
attorney as was Ross, had actual notice of the wiretap some six months
prior to trial, and had received copies of the application, affidavit, order,
and recorded conversations three weeks prior to trial.1 2 1 Because Spease
had received actual notice and was not shown to have suffered prejudice,
the Court of Appeals found that the issuing judge acted within his discre-
tion in not requiring that Spease be served with an inventory.1
22
The minimization issue in Spease raised more substantial problems.
The purpose of the minimization requirement of section 2518(5) is to
circumscribe electronic surveillance as much as possible in the circumstances
of each case.'2 3 In the absence of clear congressional guidance as to what
constitutes compliance with the minimization requirement,' 24 lower federal
courts have sought, in the circumstances presented, to assess "the reason-
ableness of the agents' efforts in light of the purpose of the wiretap and
mental misconduct Id. at 4121 & n.23. Citing Chavez v. United States, 416 U.S. 562
(1974), the Court found the identification requirement to have no central role in
the Title III statutory scheme. Id. at 4121-22.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970); see note 102 supra. The Supreme Court
has observed in dictum that the mandatory and discretionary notice provisions of
section 2518 (8) (d) satisfy the constitutional requirements set forth in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
See United States v. Donovan, 45 U.S.L.W. 4115, 4119 n.19 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1977).
121. 275 Md. at 109, 338 A.2d at 296. Thus, the requirements of section 2518(9)
were satisfied:
The contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication or evidence derived
therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial,
hearing, or other proceeding in a Federal or State court unless each party, not
less than ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding, has been furnished
with a copy of the court order, and accompanying application, under which the
interception was authorized or approved.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1970).
122. 275 Md. at 108-09, 338 A.2d at 296. In United States v. Donovan, 45
U.S.L.W. 4115 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1977), the Supreme Court held that the prosecution
has a duty to provide the judge supervising the wiretap with at least a general
description of persons not named in the order but whose conversations were over-
heard. Id. at 4119-20. However, absent either a deliberate attempt by the prosecution
to frustrate the inventory requirement or prejudice suffered by the accused, see id.
at 4121 n.26, breach of this duty does not justify suppression of evidence obtained
from the wiretap. Id. at 4122.
123. United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 918 (1974).
124. The Senate Judiciary Committee report on Title III merely restates the
language of the minimization provision of the statute. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 103 (1968). The Supreme Court has not considered the minimization ques-
tion. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1519 (1976), denying cert. to 516
F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ; Bynum v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 357 (1975), denying
cert, to 513 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1975).
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the information available to them at the time of interception.' 125  Courts
have taken into consideration a wide range of factors 126 in deciding whether
"on the whole the agents have shown a high regard for the right of
privacy and have done all they reasonably could to avoid unnecessary
intrusion."'21 7 Because of the nature of the objects sought to be seized, i.e.,
conversations, the issue of reasonableness in the circumstances of a given
case can be quite complicated. Whether a particular conversation is per-
tinent to the crime being investigated is not generally apparent until at
least a portion of that conversation has been overheard ;128 therefore, the
propriety of an interception often can be determined only after the inter-
ception has been made.
In Spease the testimony at the pretrial suppression hearing revealed
that connected to the monitoring device on Ross's telephone line was a
tape recorder that was activated automatically when the telephone receiver
was picked up.129 The police officer who conducted the tap testified that
all calls were monitored in their entirety, but the tape recorder was turned
off as soon as it was determined that a call was of a purely personal nature.
According to his testimony, no privileged conversations were intercepted, 130
and no attention was paid to calls between children, although they were
monitored. The officer also testified that the parties to calls on Ross's
telephone often talked in code. No other evidence was produced.' 31 While
noting that the record was "woefully weak or silent"'13 2 on many points,
the Court of Appeals agreed with the Court of Special Appeals that the
officers who conducted the tap "made a reasonable and good faith effort
125. United States v. Scott, 504 F.2d 194, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
126. Generally speaking, these factors embrace the nature and scope of the crime
under investigation, the location and operation of the telephone being tapped, govern-
ment expectations as to the contents of calls, and the degree of judicial supervision
exercised. United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1019-21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1020 (1974). For more detailed listings, see United States v. Bynum, 360
F. Supp. 400, 410 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), and Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 100, 338 A.2d 284, 291
(1975).
127. United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
866 (1973).
128. It is this perhaps unmanageable quality of electronic surveillance which has
led some to conclude that no electronic eavesdropping is constitutionally permissible.
See note 91 supra.
129. The sole testimony came from the officer in charge of the investigation,
who was called by the defendants. 275 Md. at 95, 338 A.2d at 289.
130. Id. at 96, 338 A.2d at 289. Apparently there were no such conversations to be
intercepted. Id. at 112 n.1, 338 A.2d at 298 n.1.
131. Id. at 95-96, 338 A.2d at 289.
132. Id. at 100, 338 A.2d at 291.
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to minimize the interception of unauthorized communications." 13 Judge
Eldridge dissented'" on three grounds: (1) because a failure to record
133. Id. at 103, 338 A.2d at 293.
It was thus not necessary for the court to consider the further issue of to
what extent evidence must be suppressed when there has been a failure to minimize.
The Court of Special Appeals stated in an extended dictum that an inadequate but
good faith effort to minimize would require suppression of those conversations which
should not have been intercepted. 21 Md. App. at 281-93, 319 A.2d at 567-73. This
position is in agreement with federal decisions applying the rule of Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (some items were properly seized and some not; only
those items which were improperly seized need be suppressed), to wiretap evidence.
See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir. 1972) (dictum), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 746-48
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974) ;
United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 874-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) ; United States
v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 543-45 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d
494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973). However, because of their potentially
broad sweep, electronic surveillance techniques present different and greater dangers
to fourth amendment rights than do physical searches. See Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967). It has been reasoned that the stricter remedy of total sup-
pression is appropriate for failures to minimize. United States v. Focarile, 340 F.
Supp. 1033, 1046-47 (D. Md.) (dictum), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano,
469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), af'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). It is not clear if or in what
circumstances those courts which have advocated partial suppression might require
total suppression; the Court of Special Appeals did not foreclose the possibility that
blatant failure to minimize might require the stricter remedy, 21 Md. App. at 281,
319 A.2d at 567. Taking a middle position between partial suppression in all instances
and total suppression in all instances are several decisions holding partial suppres-
sion proper when there was an inadequate effort to minimize, but stating that total
suppression would be required in cases involving failure to make a bona fide
attempt to comply with the minimization requirement. See, e.g., United States v.
Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430, 437 (D. Md. 1973) ; United States v. Lanza, 349 F. Supp.
929, 932 (M.D. Fla. 1972). See also United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1139-
41 (2d Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3672 (U.S. April 1, 1976)
(No. 75-1393).
If one accepts the need for electronic surveillance, total suppression seems
too drastic a remedy to apply in all cases of inadequate minimization, regardless of
good faith efforts by monitoring agents. Clearly, however, this sanction must be
available at some point to enforce the minimization requirement; otherwise, there
would be little incentive to minimize because officers could proceed to monitor all
calls with the knowledge that only improperly seized conversations would later be
suppressed. Therefore, a flexible approach seems preferable, with the degree of
suppression depending upon the degree of compliance with the minimization require-
ment. See Comment, Post-Authorization Problems in the Use of Wiretaps: Minimiza-
tion Amendment, Sealing, and Inventories, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 92, 122-25 (1975) ;
Note, Minimization and the Fourth Amendment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 861 (1974); Note,
Minimization of Wire Interception: Presearch Guidelines and Postsearch Remedies,
26 STAN. L. REv. 1411, 1435-38 (1974) ; Note, Minimization: In Search of Standards,
8 SUFFOLK U.L. Rzv. 60, 76-83 (1973).
134. 275 Md. 88, 110, 338 A.2d 284, 296.
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when it is possible to do so is a violation of section 518(8) (a), 135 turning
off the tape recorder could not possibly constitute compliance with the
minimization requirement; (2) the majority incorrectly placed the burden
of proof for the minimization issue on the defendants; and (3) there was
in sum no compliance with the statutory minimization requirement.' 36
The majority's finding of adequate minimization rested primarily on
the fact that the investigating officers turned off the tape recorder for
personal calls, for, other than listening unattentively to the calls of children,
the officers made no additional attempt to minimize interception. 13 7 The
court argued that an "intercept" under Title III includes acquisition of
a conversation either by listening or by recording 13 8 and that recording
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (a) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by any means
authorized by this chapter shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or
other comparable device. The recording of the contents of any wire or oral
communication under this subsection shall be done in such a way as will protect
the recording from editing or other alterations. Immediately upon the expira-
tion of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be
made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions.
Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge orders. They shall not be
destroyed except upon an order of the issuing or denying judge and in any event
shall be kept for ten years.
136. 275 Md. at 110-11, 338 A.2d at 296-97.
137. One hundred percent interception may be justified in some circumstances. In
such a case, of course, there need be no positive attempt to minimize. See note 148
and accompanying text infra.
138. "Intercept" is defined as "the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire
or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970).
The question whether recording alone constitutes an intercept has been de-
bated by courts and commentators. The Spease court found it anomalous that one who
records without listening could escape the sanctions of Title III and concluded that
both recording and listening were intercepts within the meaning of the Act. 275 Md.
at 101, 338 A.2d at 292. See United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 541 (S.D. Cal.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846
(1973) ; Note, Minimization of Wire Interception: Presearch Guidelines and Post-
search Remedies, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1411, 1415-17 (1974). On the other hand, as noted
by the Spease dissent, 275 Md. at 113-14, 338 A.2d at 298-99, it may be argued that
section 2518(8) (a) draws a distinction between intercepting and recording by re-
quiring that the contents of any communication intercepted be recorded. See note 135
supra. It has thus been contended that listening is the only type of intercept defined.
United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 408-09 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 490
(2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974) ; Note, Minimization:
In Search of Standards, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. Rxv. 60, 69-71 (1973).
Section 2518(8) (a), however, need not be read as establishing intercept and
recording as mutually exclusive concepts. It is not illogical to include recordation
in the category of intercepts; in the case of an intercept by recordation, the section
simply states the tautology that all recordings be recorded. Recording ought to be
viewed as an intercept. Despite Congress's use of the word "aural" to define intercept,
it seems implausible that Title III was intended to permit the recordation of any
conversation with impunity unless or until the taped conversation is heard by the
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is a greater invasion of privacy than is listening; hence, refraining from
recording was a good faith13 9 effort to minimize interception. 40
However, because there was no indication that it was not possible for
the officers conducting the wiretap to record all conversations that they
overheard, their failure to record was an apparent violation of section
2518(8) (a).141 It is difficult to understand how an action which violates
one section of Title III can be viewed as constituting compliance with
another section. It is true that recording a monitored conversation entails
some additional invasion of privacy. Section 2518(8) (a) may be viewed,
however, as a congressional judgment that when an intercept occurs, the
benefits of recording the communication outweigh the harm that is caused. 142
Proper recording of all intercepted conversations ensures that their con-
tents will not be edited or distorted, 143 that possible exculpatory conversa-
tions will not be omitted,4 4 and that evidence will be preserved for taint
hearings and for possible use in seeking civil damages for violations of
Title 111.145 In addition, recording preserves evidence relevant to the issue
of minimization. 146
human ear. See Comment, Post-Authorization Problems in the Use of Wiretaps:
Minimization, Amendment, Sealing, and Inventories, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 92, 104-05
(1975).
139. Although good faith on the part of the monitoring agents is relevant to
the determination whether minimization was achieved, the decisive consideration is
the objective reasonableness of the interceptions. See United States v. Scott, 516
F.2d 751, 756 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1519 (1976). As observed
in Scott, it is possible that even if agents seek to comply with the minimization
requirement, the interceptions may be so unreasonable as to require suppression;
conversely, interceptions may be reasonable despite a lack of subjective good faith. Id.
The factors which generally are considered in determining whether minimization was
achieved, see note 126 supra, implicitly recognize that the determination is chiefly an
objective one. See United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874-75 (7th Cir. 1975) ;
United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1018-21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1020 (1974). But see United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 44 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975).
140. 275 Md. at 101, 338 A.2d at 292.
141. See note 135 supra.
142. As a safeguard, section 2518(8) (a) provides that all recordings be sealed by
the court. See note 135 supra. By thus treating recordings as "confidential court
records," S. RFP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1968), the section places a
limitation on the invasion of privacy caused by the act of recording. In addition,
it has been suggested that upon proper application by parties affected, a court may
order erasure of nonpertinent recorded conversations. United States v. Manfredi,
488 F.2d 588, 600 n.9 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
143. See note 135 supra.
144. See United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 600 n.9 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
145. Civil damages are recoverable under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970).
146. It is customary for courts to examine carefully the transcripts of intercepted
conversations in considering the minimization question. See, e.g., United States v.
Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 599 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974);
United States v. Curreri, 363 F. Supp. 430, 436-37 (D. Md. 1973).
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Even if section 2518(8) (a) is ignored, it is doubtful that merely not
recording some conversations when all are monitored can be considered
an act of minimization. Assuming that recording is a type of intercept,'147
dual interceptions occurred in Spease. While turning off the tape recorder
may then be viewed as an attempt to minimize the interceptions consisting
of recordations, there nevertheless was no effort to minimize the intercep-
tions occasioned by the acts of listening.
If the action of not recording all conversations cannot be considered
an adequate attempt to minimize, the question remains whether the minimi-
zation requirement was nonetheless satisfied in Spease. Given the cir-
cumstances - the investigation was of a sophisticated and extensive nar-
cotics conspiracy, code words were often used, the wiretap was authorized
for a relatively short period of time, and progress reports to the court
were required - it may be, as the Court of Appeals found, that interception
of all calls in their entirety was justified. 148 However, it is questionable
whether the record in this case was sufficient to justify such a conclusion.
Courts considering the minimization problem have found it appropriate to
examine breakdowns of the proportions of pertinent and nonpertinent
calls intercepted, 149 as well as evidence relating to other factors relevant to
the minimization determination. 150 No such evidence was presented at
the suppression hearing in Spease.'5' The Court of Appeals, while recog-
nizing this fact, nevertheless resolved to consider the issue "on the evi-
dentiary record made by [Ross and Spease] on their motion to suppress.1u52
147. See note 138 supra. If recording is not an intercept, the act of turning off
the tape recorder could certainly not be considered an attempted minimization
technique.
148. A number of courts have found interception (and recording) of all calls
justified in certain circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1519 (1976); United States v. Quintana,
508 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 1020 (1974) ; United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877, 881-88 (D.N.J.
1973), aff'd, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975) ; United
States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 415-16 (S.D.N.Y.),.aff'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974) ; United States v. Focarile, 340
F. Supp. 1033, 1049 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d
522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). It has been recognized, however,
that the use of statistics presents certain hazards, and that statistical analysis alone is
insufficient. See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 415 (S.D.N.Y.),
afd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974) ;
United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 542 (S.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd on other grounds,
478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 946 (1973).
150. See note 126 supra.
151. See notes 129-31 and accompanying text supra.
152. 275 Md. at 101, 338 A.2d at 291.
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The court thereby placed the burden of proof on the defendants, a conclusion
contrary to federal decisions that have considered the issue. 153 As the
dissent argued,15 4 it is logical to place the initial burden of proving com-
pliance with the minimization requirement on the prosecution. Title III
imposes upon the state a duty to minimize, and the key factors pertinent
to the issue are within the knowledge of the state, not the accused. Because
the record in Spease was "woefully weak or silent"'15 5 on many of the
factors important to a resolution of the minimization question, it would
have been more appropriate to remand the case for a new trial 5 6 than
to proceed on the basis of an inadequate record. 57
Even if the court's decision did not result in substantial injustice
under the Spease circumstances, an unfortunate precedent has been estab-
lished. By approving the failure to record monitored conversations as a
proper minimization technique, the decision encourages a procedure that
directly conflicts with one section of Title II15 and discourages attempts
to comply fully with another.159 Additionally, by placing on the defendant
the burden of establishing noncompliance with the minimization require-
ment, the Spease result removes an incentive for careful compliance and
documentation by the state, and impedes challenges to improper govern-
mental activities. Because "[f] ew threats to liberty exist which are greater
than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices,"' 160 the court's
relaxation of protective measures against abuses of electronic surveillance
is regrettable.
153. The federal decisions uniformly state that the prosecution must make a prima
facie showing of compliance with the minimization requirement; following such proof,
the burden shifts to the defense to rebut the prosecution's evidence and demonstrate
that further minimization could reasonably have been accomplished. See United
States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975);
United States v. Quintana, 508 F2d 867, 875 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Rizzo, 491 F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974); United States
v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
154. 275 Md. at 115-16, 338 A2d at 300.
155. See note 132 and accompanying text supra.
156. In view of the court's holding in Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 289 A.2d 575
(1972), and its application in Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 337 A.2d 415 (1975),
see note 21 supra, a restricted remand for an evidentiary hearing would appear to be
unavailable.
157. Cf. United States v. Bynum, 475 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1973) (remand for
evidentiary hearing).
158. See 18 U.S.C.. § 2518(8)(a) (1970), quoted in note 135 supra.
159. Secure in the knowledge that in many cases merely turning off a tape re-
corder will constitute sufficient compliance with the minimization requirement of
section 2518(5), police officers will be discouraged from further efforts to minimize
interception.
160. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967).
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In Henry v. State' the court of appeals considered whether it was
permissible for a judge to consider at sentencing the defendant's involve-
ment in related crimes which he had been acquited.
Henry had been convicted by a jury of larceny of an automobile2
and receiving stolen property,3 but found not guilty of murder, assault with
intent to murder, and the armed robbery of a grocery store.4 The trial
judge prefaced his sentencing remarks by indicating his disagreement with
the verdicts of acquittal and on the basis of unrebutted evidence impli-
cating the defendant in the robbery and homicide, sentenced Henry to
consecutive maximum terms on the two convictions.5 On appeal the
defendant contended that the sentencing procedure had denied him due
1. 273 Md. 131, 328 A.2d 293 (1974).
2. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 348 (1976). In addition, the jury initially
returned a guilty verdict on a charge of unauthorized use of the same vehicle in
violation of MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 349 (1976). However, upon being reassembled
shortly after its discharge, the jury rendered a guilty verdict on the larceny count
alone, acquitting the defendant of unauthorized use. In affirming the larceny con-
viction, the Court of Special Appeals rejected Henry's contention that the two initial
verdicts were inconsistent and held that unauthorized use was a lesser offense included
within the crime of larceny, which therefore merged into the larceny conviction.
Henry v. State, 20 Md. App. 296, 298-99, 315 A.2d 797, 801 (1974). The Court of
Appeals disagreed, holding that because the intent elements of the crimes differed
there was no merger. 273 Md. at 134-38, 328 A.2d at 297-98; See also 35 MD. L. REv.
535 (1975). The court ruled, however, that the defendant's failure to object at trial to
the reassembling of the jury constituted a waiver, and it therefore affirmed the
larceny conviction. 273 Md. at 139, 328 A.2d at 299. See McCarson v. State, 8 Md.
App. 20, 22, 257 A.2d 471, 473 (1969).
3. See Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 467 (1976). Shortly after the robbery and
murder for which Henry was indicted, one of the defendant's companions handed
Henry sixteen dollars. The defendant said he was unaware that the money came
from the robbery. He was fully cognizant, however, that his companions were un-
employed, and he took the money knowing that they had just robbed a grocery store.
273 Md. at 145-47, 328 A.2d at 301-03.
4. Henry's two companions were convicted in a separate proceedings of murder
in the first degree. 273 Md. at 140, 328 A.2d at 299. Henry had picked them up, driven
them to the grocery store, and waited in the car while they entered the store. He
then heard three shots and saw his companions run from the store and get back into
the car, at which point he drove away from the scene. Id. at 143-44, 328 A.2d 301.
5. Id. at 140-42, 328 A.2d at 299-300. The judge imposed a fifteen year sentence
for the larceny count and a three year term for the receipt of stolen property count.
Id. at 142, 328 A.2d at 300. The sentences were reviewed and left unchanged by a
panel of three trial judges acting pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645JA-
645JG (1976). 273 Md. at 142, 328 A.2d at 300.
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process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 6 He argued that
maximum sentences for the larceny and receipt of stolen property con-
victions had been imposed because the judge believed the defendant also
was guilty of the more serious charges.7 The Court of Special Appeals
rejected this challenge and affirmed the convictions and sentences.8
On certiorari the Court of Appeals held that in setting sentence, it
was permissible for the trial judge to consider evidence of the defendant's
involvement in the homicide and robbery "at a level less than would
warrant his conviction of those crimes." 9 The court concluded that the
sentencing judge did not intend the maximum sentences as punishment
for the crimes of which Henry was acquitted ;10 however, the court vacated
the sentence on the larceny count because it exceeded the maximum allowed
by statute and remanded for imposition of a valid sentence."
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Smith noted that although a
trial judge is afforded sweeping discretion in sentencing 12 and is not
6. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . " U.S. CONST. amend. -IV, § 1. While the severity of a
sentence is not ordinarily reviewable if within statutory limits, e.g., Gleaton v. State,
235 Md. 271, 277, 201 A.2d 353, 356 (1964), an exception to the non-reviewability
principle is recognized when an objection to sentencing procedure is made on due
process grounds. See Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 538, 336 A.2d 113, 114 (1975) ;
Costello v. State, 237 Md. 464, 469, 206 A.2d 812, 815 (1965); Henry v. State, 20
Md. App. 296, 312-14, 315 A.2d 797, 806-07 (1974) (dissenting opinion); Turner
v. State, 5 Md. App. 584, 593-94, 248 A.2d 801, 807 (1968); Baker v. State, 3 Md.
App. 251, 256-57, 238 A.2d 561, 565-66 (1968). See generally Note, Toward a
Probable Cause Standard in Sentencing: Nickens v. State, 34 MD. L. REv. 133
(1974) ; Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 379 (1964).
7. 273 Md. at 140-42, 328 A.2d at 299-300.
8. Henry v. State, 20 Md. App. 296, 315 A.2d 797 (1974). The majority held
that in passing sentence the trial judge had properly considered Henry's involvement
in the murder and robbery "only in terms of its aggravating effect upon the larceny."
Id. at 308, 315 A.2d at 804. Judge Davidson, dissenting, found that the judge's re-
marks raised a substantial doubt whether the sentence had been based on an imper-
missible consideration. She argued that the case should have been remanded to the
trial court for further consideration of the sentences. Id. at 317-18, 315 A.2d at 809.
9. 273 Md. at 150, 328 A.2d at 305.
10. Id. at 148, 328 A.2d at 303.
11. Id. at 151, 328 A.2d at 305. The trial judge incorrectly sentenced Henry
under the general larceny statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 340 (1976), which permits
a fifteen year maximum, instead of under the specific statute for larceny of an auto-
mobile, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 348 (1976), which provides for a fourteen year
maximum sentence. 273 Md. at 133-34 n.1, 151, 328 A.2d at 295 n.1, 305; cf. Maguire
v. State, 192 Md. 615, 623, 65 A.2d 299, 302 (1949).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied
sub noin. Davenport v. United States, 411 U.S. 919 (1973) ; United States v. Sweig,.
454 F.2d 181, 183 (2d Cir. 1972) ; Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 540, 336 A.2d 113;
115 (1975) ; Baker v. State, 3 Md. App. 251, 256-57, 238 A.2d 561, 565 (1968) ; Gee
v. State, 2 Md. App. 61, 68, 233 A.2d 336, 339-40 (1967) ; Note, Toward a Probable
Cause Standard, supra note 6, at 144.
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bound by the strict rules of evidence that govern during trial,18 a judge
may not base a sentence on inaccurate or unreliable information 14 or on
"impermissible considerations."'1 5 A judge may consider neither a bald
accusation of criminal conduct that has resulted in a clear acquittal'6 nor
a mere rumor of a defendant's prior criminal acts ;17 in both instances the
information is excluded from the sentencing process because of its inherent
unreliability.' 8 However, the Henry court indicated that reliable reports 9
of a defendant's opprobrious but non-criminal conduct, as well as evidence
of prior criminal activity for which he was not indicted, are properly
receivable.20 Similarly, because an acquittal may reflect only the prosecu-
tion's failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and "does not have
the effect of conclusively establishing the untruth of the evidence introduced
13. See Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489 (1969) ; Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949) ; Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 193-94, 297 A.2d 696,
706 (1972); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81
HA&v. L. REv. 821, 824 (1968); Note, Toward a Probable Cause Standard, supra
note 6, at 150-53.
14. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) ; Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736 (1948). In Townsend the trial judge, setting sentence without counsel
present, failed to distinguish the defendant's prior convictions from charges that re-
sulted only in dismissal or acquittal. The Court vacated the sentence and specifically
held that in such a situation the absence of counsel at sentencing was a denial of due
process. Yet Townsend has been interpreted more broadly as holding that due process
requires that a sentence be based on accurate information. See United States v. Metz,
470 F.2d 1140, 1141 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nomn. Davenport v. United States,
411 U.S. 919 (1973); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); Note, Appellate Reviez of Sentences and the
Need for a Reviewable Record, 1973 DuKz L.J. 1357, 1361; Note, Procedural Due
Process, supra note 13, at 826, 845-46. For a discussion of Townsend and a review
of recent federal and Maryland sentencing cases, see Note, Toward a Probable Cause
Standard, supra note 6, at 140-47.
15. See Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 538, 336 A.2d 113, 114 (1975) (considera-
tion of defendant's decision to plead not guilty); Heyward v. State, 161 Md. 685,
696-97, 158 A. 897, 901 (1932) (consideration of defendant's refusal to give informa-
tion to a grand jury) (dictum); Mahony v. State, 13 Md. App. 105, 113-14, 281 A.2d
421, 425-26 (1971), cert. denied, 264 Md. 750 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 978
(1972) (penalizing defendant for expressing intention to file an appeal) (dictum);
Note, Toward a Probable Cause Standard, supra note 6, at 144-47.
16. See, e.g., Purnell v. State, 241 Md. 582, 217 A.2d 298 (1966); Walker v.
State, 186 Md. 440, 443, 47 A.2d 47, 48 (1946) (dictum) ; Baker v. State, 3 Md. App.
251, 258-59, 238 A.Zd 561, 566 (1968).
17. See Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570 (1952) (by implication).
18. See Note, Toward a Probable Cause Standard, supra note 6, at 147.
19. Until recently no Maryland case had set forth a reliability standard for
sentencing information. The determination rested largely within the discretion of the
trial judge. One commentator has argued that Nickens v. State, 17 Md. App. 284,
301 A.2d 49 (1973), should be viewed as establishing such a test based on a probable
cause standard. See Note, Toward a Probable Cause Standard, supra note 6.




against the defendant, '2 1 the Court of Appeals held that the sentencing
judge may consider reliable evidence of a defendant's participation in a
crime of which he has been acquitted.2 2 The court observed that the trial
judge was able to draw on highly trustworthy evidence "from Henry's
own lips" placing him at the scene of the grocery store robbery and
murder.23 The court therefore concluded that the judge could consider
Henry's involvement in those crimes as significantly increasing the gravity
of the larceny and receipt of stolen property convictions.
2 4
The Fourth Circuit faced a similar sentencing problem in United
States v. Eberhardt.25 While awaiting sentencing with several others fol-
lowing convictions on charges of destroying government property and
interfering with the Selective Service System, two defendants participated
in a second war protest in which draft board records were burned.26 At
sentencing the two received longer terms than their co-defendants. They
contended on appeal that the extra length of their sentences was attributa-
ble only to a desire by the trial judge to punish them for the subsequent
offenses in which they had been implicated. The Fourth Circuit affirmed
the convictions but remanded for reconsideration of the sentences.2 The
court stated that the sentencing judge was not required to ignore evidence
21. 273 Md. at 148, 328 A.2d at 303, quoting from Henry v. State, 20 Md. App.
296, 315, 315 A.2d 797, 808 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
22. 273 Md. at 148, 328 A.2d at 303. Accord United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d
181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972) ; Bell v. State, 57 Md. 108, 116-17 (1881) ; cf. Scott v. State,
238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575 (1965). The Court of Special Appeals viewed Scott as
authority for the conclusion that the trial judge was permitted to consider evidence
of Henry's involvement in the robbery and murder despite the acquittals. 20 Md.
App. at 306-07, 315 A.2d at 803. Judge Davidson noted in her dissent that Scott
was inapposite because it involved a revocation of probation proceeding that did not
require a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 316-17, 315 A.2d at 808-09.
The Court of Appeals opinion did not discuss Scott.
23. 273 Md. at 150, 328 A.2d at 304. The defendant testified on direct and cross-
examination that he had lived in the neighborhood for a long time; that he twice
drove his companions to the grocery store for suspicious reasons, the second time
parking the stolen auto three car lengths up the street when there were closer spaces
available; and that he waited for his friends after hearing shots and seeing them flee
from the store. Id. at 143-47, 328 A-2d at 300-02. While the reliability of this testi-
mony was not an issue on appeal, it has been suggested that evidence of this kind
"may often be more reliable than the hearsay evidence to which the sentencing judge
is clearly permitted to turn, since unlike hearsay, the evidence involved here was given
under oath and was subject to cross-examination and the judge had the opportunity
for personal observation of the witnesses." United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184
(2d Cir. 1972).
24. 273 Md. at 151, 328 A.2d at 305.
25. 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970).
26. The defendants were subsequently convicted of mutilating government records,
destruction of government property, and interference with the administration of the
Selective Service System; these convictions were affirmed on appeal. United States
v. Berrigan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970).
27. 417 F.2d at 1015.
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of subsequent misconduct, and suggested that it had "no reason to think
that the judge undertook to impose a penalty for the second offense."'28
Nevertheless, the court was unwilling to speculate on precisely what passed
through the trial judge's mind at sentencing, 29 and therefore considered
it "fair and in the interest of justice" to require the trial judge to reevaluate
the sentences and reduce them if he actually had an improper sentencing
motive.8 0
It is implicit in Eberhardt that an appellate court has a limited function
when reviewing a sentence on due process grounds.8 1 To justify a re-
mand, the reviewing court need not be completely persuaded that the judge
had an improper sentencing motive, although it must have some objective
basis for believing that he may have had one.32 It is unclear whether
the Henry court applied such a standard in reviewing the defendant's sen-
tences because it did not explicitly engage in a substantive analysis of
the sentencing judge's remarks, but instead stated its findings in a con-
clusory fashion.33 However, the court appears justified in holding that
the remarks of the trial judge, when considered as a whole,3 4 did not
constitute sufficient evidence of an improper sentencing motive. While
the defendant might find some support for his position through a selective
and out-of-context reading of isolated passages of the sentencing state7
ment,3 5 a reading of the full text convinced the Court of Appeals that
28. Id.
29. Id. Apparently the district court judge did not state his reasons for imposing
longer sentences on two of the defendants.
30. Id.
31. See United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub norm.
Davenport v. United States, 411 U.S. 919 (1973). In remanding the cases for further
consideration of the sentences, Judge Sobeloff noted that if the trial judge undertook
to penalize the defendants for an offense other than the one of which they were con-
victed, he would have placed them in double jeopardy. 417 F.2d at 1015. This argument
would seem equally applicable to the Henry facts.
32. See Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 538, 336 A.2d 113, 115 (1975). In
Johnson the Court of Appeals found evidence in a colloquy between the trial judge and
the defendant at sentencing that the judge may have considered the defendant's plea
of not guilty when setting sentence. The court stated that
although we cannot be sure to what extent it actually affected the judge's ultimate
determination, if at all, we think that certain remarks made by the sentencing
judge ...indicate that he may have imposed sentence in this case based upon an
impermissible consideration.
Id.
33. The court did not believe that the trial judge had sentenced based on a
belief that Henry was guilty of the crimes of which he had been acquitted, stating
simply that "[wie do not see it that way." 273 Md. at 148, 328 A.2d at 303.
34. The court analogized to the rule requiring that a judge's instructions to a
jury be considered as a whole. Id. at 150, 328 A.2d at 304, citing Wood v. Abell, 268
Md. 214, 235, 300 A.2d 665, 676 (1973) ; Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Plews, 262 Md. 442,
462, 278 A.2d 287, 297 (1971).
35. The trial judge referred to the defendant as the "commander of the troops
and the pilot of the automobile," and later characterized him as the person who
"masterminded and engineered the holdup." 273 Md. at 141, 328 A.2d at 299.
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the judge did not intend the maximum sentences as punishment for crimes
of which Henry had been acquitted. 6
In reaching this result, the court determined that Eberhardt was dis-
tinguishable on its facts.87 The trial judge in Henry was able to rely on
the defendant's own admission of involvement in the robbery and homi-
cide ;38 the judge in Eberhardt, however, apparently did not possess at the
time of sentencing any reliable evidence of the defendants' involvement in
burning the draft records. Furthermore, in Eberhardt the trial judge
failed to state his reasons for imposing longer terms on the two defendants. 39
The Fourth Circuit therefore was forced to evaluate the district court
judge's sentencing motives without a complete record. 40 Given the possi-
bility of an improper sentencing motive,41 the Fourth Circuit was justifiably
reluctant to affirm the sentence on sheer conjecture, and remanded "in the
interest of justice" rather than resolving any lingering doubt against the
defendant. By contrast, the trial judge in Henry fully articulated his
reasons for imposing the maximum sentences. 42 He was careful to limit
his criticism of the jury's verdict to an introductory remark,43 and then
correctly considered the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's participa-
tion in the robbery and murder only in determining sentences for the
related offenses. The Court of Appeals properly concluded that there was
no objective basis for believing that the trial judge had been improperly
motivated in setting these sentences.
36. While the Court of Appeals merely stated its conclusion, see note 33 and
accompanying text supra, the Court of Special Appeals observed that
[the judge] was painstakingly careful . . . to consider the murderous conduct
only in terms of its aggravating effect upon the larceny. He made his purpose
preeminently clear and carefully touched all bases.
20 Md. App. at 308, 315 A.2d at 804.
37. 273 Md. at 150, 328 A.2d at 304.
38. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
39. See 417 F.2d at 1015.
40. See note 29 supra.
41. The disparate sentences furnished the Fourth Circuit with at least some
indication that the harsher sentences may have been imposed in response to the de-
fendants' later draft protests and therefore were intended as punishment for crimes
for which they had not yet been tried and convicted.
42. 273 Md. at 140-42, 328 A.2d at 299-300.
43. Id. at 140, 328 A.2d at 299.
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In Wilson v. Board of County Commissioners' the Court of Appeals
reviewed, for the first time, the current provisions of Article 41 of the
Annotated Code of Maryland (hereinafter the Act) authorizing local bond
issues to finance the purchase or construction of industrial facilities.2
Under the Act, municipalities and counties are empowered to "borrow
money by issuing negotiable revenue bonds for the purpose of financing
the cost of acquiring any industrial building or buildings or port facilities,
either by purchase or construction." Wilson involved Allegany County
revenue bonds that were to be issued in conjunction with the installation
of pollution control devices 4 at a paper processing plant; the company
had previously consented to orders issued by the Maryland Department
of Water Resources and the Division of Air Quality Control of the Mary-
land Environmental Health Services designed to implement pollution abate-
ment measures.5 The company requested that the County Commissioners
issue bonds to finance the pollution control facilities as allowed by the
1. 273 Md. 30, 327 A.2d 488 (1974).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 266A through I (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Industrial development revenue bonds work as follows: The municipality or
county issues bonds and the proceeds are used to finance the acquisition or construc-
tion of industrial facilities for a private corporation. Although the governmental
entity owns the project, the corporation rents it for an amount that equals the pay-
ments of principal and interest to the bondholders. Generally, the governmental
entity neither supports the bond with its faith and credit nor assumes liability for
the payment of principal or interest; the bondholders must depend on the income
of the project for payment. Essentially, the governmental entity uses its ability to
borrow funds at a low rate of interest (since such interest is rendered tax-exempt
to bondholders through utilization of the entity's taxing power to benefit the private
corporation). 15 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 43.11 & 43.34 (3d ed.
1970); I S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS 287-88 (1972).
With a general obligation bond, unlike a revenue bond, the issuing govern-
mental entity assumes liability for the payment of principal and interest. The issu-
ance of a general obligation bond requires a public purpose because the funds used
for repayment come from tax revenues. See City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md.
9, 15-16, 136 A.2d 852, 855 (1957) ; MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 15;
15 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 43.05 (3d ed. 1970). See generally
note 14 infra. Since the taxing power is at the heart of both types of bond issuances,
it is arguable that the public purpose necessary to support each is the same. See note
20 infra.
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 266B(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
4. The statutory definition of "industrial building" or "port facility" includes
"pollution control facilities," id. § 266A(c), which in turn are defined as "any
building, structure, machinery, equipment or facility designed for the control, re-
duction, prevention or abatement of pollution of the natural environment by gaseous,
liquid, or solid substances, discharges or radiation, (including adverse thermal
effects therefrom), noise or any combination thereof," id. § 266A(d).
5. 273 Md. at 36-37, 327 A.2d at 491-92.
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Act, although the Act had been passed after execution of the consent
orders and after commencement of the construction of the facilities. Two
county residents challenged the $22,700,000 bond issue proposed by the
Allegany County Commissioners on a variety of grounds,6 but the Wilson
court upheld the validity of the bond issue.
The authorizing language of the Act, which permits municipalities
or counties to raise funds for financing the acquisition of industrial build-
ings or port facilities by issuing revenue bonds, 7 expresses the legislature's
desire that the bonds be used to accomplish the purposes delineated in
the Act. The legislature has identified five purposes: (1) relieving unem-
ployment, (2) encouraging additional industry and a balanced economy
in Maryland, (3) assisting in the retention of existing industry by means
of pollution control, (4) promoting economic development, and (5) pro-
tecting natural resources.8 In turn, these enumerated legislative purposes
are premised on findings by the legislature that unemployment exists in
Maryland, that industrial development is needed to relieve unemployment
and to establish a balanced economy, that the development of industrial
buildings and port facilities under the Act will promote the general wel-
fare, and that pollution control or abatement is necessary to attract new
and retain old industry in order to promote economic development and
the general welfare.9
Under the Act, the municipality or county must adopt an ordinance
or resolution specifying certain information necessary for financing the
proposed undertaking by a revenue bond issue.10 It is expressly pro-
vided that should there be a subsequent challenge to the bond issuance,
all findings by the legislative body of the municipality or county in regard
to unemployment conditions, pollution control, industrial and economic
development, the protection of natural resources, or the promotion of the
6. The plaintiffs were residents, citizens and taxpayers of Allegany County.
A number of parties who relied heavily upon revenue bonds to finance pollution abate-
ment intervened on behalf of the county, most significantly the State of Maryland,
which argued that a substantial public interest was involved in the implementation of
this and similar resolutions authorizing local bond issues to finance pollution abatement.
273 Md. at 39-42, 327 A.2d at 493-94.
7. The Act is one of three statutory efforts to encourage industrial development
in Maryland. The other state efforts in this regard are the Maryland Industrial
Development Financing Authority, established by MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 266J-
266CC (1971 & Cum. Supp. 1976), which insures payment of mortgage loans secured
by industrial projects, and the Development Credit Corporation, established by MD.
ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 412-29 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1976), which makes loans to
industries within Maryland for the erection of buildings and for the supply of
working capital. See Maryland Indus. Dev. Financing Auth. v. Helfrich, 250 Md.
602, 243 A.2d 869 (1968); Development Credit Corp. v. McKean, 248 Md. 572, 237
A.2d 742 (1968); Maryland Indus. Dev. Financing Auth. v. Meadow-Croft, 243 Md.
515, 221 A.2d 632 (1966) ; note 14 infra.
& MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 266B(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
9. Id. § 266B'(a).
10. Id. § 266B(d).
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general welfare shall be conclusive." In Wilson, the Allegany County
Board of Commissioners resolved that the revenue bond issue requested
by the paper processing company would assist in the acquisition of pollu-
tion control facilities for the company, and found:
The construction and acquisition of the facilities by the Company
and the financing thereof by the County (a) promote the declared
legislative purposes of the Act through furtherance of the control,
reduction or abatement of pollution of the environment and (b) facili-
tate compliance with the requirements of federal, State and local laws
and regulations governing the control, reduction or abatement of
pollution of the environment, and thus (i) sustain jobs and employ-
ment opportunities and aid in maintaining employment, thus relieving
conditions of unemployment in the State of Maryland and in the
County; (ii) encourage the increase of industry and a balanced
economy in the State of Maryland and in the County; (iii) assist in
the retention of existing industry in the State of Maryland and in
the County; (iv) promote economic development; (v) protect natural
resources; and (vi) promote the health, welfare and safety of the
residents of Allegany County, Maryland, and the State of Mary-
land .... 12
Subsequently, the County undertook to issue bonds, in an amount not to
exceed $22,700,000, pursuant to the Board decision to finance the con-
struction of facilities designed to abate air and water pollution at the
plant.
The validity of the bond issue and proposed expenditure of funds
was challenged on four grounds: (1) that the project lacked sufficient
public purpose; (2) that even if the construction of pollution abatement
facilities were a sufficient public purpose, this public purpose would not
be served because the company was already under an enforceable order
to construct the facilities; (3) that the Act's timing constraints would be
violated by this issuance because construction commenced prior to the
effective date of the Act's authorization of financing of pollution abatement
facilities and because construction began prior to the County resolution,
and (4) that bonds could not be issued by Allegany County to finance
construction of facilities in West Virginia or Garrett County.13 The
Court of Appeals addressed these challenges seriatim, concluding in each
instance that the proposed bond issue was valid notwithstanding Wilson's
11. Id. § 266B(f). The text of this provision is printed in note 36 infra.
12. 273 Md. at 38, 327 A.2d at 492-93.
13. Id. at 32, 327 A.2d at 490.
The court did not phrase the issues in terms of the "legitimate means" and
"legitimate ends" of governmental action. However, in cases raising the issue whether
a use of the state's police power serves a public purpose, the court will consider the
ends of that use, the means employed, the legitimacy of both the ends and the means,
and the rationality of the relationship between the two. See Salisburg Beauty Schools
v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 300 A.2d 367 (1973).
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arguments because the issue served a substantial public purpose and com-
plied with the statutory requirements. 4
14. The court was not presented with the issue whether the Act violated the
"credit clause" of MD. CoNsT. art. III, § 34, which states:
The credit of the State shall not in any manner be given, or loaned to, or in
aid of any individual association or corporation; nor shall the General Assembly
have the power in any mode to involve the State in the construction of works
of internal improvement, nor in granting any aid thereto which shall involve the
faith and credit of the State ....
A bond issue may be invalid because it lacks public purpose or because it extends the
state's credit to a private group. These are distinct issues and should not be confused
in analysis; the presence of one deficiency does not necessarily indicate the existence
of the other. Problems have arisen because of a misunderstanding over what con-
stitutes an extension of state credit. The state may use its borrowing powers and
give the money to a private group without violating the credit clause. In Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Williams, 199 Md. 382, 86 A.2d 892 (1952), the court held that
the credit clause had not been violated where the state borrowed money and gave the
cash proceeds to a private school, although the state was still liable for the debt.
This was a use of borrowed funds, not a lending of credit. "The generally accepted
meaning of a pledge of the faith and credit of a political entity is that the govern-
mental body is unconditionally liable for the payment of the debt, if sufficient money
is not otherwise made available." Maryland Indus. Dev. Financing Auth. v. Meadow-
Croft, 243 Md. 515, 522, 221 A.2d 632, 637 (1966). Rephrased, this means that the
"credit clause" disallows a suretyship obligation incurred by the governmental entity,
but it permits a primary obligation assumed by that entity. See 28 MD. L. Rvv. 411,
416 (1968). The rationale for the enactment of the "credit clause," as explained in
Johns Hopkins University, was to prevent the careless use of state credit to support
private corporations whose operations might serve a public purpose.
The Maryland Industrial Development Financing Authority and the Develop-
ment Credit Corporation, see note 7 supra, have been held to conflict with the "credit
clause," and the statutory provisions creating those bodies were declared unconstitu-
tional for pledging the state's faith and credit in violation of MD. CONST. art. III,
§ 34. See Maryland Indus. Dev. Financing Auth. v. Helfrich, 250 Md. 602, 243 A.2d
869 (1968), noted in 28 MD. L. REv. 411 (1968) ; Development Credit Corp. v. McKean,
248 Md. 572, 237 A.2d 742 (1968). See also Maryland Indus. Dev. Financing Auth.
v. Meadow-Croft, 243 Md. 515, 221 A.2d 632 (1966).
The Act specifically provides that a pledge of faith and credit by the county
or municipality is prohibited. Mn. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 266D(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
The trial court in Wilson concluded:
The revenue bonds are not an obligation of the County and will be repaid solely
from the repayments from Westvaco to Allegany County. Neither the full faith
and credit nor the taxing power of the County is in any way pledged to the re-
payment of these bonds.
Purchasers of these bonds rely solely on the credit of Westvaco for repay-
ment. The purchasers in no way consider that the County is liable to repay the
bonds. The issuance of these pollution control revenue bonds in no manner im-
pairs or uses up the County's capacity to issue its own general obligation bonds.
273 Md. at 42, 327 A.2d at 494-95. This statement fails to fully consider the possi-
bility that issuance of revenue bonds by a governmental entity might jeopardize its
borrowing ability and credit status. See text accompanying notes 45 to 47 infra.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals has consistently held that revenue bonds issued
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Historically, formulating a definition of public purpose has proven
an elusive task for the Court of Appeals. Discussing the application of
the principle (of public purpose) in City of Frostburg v. Jenkins,"5 the
court noted:
"What is a public purpose for which public funds may be expended
is not a matter of exact definition; it is almost entirely a matter of
general acceptation." We may add that the line of demarcation is
not immutable or incapable of adjustment to changing social and
economic conditions that are properly of public and governmental
concern.
16
The act upheld in Frostburg empowered the city to issue up to $100,000
in general obligation bonds in order to erect a building for a manufacturing
company that had agreed to locate in the city if this were done. The
company entered into a purchase agreement to buy the building from
the city over twenty-five years. As did the court in Wilson, the Frostburg
court rejected the argument that the bonds were invalid because they
benefited a private corporation: "The fact that incidental benefits are
passed on to the locating corporation is not fatal, if there are substantial
without the faith and credit of the issuing body are constitutional. See Waring v.
Board of Trustees of St. Mary's College, 243 Md. 513, 221 A.2d 631 (1966) ; Lacher
v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 243 Md. 500, 221 A.2d 625 (1966) ; Lerch v.
Maryland Port Auth., 240 Md. 438, 214 A.2d 761 (1965); Castle Farms Dairy
Stores, Inc. v. Lexington Market Auth., 193 Md. 472, 67 A.2d 490 (1949) ; Wyatt v.
Beall, 175 Md. 258, 1 A.2d 619 (1938) ; cf. Mayor of Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375
(1869) (declaring unconstitutional a bond issue that pledged existing governmental
property as security, thereby creating a debt which might result in additional burdens
on citizens).
15. 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852 (1957).
16. Id. at 16, 136 A.2d at 855 (citation omitted) (quoting Finan v. Mayor of
Cumberland, 154 Md. 563, 565, 141 A.2d 269, 270 (1928)). Finan in turn relied upon
Citizens' Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875), in which
the Supreme Court stated:
[Iun deciding whether ... the object for which the taxes are assessed falls upon
the one side or the other of [the public purpose] line, [courts] must be governed
mainly by the course and usage of the government, the objects for which taxes
have been customarily and by long course of legislation levied, what objects or
purposes have been considered necessary to the support and for the proper use
of the government, whether State or municipal. Whatever lawfully pertains
to this and is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the people may well be
held to belong to the public use, and proper for the maintenance of good govern-
ment ....
Id. at 665.
Because the people in a republican form of government manifest their beliefs
through their legislature, a judicial desire to permit the public to decide whether a
governmental action requiring a public purpose does in fact serve such a purpose
justifies deference to the legislative judgments. See notes 36 to 40 infra and accom-
panying text.
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public benefits to support the action taken.' 7 Despite the numerous cases
involving the public purpose requirement, the Court of Appeals has not
articulated a more precise definition of the term.'8
Although the county contended that a public purpose was not neces-
sary in order to validate the bond issue,19 the Wilson court assumed,
17. 215 Md. at 17, 136 A.2d at 856; accord, John A. Gebelein, Inc v. Milbourne,
12 F. Supp. 105, 114 (D. Md. 1935) (stating the same rule but reaching a different
result on the facts) ; Marchant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 146 Md. 513, 521, 126 A. 884,
886 (1924).
Judge Prescott delivered a strong dissent in Frostburg, criticizing the pro-
posed bond issue as serving a private purpose and posing a threat to the free enter-
prise system. He considered the benefit to the public welfare an incidental by-product
of direct aid to the private sector. One might rebut these contentions, as did the
majority, by arguing that the private profit incidentally results from the public effort
to foster employment. Judge Prescott's analysis implies that his main concern was
with what he felt was an unconstitutional extension of the city's credit. But Frostburg
involved a general obligation bond on which the city would be primarily liable;
because the city did not act as a surety, the credit clause of the Maryland Constitution
was not violated. See note 14 supra.
18. The September 1974 Term case of Prince George's County v. Collington
Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278 (1975), discussed the inability of the
court to formulate a definition of "public use" in cases concerning the exercise of
eminent domain. The court noted that doing so might be unwise, even if it were
possible, because of the ever changing condition of the world. Id. at 181-82, 339
A.2d at 284; see Riden v. Philadelphia B. & W.R.R. Co., 182 Md. 336, 340-41, 35 A.2d
99, 101 (1943).
One is thus left to one's inductive abilities to glean from various fact patterns
a general sense of what means and ends might be viewed favorably. See, e.g., Lerch
v. Maryland Port Auth., 240 Md. 438, 214 A.2d 761 (1965) (upholding proposed
issue of revenue bonds to finance construction of a building to serve as an Inter-
national Trade Center, potentially increasing trade, even though parts of the building
were to be leased to private parties for non-maritime purposes) ; Finan v. Mayor of
Cumberland, 154 Md. 563, 141 A.2d 269 (1928) (upholding proposed issue of general
obligation bonds to finance the erection and maintenance of a public hospital as well
as a hospital owned by a private eleemosynary corporation). See also Town of
Williamsport v. Washington County Sanitary Dist., 247 Md. 326, 231 A.2d 40 (1967);
St. Mary's Indus. School for Boys v. Brown, 45 Md. 310, 331-32 (1876).
Cases which have considered the issue whether exercise of the eminent
domain power had been employed to condemn property for a "public use" are also
apposite. See, e.g., Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md.
171, 339 A.2d 278 (1975) (approving condemnation of land to create a private
industrial park to promote employment) ; Flaccomio v. City of Baltimore, 194 Md.
275, 71 A.2d 12 (1950) (approving city's condemnation of property to be turned
over to a private museum). Collington Crossroads is particularly important because it
marks the first time that the Court of Appeals approved a condemnation "of land for
industrial or commercial purposes in contexts other than those associated with rail-
roads, public utilities, or port development." 275 Md. at 189, 339 A.2d at 288.
19. 273 Md. at 43, 327 A.2d at 495.
The county argued that a public purpose was not required because the bond
issue did not involve general obligation bonds which would use public funds and be
payable out of the county's general revenues. The court observed that the extension
of a tax-exempt status to the bondholder under the Act, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
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without so deciding, that a public purpose must be established.20 The
court later explained that classification of a matter as one of public concern
is not a static process, as demonstrated by the court's frequent recognition
that evolving notions of public concern have engendered legislation en-
compassing such modern phenomena as shorter work weeks, improved
sewage and waste disposal, and automobile pollution control devices..2 1
Thus, while elimination of air and water pollution might not have been a
conceivable public purpose in the past, environmental protection and indus-
trial development to aid in combating unemployment are currently major
public concerns; therefore, a bond issue under the Act intended to facili-
tate the reduction of industrial pollution and to enable industry to remain
in the community could serve a modern-day public purpose.22 Agreeing
with the courts of a number of other jurisdictions, 23 the Court of Appeals
concluded in Wilson that a public purpose was served by a bond issue
designed to abate pollution as well as to enable an industry to remain in
the county and state.24
§ 266C(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976), supported the validity of the assumption that a public
purpose was required. Id. at 44, 327 A.2d at 495; see Matzenberg v. Comptroller, 263
Md. 189, 282 A.2d 465 (1971). See also Kimball-Tyler v. Baltimore City, 214 Md.
86, 133 A.2d 433 (1957). MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 15 provides that
the taxing power can be used only for a public purpose. The creation of a tax-exempt
status is a ramification of the taxing power and should therefore be subject to
similar requirements.
20. 273 Md. at 44, 327 A.2d at 495.
Wilson involved the application of the public purpose test in validating the
issuance of revenue bonds. However, the court's failure to distinguish between
revenue bonds and general obligation bonds in requiring a public purpose implies that
the court would apply the same standards in its assessment of a general obligation
bond issue. Moreover, since the tax exemption was a significant factor in Wilson
justifying application of the public purpose test, the method of analysis used here
would apply whenever a tax exemption was at issue. See note 19 supra. That there
is but one public purpose test is supported by the court's practice of using bond cases
as authority when deciding the public use issue in eminent domain cases. See Prince
George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 190 n.6, 339 A.2d 278,
288 n.6 (1975).
21. 273 Md. at 46-47, 327 A.2d at 496-97.
22. See id. at 47-50, 327 A.2d at 497-98; Early, Financing Pollution Control
Facilities Through Industrial Development Bonds, 27 TAX LAWYER 85 (1973);
Harwell, Lawyer and State Development Agencies, 60 A.B.A.J. 1098 (1974) ; 61
Amr. JUR. 2d Pollution Control § 4 (1972). See also 15 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §§ 43.31 & 43.32a. (3d ed. 1970).
23. See, e.g., Industrial Dev. Auth. v. Nelson, 109 Ariz. 368, 374, 509 P.2d 705,
711 (1973) ; Opinion of the Justices, 359 Mass. 769, 772, 268 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1971) ;
Fickes v. Missoula Co., 155 Mont. 258, 268, 470 P.2d 287, 293 (1970) ; State ex rel.
Brennan v. Bowman, 512 P.2d 1321, 1322 (Nev. 1973) ; Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Town of Hurley, 84 N.M. 743, 745, 746, 507 P.2d 1074, 1076, 1077 (1973) ; Harper v.
Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 496, 189 S.E.2d 284, 289-90 (1972) ; State ex rel. Hammer-
mill Paper Co. v. LaPlante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 57, 205 N.W.2d 784, 798-99 (1973).
24. 273 Md. at 51, 327 A.2d at 499.
[VOL. 36
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The Wilson court upheld the use of revenue bonds as a legitimate
means to implement pollution control plans even though the state, through
its police power, already had ordered abatement.2 5 According to the plain-
tiffs, the bonds did not enable the public to obtain any sufficient benefits
to which it was not already entitled because the bonds induced neither the
construction of the pollution facilities nor the location or retention of the
company in Maryland ;26 instead, the county's action would spend public
resources to aid a private party in meeting a legal obligation, and also
provide that party with improved facilities. The trial court had dismissed
this argument by finding that the facilities would neither increase the
productive capacity of the plant nor benefit the plant owners through in-
creased profits.27 This response is not wholly satisfactory, however, be-
cause it ignores the effect of the abatement orders. In contrast, the ends-
oriented approach of the Court of Appeals correctly considered this factor,
stating that the proper concern was not whether the company would
benefit but whether society would benefit through the cooperative effort.
The court concluded that incidental benefits to private parties did not
preclude a finding of public purpose.28
Although directly concerned with the technical requirements of the
Act and resolution, the plaintiffs' third challenge presented the court with
an opportunity to strengthen its preceding conclusions by showing that
federal regulations encouraged such bond issues. The court rejected the
contention that loan proceeds could not be applied to finance facilities
begun before the effective date of the Act or construction completed prior
to the date of the resolution. The General Assembly had specifically in-
cluded within the Act's authorization the financing of "pollution control
facilities which can be financed by bonds determined to be tax exempt
under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954."29 The court
determined that the applicable Treasury Regulations effectively incor-
porated by the Act probably would confer a tax exemption upon holders
of the bonds in question. 3 Bonds meeting the federal guidelines a fortiori
25. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
26. Brief for Appellant at 14, Wilson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 273 Md.
30, 327 A.2d 498 (1974).
27. 273 Md. at 40-42, 327 A.2d at 493-94.
28. Id. at 51-52, 327 A.2d at 499.
29. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 266A(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976). The Act would be
virtually useless if the federal tax exemption were not available. See 273 Md. at 53,
327 A.2d at 500.
30. I.R.C. § 103(c)(4), as modified by Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(a)(5) (1973),
gives a federal tax exemption for interest on pollution control revenue bonds issued
to finance facilities begun after September 2, 1972. In addition, the same treatment is
provided for bonds issued to finance facilities begun before that date if the authorizing
ordinance is adopted "prior to the date the entire facility is first placed in service."
The Regulations further explain that "placed in service shall not be earlier than the
date on which - (a) [the facility] has reached a degree of completion which would
permit operation at substantially the level for which it is designed, and (b) it is, in
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satisfy the statute's requirements. Proceeding to discuss the statutory
language allowing bond issues to finance the cost of "acquiring" pollution
control facilities, the court adopted the reasoning of other jurisdictions3'
that have interpreted statutes empowering a county to "acquire" facilities
as including the ability to acquire the plant at any stage of construction, or
even after completion, so long as the financing serves a public purpose .32
Finally, the court rejected the argument that bond proceeds could
not be used to finance portions of the planned construction that were con-
structed in another county in Maryland or outside of the state. In
Grinnell Co. v. City of Crisfield,3 3 the court considered the contention that
a plant addition financed by a bond issued pursuant to the same Act could
not serve a public purpose if that plant were located outside of the city
issuing the bonds. The court held that the extraterritoriality of the de-
velopment did not preclude it from serving a public purpose: "The appli-
cable provisions of [the Act] contain no such geographic limitation on
the location of a project and we feel that to judicially draft one would
be contrary to the intent of the legislature . . . ., That rule was applied
in Wilson. Once again the court focused on the benefit conferred by the
project as a whole on the governmental entity issuing the bonds. Evi-
dently, a benefit conferred upon a neighboring city, county, or state may
be a permissible by-product in the achievement of the public goal similar
to any incidental benefit conferred upon private industry.3 5
Although the Act creates a framework within which any bond issue
serving a public purpose will be upheld, some bond issues ostensibly
serving public purposes may nonetheless be unwarranted where the public
benefit is insignificant in comparison with the competitive advantages
realized by the private beneficiary. Under section 266B(f) of the Act,
fact, in operation at such level." Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(a)(5) (1973). Within the
meaning of this language, the facilities had not yet been "placed in service on Septem-
ber 2, 1972." The extension of the federal tax exemption to cover certain bonds
issued before that date demonstrated the Treasury's effort to avoid the selection of
an arbitrary cut-off date which would impose a burden on state efforts to combat
pollution: "Temporary construction or other financing of a facility prior to the
issuance of State or local governmental obligations to provide such a facility will not
cause such facility to be one which is not described in this subdivision." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.103-8(a) (5) (iii) (1973).
31. E.g., White v. City of Hickman, 415 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1967); Manning v.
Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 405 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1966) ; Nuessner v. McNare,
250 S.C. 257, 262-63, 157 S.E.2d 410, 413 (1967).
32. 273 Md. at 56, 327 A.2d at 501.
While the Act defines "acquisition" to include "rehabilitation, remodeling,
extension, or permanent improvement" of facilities, MD. ANN. CODn art. 41, § 266A(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1976), the language does not indicate whether bond issues are authorized
to finance projects that are already commenced or completed.
33. 264 Md. 552, 287 A.2d 486 (1972).
34. Id. at 559, 287 A.2d 490; see 15 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§§ 39.21 & 43.33 (3d ed. 1970).
35. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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the legislative body of the issuing municipality or county has virtually
absolute and unreviewable discretion over the propriety of issuance be-
cause the findings of that body with respect to local economic or environ-
mental conditions are made conclusive in any proceeding challenging the
validity of a bond issue.86 The Wilson court recognized the primacy of the
local legislative judgment and deferred to the issuing body, employing a
narrow test for reviewing the validity of the county resolution: "it is
only necessary that the legislative determination to spend a particular
amount of public funds be reasonable and based on an honest judgment
of those officials charged with care of the public purse that the expenditure
is for the best interests of the city."'3 T In City of Frostburg v. Jenkins8
the court employed a similar test, requiring only that the legislation serve
a public purpose and have "a substantial relation to the public welfare."3 9
Minimal judicial involvement in the issuance of revenue bonds is
appropriate because the function of weighing and balancing the factors
that determine the propriety of a bond issue is better performed by the
legislature than by the courts.40  Proper consideration of the pertinent
36. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 266B(f) (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides:
In any suit, action, or proceeding involving the validity or enforceability of
any bond issued under this subheading or the security therefor, any finding by
the legislative body of the municipality or county in regard to the existence or
relief of conditions of unemployment, the increase of industry in this State, the
retention of existing industry in this State, the control and abatement of pollu-
tion, the promotion of economic development, the creation of a balanced economy,
the protection of natural resources, and the promotion of the health, welfare
and safety of the residents of such municipality or county shall be conclusive.
37. 273 Md. at 49, 327 A.2d at 498 (quoting Williamsport v. Washington County
Sanitary Dist., 247 Md. 326, 332, 231 A.2d 40, 44 (1967)); see 15 E. MCQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 43.29 to 43.33 (3d ed. 1970).
38. 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852 (1957).
39. Id. at 19, 136 A.2d at 857. See 2 C. ANTIFAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
LAW § 15.04 (1973). The Court of Appeals has frequently deferred to the legislative
judgment in cases involving the issuance of revenue bonds to finance private facilities
that would benefit the public. See, e.g., Williamsport v. Washington County Sanitary
Dist., 247 Md. 326, 231 A.2d 40 (1967); Lerch v. Maryland Port Auth., 240 Md.
438, 214 A.2d 761 (1965) (acquisition and construction of international trade center)
Wyatt v. Beall, 175 Md. 258, 1 A.2d 619 (1938) (construction of roads and bridges)
Finan v. Mayor of Cumberland, 154 Md. 563, 141 A. 269 (1928) (financing of private
hospital). But see Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md.
171, 182, 339 A.2d 278, 284 (1975) (quoting New Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek
Coal & Iron Co., 37 Md. 537, 560 (1873)) ("[Wlhether the use, in any particular
case, be public or private, is a judicial question; for otherwise, the constitutional
restraint would be utterly nugatory . . . ."). For an example of a court stating that
it would not be bound by the legislative findings despite the great weight given them
and that it would therefore itself examine and study the enactment for a public
purpose, see State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. LaPlante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 50,
205 N.W.2d 784, 795 (1973).
40. See City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 17, 136 A.2d 852, 856 (1957)
("[W]hether . .. private benefits outweigh the public benefits accruing from the
location of the plant within the municipality seems to us to be primarily a legislative
1976]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
economic and social factors might require hearings, expert studies and
analyses, substantial statistical data, and possibly even a sampling of
public opinion on the issues. Gathering and assimilating such information
could not be accomplished adequately by the courts in the rigid context of
the adversary system. Thus, it is imperative that a legislative body de-
liberating upon a possible revenue bond issue pursuant to the Act assess
carefully the relationship of the contemplated statutory means to the de-
sired ends by comprehensive analysis of the relative costs and benefits that
would result from the bond issue.
In determining whether a revenue bond issue will serve a public
purpose, the public benefits generally are apparent - e.g., a balanced
economy and increased employment resulting from industrial development,
protection of the environment, and general economic development in the
county and state.41 Such public benefits may even be quantifiable. The
benefit accruing from the expenditure of resources that lures new industry
into the state42 may be greater than that which only makes it more likely
that an existing industry will not relocate outside the state.43 Similarly,
facilities constructed extraterritorially are likely to provide less public
benefit to the issuing county than a plant built within the issuing county,
since non-county residents would probably be employed at the former and
local tax revenues generated by it would be less substantial.
The public costs that must be endured to secure the typical benefits
are not as evident. The need for public and private services may rise as
increased employment opportunities attract people into the county,44 thus
necessitating either increased taxes or a reduction in the quality of services.
The Wilson court observed that the county's credit status can be jeop-
ardized by the use of revenue bonds because, although the county is not
liable for the debt, a default by the lessee corporation would result in a
default in the bonds, making it more difficult for the county to sell its bonds
in the future. 45 Local government use of revenue bonds involves other cost
factors not discussed in Wilson. Revenue bonds compete with regular
municipal bonds, forcing the interest rates on the latter to increase; this
rise in interest rates burdens the city by decreasing its ability to finance
rather than a judicial problem."); Lerch v. Maryland Port Auth., 240 Md. 438,
452, 214 A.2d 761, 768 (1965) ("What is the best economic use of public land for a
public purpose is a question for legislative, or, if authorized, administrative deter-
mination.").
41. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 266B(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976). See Note, The
"Public Purpose" of Municipal Financing for Industrial Development, 70 YALE L.J.
789, 801-03 (1961).
42. See City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852 (1957).
43. See Wilson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 273 Md. 30, 327 A.2d 488 (1974).
44. See Note, The "Public Purpose" of Municipal Financing for Industrial De-
velopment, 70 YALE L.J. 789, 801-03 (1961).
45. 273 Md. at 44-45, 327 A.2d at 495-96.
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public services.46 The governmental issuer may also injure private lending
institutions by affording favorable financial treatment to private industry.
Possible reduction in economic efficiency resulting from revenue bond
issues should be weighed as a public cost.47 This cost is magnified where
the benefited private company already was under an order to abate pollu-
tion, as was the case in Wilsdn. The private company benefits by receiving
funds loaned to it at a low interest rate, which is made possible by the
exemption of the bondholders' interest from federal and state taxation.
If the company could obtain only private financing, its costs would be
greater. Nevertheless, pollution would be abated, and the resultant in-
crease in the price of the company's product would reflect its true cost.
Such internalization of costs could lead to a more efficient allocation of
society's resources by driving inefficient enterprises out of the market.
If the desired public benefit were only the abatement of pollution, the
public costs might often outweigh the benefits where a company is already
subject to an enforceable abatement order. However, the Act seeks to
promote public goals in addition to pollution abatement, such as indus-
trial development and reduced unemployment. 48 A project's contribution
to achievement of these public purposes may swing the balance in favor of
a bond issue, even where the private entity is already under an abatement
order.
The intense interest of the public, government, and industry in indus-
trial development and the abatement of pollution, weighed against the costs
which society could incur if revenue bonds were indiscriminately used
to accomplish such goals, mandates close legislative scrutiny of proposed
bond issues.49 A Maryland municipality or county presented with re-
peated requests for bond issues under the Act may eventually reach a
point of diminishing returns where the costs of additional projects do not
provide meaningful benefits to the community.
46. F. MICHAELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT IN URBAN
AREAS, CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 47-48 (1970) (quoting Stanley S. Surrey,
former past Assistant Secretary of the Treasury).
47. See generally 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL
INcOME TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS 276-89 (1972). The authors argue that
the federal government's allowance of a tax exemption promotes a highly inefficient
and inequitable way of aiding the states. The present system benefits private industry
at the expense of the federal and state governments. Id. at 276-83, 287-89.
48. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 266B(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
49. See generally Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial
Financing - An Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 306-12
(1963).
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TAX - Supervisor of Assessments v. Peter & John Radio Fellow-
ship, Inc.-
The Court of Appeals in Supervisor of Assessments v. Peter & John
Radio Fellowship, Inc. affirmed an order of the Tax Court granting an
exemption from taxation under section 9(4) of Article 81 of the Anno-
tated Code of Maryland 2 for nearly 473 acres of property located in Car-
roll County, Maryland.3 Section 9(4) exempted from assessment and
taxation two categories of property; buildings used exclusively for public
worship, and the grounds appurtenant to such buildings if shown to be
necessary for the use of the buildings.4 The Fellowship, a non-profit cor-
poration organized under the laws of Maryland, 5 operated a nondenomina-
1. 274 Md. 353, 335 A.2d 93 (1975).
2. Ch. 226, § 7(5), [1929] Laws of Md., codified at the time of this case at
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(4) (1969), has since been revised. See note 4 infra.
3. In a second appeal, the court upheld the Tax Court's denial of an exemption
for a religious bookstore operated by the Peter & John Radio Fellowship, Inc. [here-
inafter referred to as the Fellowship] in Baltimore. The bookstore sold only those
books and records doctrinally acceptable to Fundamentalists. While this store was not
operated at a profit, the court determined that it was in competition with other church
operated bookstores that were subject to personal property taxes on their inventories.
At the time of the assessment, exemptions were granted for "[b]uildings and the
ground . . . appurtenant thereto, equipment and furniture used exclusively for . . .
charitable . . . institutions or organizations," ch. 362, § 1, [1967] Laws of Md.,
codified at the time of this case at MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(7) (1969). [Such
equipment and furniture is now exempt only if it is "actually used exclusively for and
[is] necessary for charitable ... purposes . .. in the promotion of the general public
welfare of the people of the State." MD. ANN. CODE art 81, § 9(e) (Cum. Supp.
1976). The Tax Court has affirmed the assessment of the Supervisor, finding that
the operation was "more commercial than religious, charitable or educational." 274
Md. at 366, 335 A.2d at 100. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed, observing that
the Tax Court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbi-
trary, capricious, or unreasonable. Id. See note 12 infra.
4. Ch. 226, § 7(5), [1929] Laws of Md., codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§ 9 (1969), provided in pertinent part:
The following shall be exempt from assessment and from State, county and city
taxation in this State, each and all of which exemptions shall be strictly construed:
(4) Churches, parsonages, etc. - Houses and buildings used exclusively for
public worship, and the furniture contained therein, and any parsonage used in
connection therewith, and the grounds appurtenant to such houses, buildings and
parsonages and necessary for the respective uses thereof.
This language remained unchanged from its enactment in 1929 until the
section's repeal and reenactment in 1972. It is now codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§ 9(c) (1975). This revision resulted in extensive changes: all property, real or
personal, is exempted if it is "actually used exclusively for public religious worship."
In addition, real property need no longer be "appurtenant" to buildings to qualify for
exemption. For a discussion of the consequences of this revision see note 34 infra.
5. By charter, the Fellowship may broadcast religious programs, hold confer-
ences, and conduct bible and children's camps. 274 Md. at 356, 335 A.2d at 95.
(472)
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tional bible camp for eight weeks each summer. This camp, known as the
River Valley Ranch, had a western frontier setting with a stage depot,
stage coach, frontier jail, rodeo arena, and other similar facilities. 6 Of the
473 acres, thirteen comprised the camp, five were woodlands used to
guard against encroachment, and the remainder were farmed primarily
to provide hay and feed for the camp's animals. Other groups were per-
mitted to rent the facilities during the off-season.7
The Supervisor of Assessments for Carroll County refused to grant
an exemption based on section 9 (4),8 finding that the camp's barns, storage
sheds, kitchens, and other structures were not "buildings used exclusively
for public worship," and that the rodeo arenas, swimming pools, and lands
used for farming or to guard against encroachment were not appurtenant
grounds necessary for an exclusively public worship use of the buildings.9
The Maryland Tax Court' ° viewed the case differently; based on the
testimony of the Fellowship's president and camp director it granted an
exemption, finding that "[t]he entire property . . . provides the setting
for planned and spontaneous religious activities.""
Following an appeal by the Supervisor, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the Tax Court.12 The court did not attempt to determine whether the
6. Id.
7. Id. These groups, with the exception of the Carroll County Board of Educa-
tion, were all religious in nature.
8. The Supervisor assessed a tax of $147,295 on the property for the tax year
ending June 1971. 274 Md. at 354, 335 A.2d at 94.
9. Id. at 357, 335 A.2d at 95. It is a well settled rule of construction in Mary-
land that the word "exclusively," when used as in section 9(4), is to be read as
"primarily." "This construction is but a recognition of reality with respect to the
operation of modern churches." Ballard v. Supervisor of Assessments, 269 Md. 397,
404, 306 A.2d 506, 510 (1973). See Murray v. Comptroller, 241 Md. 383, 401, 216
A.2d 897, 907 (1966) ; Maryland State Fair v. Supervisor of Assessments, 225 Md.
574, 587, 172 A.2d 132, 137-38 (1961). Consequently, the fact that the land was not
used solely for public worship, see notes 6 & 7 and accompanying text supra, would
not alter the Fellowship's tax status.
10. The Maryland Tax Court's authority to review and change assessments on
real property is granted in MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 229A (1975).
11. 274 Md. at 363, 335 A.2d at 98.
12. Prior to reviewing the orders of the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals dis-
cussed the scope of appellate review it could exercise. The court first noted that ch.
385, [1971] Laws of Md., which had mandated an affirmance of the Tax Court's
determinations unless "erroneous as a matter of law or unsupported by substantial
evidence," was repealed and reenacted in 1971, the new codification not specifying a
fixed scope of review. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 229(l) (1975) (subsequently
ruled unconstitutional in Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 276 Md. 36, 343
A.2d 521 (1975), on the ground that it effectively granted original jurisdiction to the
appellate courts). It was determined that a decision should be affirmed if supported by
substantial evidence and not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 274 Md. at 355,
335 A.2d at 94. This language would suggest that the court treated the record as pre-
senting a question of fact See, e.g., K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIE LAW § 29.01 (3d ed.
1972). The court found that the Tax Court's decision was supported by substantial
evidence, 274 Md. at 363, 335 A.2d at 98, yet proceeded to discuss Maryland case law.
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isolated use of each camp facility satisfied the requirements of section
9(4) ; instead, it concluded that the facilities comprising the camp and the
religious worship and instruction provided at the camp were "inseparable
because of the philosophy underlying the activities."'1 3 While it would be
difficult to classify such specific acts as riding in a stage coach or swim-
ming as public worship, the court had little difficulty finding that these
activities, when considered in light of the camp's purpose of encouraging
the development of religious beliefs,14 provided an environment of public
worship that encompassed all camp activities.
In support of its position, the court relied on Morning Cheer, Inc. v.
County Commissioners.15 In that case a thirty-five acre tract 16 owned by
a Pennsylvania corporation that made religious broadcasts and invited
listeners to its Maryland retreat was held exempt from taxation under
a predecessor to section 9(4).1 Morning Cheer's facilities and activities
were somewhat different from the Fellowship's: the buildings included a
tabernacle, a lodge, a house for the minister, and several cottages; card
games and smoking were prohibited; and the retreat was described as "a
purely spiritual enterprise where people come for spiritual help and guid-
ance.'-" The exemption was based on a finding that the entire thirty-five
Because such a discussion would be unnecessary if there were a dispute only as to the
sufficiency of the evidence, this would suggest that the court felt that a question of law
was presented as well.
Judge Smith, in a dissent joined by Chief Judge Murphy, properly concluded
that the Tax Court "erred as a matter of law." Id. at 368, 335 A.2d at 101. As the
breadth of section 9(4) was unclear and in need of judicial definition, a question of
law clearly was presented.
13. 274 Md. at 365, 335 A.2d at 99.
14. Id. at 357-58, 335 A.2d at 95-96. The president of the Fellowship explained
the camp's philosophy:
There are many ways to attract young people.... We realized that young people
are not running with glee to hear the Gospel or going to church. . . . And the
attraction to these young people, we felt, was a subtle way, under God, to get
these young people under the sound of God's Holy Word.
Id.
15. 194 Md. 441, 71 A.2d 255 (1950).
16. Morning Cheer owned a tract of 227.25 acres, all but thirty-five of which
were undeveloped woodlands. It had sought an exemption under ch. 387, § 5(8),
[1939] Laws of Md., the predecessor to MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(e) (Cum. Supp.
1976). As this statutory exemption was limited to 40 acres, Morning Cheer only re-
quested that the developed thirty-five acre tract be exempted. The Court of Appeals
chose to apply ch. 226, § 7(5), [1929] Laws of Md., printed in pertinent part at note 4
supra. Although this section had no acreage limit, the court considered only the exemp-
tion claimed - the thirty-five acres. Consequently, Morning Cheer was silent on the
status of undeveloped land under the exemption in ch. 226, § 7(5), [1929] Laws of
Md. See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 infra.
17. Ch. 226, § 7(5), [1929] Laws of Md., printed in pertinent part at note 4 supra.
Morning Cheer was decided under the 1939 codification of this act, MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, § 7(4) (1939).
18. 194 Md. at 445, 71 A.2d at 256.
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acre tract was necessary for the use of the buildings for public worship. 19
The Peter & John Radio court felt that "[t]o extend this rationale to ...
the instant case, when there is testimony that the entire area is devoted
to bible study and the religious experience is continued while riding,
hiking, camping, is fully compatible with Morning Cheer."20
The soundness of this extension is questionable as there are several
important distinctions between the Peter & John Radio and Morning Cheer
cases. First, the functional use of the land in each case was different.
Morning Cheer, essentially a retreat, emphasized spiritual activities, 21
while the Fellowship, basically a summer camp, emphasized recreational
activities. Because section 9(4) requires that property be used pri-
marily22 for public worship to qualify for exemption, this distinction is
important. It is arguable whether horseback riding and similar activities,
regardless of the context in which conducted, may ever be validly termed
a form of public worship. But even if they may, the focus of activity in
a religious retreat differs so markedly from that in a summer camp that
the treatment of the latter as simply an extension of the former is unwar-
ranted. Certainly the determination that the Fellowship's summer camp
was operated with the primary purpose of engaging in public worship
required closer analysis than that given by the court.
Secondly, the property exempted in Morning Cheer actually was
used in a manner similar to the Fellowship's use of the thirteen acre ranch,
each being the site of buildings and other facilities. But in Peter & John
Radio the court extended the rationale of Morning Cheer to exempt an
additional 460 acres of farm and woodlands, finding this land necessary
for the use of the ranch for public worship. 23 Because the Morning Cheer
court did not examine the tax status of farm and woodlands tangentially
used to support a religious organization's main facilities, the extension of
Morning Cheer to sustain the exemption in Peter & John Radio for such
supporting lands also required closer analysis.24
Finally, the vast difference in the size of the tracts is itself important.
While the exemption of a relatively small retreat clearly is within the
19. Id. at 447, 71 A.2d at 257.
20. 274 Md. at 363-64, 335 A.2d at 98-99.
21. 194 Md. at 445, 71 A.2d at 256.
22. See note 9 supra.
23. The Peter & John Radio court viewed the two cases as presenting analogous
situations: both dealt with exemptions of relatively small tracts of land that contained
buildings and supporting facilities (one to two acres in Morning Cheer, thirteen acres
in Peter & John Radio) "used exclusively for public worship" that were then extended
to include land "necessary" for the use of the buildings for public worship (the re-
mainder of the thirty-five acres in Morning Cheer, 460 acres in Peter & John Radio).
While the cases are analogous, they are also distinguishable. The "core" of each camp,
that land on which the buildings and main facilities were located, included the entire
thirty-five acres of Morning Cheer, but only the thirteen acre ranch of Peter & John
Radio. Beyond this "core" area it would seem difficult to show that the land was
"necessary" for the use of the buildings.
24. See text accompanying note 33 infra.
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scope of the statute, the proposition that 460 acres of farm and woodlands
may be considered "grounds necessary" for public worship is a startling
one.2 5 While this disparity in size should not be determinative, it should
subject the exemption to close scrutiny. The court's failure to closely
examine the "necessity" requirement as it related to these 460 acres is
even more troublesome in light of the statutory requirement that the
language of section 9(4) be strictly construed. 2
Even if the court's extension of Morning Cheer to the Fellowship's
farm and woodlands is presumed valid on its face, the granting of the
exemption for those tracts is still subject to question. It is quite clear that
there was no basis for exempting the five acres of woodland. The court
properly should have found that this tract was not necessary for a public
worship use of the ranch acreage, because it was used for no purpose other
than to guard against encroachment. The decision to exempt the farm-
lands presents a more difficult problem. The Supervisor argued, on the
basis of Bullis School, Inc. v. Appeal Tax Court,2 7 that the farmland did
not qualify for exemption. In Bullis a boys' preparatory school purchased
a large tract of land as a future site for the school. In the interim the land
was farmed, with the produce used primarily to feed the students. 28 The
Court of Appeals declined to hold this use of the land to be one necessary
25. This was the basic thrust of Judge Smith's dissent. He felt that, in light of
the requirement that all exemptions be strictly construed, see note 4 supra, Morning
Cheer had stretched the exemption to its "outer limits" - limits that were then
exceeded in Peter & John Radio. 274 Md. at 366, 335 A.2d at 100. Judge Smith
further argued that an exemption for 460 acres was beyond the intent of the legislature
for two reasons. First, the language of this exemption was drafted prior to the 1948
Amendment to the Maryland Declaration of Rights. MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS art 38 (1972). As Judge Smith noted, prior to this amendment legislative
consent was iequired for a "'gift, sale or devise of land ... to any Religious Sect,
Order or Denomination' other than for 'any sale, gift, lease or devise of any quantity
of land, not exceeding five acres, for a church, meeting-house, or other house of wor-
ship . . . .'" 274 Md. at 367, 335 A.2d at 101. Judge Smith contended that because
the legislature did not intend to allow the transfer of more than five acres of realty
to religious organizations without legislative consent, it could not have intended to
permit tax exemptions on large tracts of property owned by such organizations. This
argument is only partially convincing given the tenuous relationship between these
legislative motives. Secondly, Judge Smith felt "morally certain" that since 1948 the
General Assembly "has not contemplated that a tract more than ten times the size
of that exempted in Morning Cheer .. .would be exempted from taxation as neces-
sary for 'buildings used exclusively for public worship.'" Id. at 368, 335 A.2d at 101.
Such use of legislative silence to set limits upon the proper interpretation of the scope
of a statute again seems somewhat questionable.
26. See ch. 226, § 7(5), [1929] Laws of Md., printed in pertinent part at note 4
supra.
27. 207 Md. 272, 114 A.2d 41 (1955).
28. Some use was made of the land for school purposes: the main building was
the headmaster's residence, a few students were tutored there during the summer, and
three school social functions were held on the grounds each year. Id. at 275, 114
A.2d at 42.
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for educational purposes,2 9 concluding that the school's use of the land
would not have been different had it merely sold the produce and used the
proceeds for school purposes.30 In Peter & John Radio the Supervisor
argued that since the Fellowship's farmland was used primarily to pro-
vide feed for its animals, it could also have sold that produce and used
the proceeds to defray the operational costs of the camp. There is no
apparent explanation of how such a use can be one necessary for religious
purposes, yet not be one necessary for educational purposes. The court,
however, did not consider this contradiction.3 1 It concluded that the Bullis
court was correct in recognizing that the Morning Cheer doctrine was
inapplicable to the Bullis facts, 2 and implied that since Morning Cheer
was applicable in Peter & John Radio, Bullis was not.
Leaving such a crucial analytical step to implication seems unfor-
tunate. In Morning Cheer the property in issue was that containing the
central concentration of the retreat's facilities, while the property in issue
in Bullis was farmland used to support the school's central concentration
of facilities. Because the use of the facilities in the two cases was dif-
ferent, the Peter & John Radio court was quite correct in noting that
Morning Cheer did not control in Bullis. But Peter & John Radio is a
case in which both these uses appear - it involved a tract containing
facilities, as in Morning Cheer, and a tract containing supporting farm-
land, as in Bullis. Consequently, while the court correctly concluded that
Bullis was not applicable in determining the tax status of the ranch
acreage, it was too hasty in dismissing that case's relevance for determin-
ing the tax status of the farmlands. In fact, it is difficult to reconcile grant-
ing an exemption to the Fellowship's farmlands with denying such status
to the farmlands in Bullis - each was used to provide farm products for
the use of the respective facilities. The Bullis rationale that the argicultural
use of the land was not necessary for educational purposes because the
products could have been sold on the market applies with equal force
under the public worship use present in Peter & John Radio. While the
Fellowship may have used the farmlands in continuation of their effort to
further public worship, by providing riding trails and feed for the animals,
the principal use of the land was so similar to that in Bullis that to treat
the tracts differently for tax purposes is unwarranted. 83 Peter & John
29. The exemption was claimed on the basis of ch. 27, § 1(8), [1950] Laws of
Md., presently codified, in part, at MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(e) (Cum. Supp. 1976),
which excluded from assessment buildings of educational institutions and grounds
appurtenant to those buildings and necessary for their educational use.
30. 207 Md. at 277, 114 A.2d at 43. Because this land was located seven miles
from the site of the school, it seemingly was not "appurtenant" to the institution, a
point not considered in Bullis, but noted in Peter & John Radio. See 274 Md. at 364,
335 A.2d at 99.
31. See 274 Md. at 364, 335 A.2d at 99.
32. Id.
33. Some nonagricultural use of the land was made in Bullis as well. See note 28
supra.
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Radio therefore appears to be both an unjustified extension of Morning
Cheer and an unsupportable deviation from Bullis.
- 4
34. The statute under which the Fellowship claimed its exemption, ch. 226, § 7(5),
[1929] Laws of Md., codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(4) (1969), has been re-
pealed and reenacted; it is now codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9 (1975) :
(a) Generally; exemptions strictly construed. - The following real and tangible
personal property shall be exempt from assessment and from State, county
and city ordinary taxation, except as otherwise stated herein, each and all
of which exemptions shall be strictly construed;
(c) Churches. - Property owned by a religious group or organization and actually
used exclusively for public religious worship, including parsonages and con-
vents, and property owned by any such group or organization and actually
used exclusively for educational purposes.
In the context of the current discussion, two important statutory changes were
made: the words "used exclusively" were changed to "actually used exclusively," and
the language "the grounds appurtenant . . . and necessary" was eliminated. There
are three plausible readings of the addition of the word "actually." First, it may signal
the end of the rule of construction requiring "primarily" to be substituted for "exclu-
sively." See note 9 supra. While the same factors that led the court to adopt the
"primarily" interpretation still exist, the legislative addition may be interpreted as an
intent to give added force to the prerequisite of exclusive use. The property thus
would be exempt if used solely for public religious worship; if any group were to use
the property for a non-religious purpose, the exemption would not be available. This
reading would require the Fellowship to pay taxes on the Carroll County property
given the non-religious use by the County Board of Education. See note 7 supra.
Alternatively, rather than emphasizing the word "exclusively" courts could
decide that an emphasis on "actually" is mandated - even if some use of the entire
property is not for public religious worship, the exemption will be granted as long as
the property is actually, as well as primarily, used for public religious worship. Groups
not engaged in public religious worship may use the property sometimes, and groups
engaged in a series of activities, the primary activity being public religious worship,
may use the property at any time. Such a reading would give this section the same
meaning attributed to the predecessor provision at issue in Peter & John Radio.
Finally, the section could be interpreted to mean that the property will be
exempted only if it is used solely for public religious worship without any form of
contemporaneous use. Thus, if an owner were to conduct a summer camp and promote
public religious worship at the same time, the property would not qualify for exemp-
tion. Such a reading, of course, would require that the Fellowship pay taxes on the
Carroll County land.
The removal of the clause requiring that the grounds be appurtenant and
necessary would also alter the result in Peter & John Radio. Under the revised statute,
real property is exempt if "owned by a religious group or organization and actually
used exclusively for public religious worship." Prior to revision, the section required
only that property be necessary for the public worship use of the buildings to qualify
for exemption; under the revised section, the property itself must now be used for
public religious worship. While the 460 acres of farm and woodland may have been
necessary for the use of the buildings, as the court determined, they clearly were not
used primarily for public religious worship of any form.
TORTS - PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The ever growing law of products liability accounted for two es-
specially significant decisions during the September Term, 1974. In the
area of automobile collision cases, the Court of Appeals expanded on an
earlier decision' in holding that causes of action under breach of warranty
could lie against both an automobile manufacturer and a dealer for injuries
received in a "second collision ' 2 and caused by design defects. 3 In the
second case, not discussed in the Survey, the court dealt extensively with
the foreseeability of use requirement in products liability cases. 4
FRERICKS V. GENERAL MOTORS CORP.
5
In Frericks the Court of Appeals extended its holding in Volkswagen
of America, Inc. v. Young 6 to cover causes of action for breach of war-
ranty as well as for negligence. 7 Young held that an automobile manu-
facturer could be liable in negligence for design defects causing or enhancing
injuries in second collision cases.8 Following the rationale expressed in
Young, the court in Frericks held that allegations of secondary impact
injuries caused by design defects were sufficient to state causes of action
against an automobile manufacturer in negligence and against both the
manufacturer and the dealer for breach of warranty.9
The plaintiff was injured when the Opel Kadett in which he was a
passenger overturned into a ditch after going off the road, allegedly because
the driver was speeding. 10 Plaintiff claimed that the injuries he received
were enhanced as a result of two defects in the design of the car: (1) the
tilting mechanism of the front seat in which he was sleeping at the time of the
accident failed, causing the seat-back to tilt downward to a nearly hori-
zontal position, and (2) the rear roof supports gave way as the car rolled
1. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
2. A "second collision" is generally one that occurs within the automobile be-
tween an occupant and some part of the automobile, as opposed to the initial collision
between the automobile and some other object.
3. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975).
4. Moran v. Faberg6, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975). This case is noted
in Evolving Consumer Safeguards - Increased Producer and Sellor Responsibility
in the Absence of Strict Liability, 5 U. BALT. L. Rzv. 128 (1975).
5. 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975).
6. 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
7. Young did not consider whether a cause of action for breach of warranty had
been stated. The automobile in Young had been purchased in Alabama, and the law
of that state therefore controlled any warranty issue. Id. at 220, 321 A.2d at 747.
8. Id. at 216, 321 A.2d at 745.
9. 274 Md. at 306, 336 A.2d at 128.
10. Id. at 290, 303, 336 A.2d at 120, 127.
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over into the ditch." In addition, Frericks claimed that General Motors
had failed to test adequately the allegedly defective items and that the
defects could have been corrected.' 2 Suit was brought in negligence, breach
of warranty and strict liability' 3 against both the manufacturer and the
dealership that had sold the car. 14 The trial court sustained demurrers to
plaintiff's amended declaration for failure to state a legal theory on which
relief could be granted.15 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an
opinion written prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Young.16
In an opinion by Judge Eldridge, the Court of Appeals vacated the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Following Young, the court
held that a manufacturer could be liable in negligence for a design defect
that it could have foreseen would cause or enhance injuries in a second
collision. 17 Then, reasoning that the elements of causes of action in negli-
gence and warranty are essentially equivalent, the Frericks court held
that the principles of Young are to be used to evaluate the sufficiency of
a cause of action in warranty.' s Thus, the declaration was determined to
have stated causes of action against both the manufacturer and the dealer
for breach of warranty.
Debate concerning a manufacturer's liability in negligence for second
collision injuries caused or enhanced by design defects resulted in two
seminal federal decisions in the late 1960's. In Evans v. General Motors
Corp.19 the Seventh Circuit held that an automobile manufacturer has no
duty to design a car that will minimize injuries or be reasonably safe when
11. Id. at 291, 336 A.2d at 120-21. Plaintiff's head, thrust toward the rear of the
car when the seat mechanism failed, was crushed by the roof when the supports
gave way.
For a discussion of products that are defective because constructed with
materials of inadequate strength, see Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or
Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 827-30 (1962). For a collection
of cases on the duty of a manufacturer to test for weak or defective materials, see
Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 91, 142-55 (1966).
12. 274 Md. at 302, 336 A.2d at 126-27.
13. The Frericks court, following Young, did not adopt the doctrine of strict
liability in tort. 274 Md. at 298-99, 336 A.2d at 124; see Volkswagen of America, Inc.
v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 220-21, 321 A.2d 737, 747-48 (1974). However, the Court of
Appeals has recently adopted the strict liability theory contained in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965). See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., __ Md...
363 A.2d 955 (1976). The Phipps court explained that § 402A had not previously
been rejected; rather, strict liability was simply inapplicable in prior cases in which
the issue had been raised. Id. at _, 363 A.2d at 960.
14. 274 Md. at 290-91, 336 A.2d at 120. Plaintiff also sued the driver of the
car and his parents based on allegedly negligent driving. That action was settled
before the appeal to the Court of Appeals. Id. at 293, 336 A.2d at 121.
15. Frericks v. Baines, Law No. 10307 (Cir. Ct. Cecil County, filed Oct. 3, 1972).
16. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, 317 A2d 494 (1974).
17. 274 Md. at 297, 336 A.2d at 124.
18. Id. at 300-01, 336 A.2d at 125-26.
19. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
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involved in collisions.20 Under general negligence principles, the duty of
a manufacturer is to design and manufacture products that are safe for
their intended purposes.21 The Evans court and those courts that followed
it w2 refused to extend an automobile manufacturer's duty of due care beyond
the responsibility of designing and manufacturing automobiles that will not
cause accidents. The express rationale for the court's position was that
"[t] he intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation
in collision with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee
the possibility that such collisions may occur. "23
The Eighth Circuit, in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,24 rejected the
Evans reasoning. The Larsen court agreed that the duty of a manufacturer
is to design automobiles that are reasonably safe for their intended uses. 25
The concept of intended use, however, was broadened to include those uses
reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer. The court reasoned that col-
lisions incident to the normal use of an automobile are "statistically in-
evitable" and thus "clearly foreseeable," and therefore concluded that an
automobile manufacturer has "a duty to use reasonable care in the design
of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury
in the event of a collision."'2 6
Faced for the first time with the issue of liability for second collision
injuries, the Court of Appeals adopted the Larsen rationale in Volkswagen
of America, Inc. v. Young.27 Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Eldridge
noted that liability for injuries caused by latent design defects had been
imposed on manufacturers in Maryland. 28 Moreover, the court observed,
under traditional tort principles a party is held liable where injuries are
20. 359 F2d at 824.
21. The great weight of authority permits recovery for accidents caused by de-
sign defects. See, e.g., Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961) ;
Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F2d 404, 406-07 (3d Cir. 1954).
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (Cardozo, J.),
is the leading case imposing liability on a manufacturer for a construction defect
causing an accident. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959).
A construction defect is a deviation from the design during the manufacturing of the
product. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 207, 321 A.2d 737,
740 (1974).
22. See, e.g., McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1973); Alex-
ander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Ford Motor
Co. v. Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970); Ford v. Rupple, 161 Mont. 56, 504
P.2d 686 (1972) ; Hoenig & Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness": an Untenable
Doctrine, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 578, 581 (1971).
23. 359 F.2d at 825; accord, Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311,
313-14 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
24. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
25. Id. at 501.
26. Id. at 502.
27. 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
28. Id. at 215, 321 A.2d at 744 (citing Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 138
A.2d 375 (1958)).
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caused by both his negligence and a foreseeable intervening cause. Thus,
the fact that the design defect did not cause the initial collision should not
relieve the negligent party from liability if the design defect is a cause
of the eventual injury.29
In second collision situations, a manufacturer's alleged negligence
consists of manufacturing and selling an automobile that it knows, or should
know, is defectively designed. A secondary injury is then caused by the
joint action of an intervening collision and the design defect. The Young
court followed Larsen in concluding that the intended use of an automobile
is to provide reasonably safe transportation,3 0 and that since frequent col-
lisions are foreseeable as a matter of law, "the intended purpose of all . . .
parts of the vehicle is to afford reasonable safety when those collisions
occur. '"81 Applying the negligence principles it had reviewed, the court
held that "an automobile manufacturer is liable for a defect in design which
the manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen would cause or enhance
injuries on impact, which is not patent or obvious to the user, and which
in fact leads to or enhances the injuries in an automobile collision. '3 2
The Frericks court applied Young directly and held that the allegations
in the declaration were sufficient to state a cause of action in negligence
against the manufacturer.3 3 The plaintiff in Frericks also sought recovery
29. Id. at 215-16, 321 A.2d at 744-45; see Howard County v. Leaf, 177 Md. 82,
95, 8 A.2d 756, 761-62 (1939); Bohm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 159, 305
N.E.2d 769, 773-74, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 650-51 (1973).
30. 272 Md. at 206, 321 A.2d at 740; see Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495, 501-02 (8th Cir. 1968).
31. 272 Md. at 217, 321 A.2d at 745.
32. Id. at 216, 321 A.2d at 745. Of course, a plaintiff can recover from the party
responsible for the design defect only damages for those injuries caused or aggravated
by the second collision. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir.
1968). Evidence must be presented by which a jury can apportion damages between
injuries caused by the initial collision and injuries resulting from the second collision.
Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 109 (D.N.J. 1973).
33. 274 Md. at 302-03, 336 A.2d at 126-27.
The Young court did not reach the issue of liability for breach of warranty.
The automobile in Young had been purchased in Alabama, and the court followed the
general rule that the law of Alabama, the place of sale, would govern the claims for
breach of warranty. 272 Md. at 220, 321 A.2d at 747. Maryland law governed the
negligence claim in Young because the accident had occurred in Prince George's
County, Maryland. See, e.g., Wilson v. Fraser, 353 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Md. 1973);
Harford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brunchey, 248 Md. 669, 238 A.2d 115 (1968); White v.
King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966).
A different conflict of laws problem appeared in Frericks, because although
the automobile had been purchased in Maryland, the accident occurred in North
Carolina. The warranty claims clearly were governed by Maryland law, the law of
the place of sale. The law of North Carolina, however, would seem to control as
to any cause of action in negligence, as the Frericks court properly observed, see 274
Md. at 296-97, 336 A.2d at 123-24, and North Carolina perhaps would follow Evans
and preclude recovery for secondary injuries resulting from design defects. See
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under a negligence theory from the automobile dealer.34 Observing that no
allegation had been made that the dealer knew or should have known of
the design defects, the court concluded that no cause of action in negligence
against the dealer had been stated.3 5 The court differentiated between a
manufacturer and a dealer where a design defect is alleged. An allegation
of negligent design may, standing alone, state a cause of action against the
manufacturer, because the manufacturer is also the designer and can be
presumed to have knowledge of a defective design.36 But that presumption
is invalid with respect to a dealer, since a dealer is not involved in the
design of an automobile. Knowledge of the defect, either actual or based
on discovery that would result from the exercise of reasonable care, must
therefore be specifically alleged in order to state a cause of action in negli-
gence against a dealer. No such allegation was made in the declaration in
Frericks.87
itd. at 288, 297 n.2, 336 A.2d 118, 124 n.2 (1975) (citing Alexander v. Seaboard Air
Line R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320, 327 (W.D.N.C. 1971)).
Nonetheless, the Frericks court followed Maryland law and applied Young
to decide the negligence claims. The court refused to take judicial notice of North
Carolina law, because the defendants had not complied with the statutory require-
ment of giving the court and opposing parties notice of an intention to rely on foreign
law, see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-504 (1974), and because the lower
courts therefore had proceeded on the assumption that Maryland law governed. 274
Md. at 296-97, 336 A.2d at 123-24. The court did observe, however, that upon
remand, opportunity to give such notice would be available, and that the application
of North Carolina law might then preclude any recovery in negligence. Id. at 297,
336 A.2d at 123-24.
34. The basis of the negligence claim against the dealer was that the dealer sold
the vehicle with a design defect to the injured plaintiff's parents, and that the dealer
was negligent in failing to warn of the design defects and failing to use adequate
methods of recall of vehicles with design defects. 274 Md. at 291-92, 336 A.2d at 121.
35. Id. at 304-06, 336 A.2d at 128. Allegations and subsequent proof of actual or
constructive knowledge of a defect are normally required to establish a lack of due care
on the part of any supplier. See, e.g., Woolley v. Uebelhor, 239 Md. 318, 325, 211 A.2d
302, 305-06 (1965).
36. The presumption that a manufacturer knows of a design defect should not be
an irrebutable one, however. A manufacturer's familiarity with the general design of
an item does not necessarily mean the manufacturer knew or should have known the de-
sign was defective (unreasonably dangerous) in one of its specifics. The manufacturer's
duty is to conduct tests that it "should recognize as reasonably necessary to secure
the production of a safe article." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 395, Comment f
(1965) ; see Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729, 731-32 (8th Cir. 1959); Babylon
v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 303-04, 138 A.2d 375, 377-78 (1958) ; W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 96, at 644 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, the manufacturer's responsibility should
extend to those defects that reasonable safety inspections would have discovered. The
presumption that a manufacturer knows of design defects shifts to the manufacturer
the burden of demonstrating that it did in fact conduct reasonable tests and inspections
yet did not discover the alleged defect. Access to the information needed to establish
this fact certainly lies more with the automobile manufacturer than with the con-
sumer.
37. 274 Md. at 305, 336 A.2d at 128.
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The holding of the Frericks court that causes of action for breach of
warranty were stated against both the manufacturer and the dealer was
grounded on the express rationale that in second collision cases "the ele-
ments of a breach of warranty action are essentially the same as those of a
negligence action." 38 The court observed that Young established that in a
negligence action manufacturers have a duty to manufacture and design
cars suitable for their intended use, including the provision of a reasonable
measure of safety for the inevitable occurrence of collisions.8 9 To recover
under a warranty theory, it must generally be shown that a warranty
existed, that the representations made in the warranty were breached be-
cause the product sold did not conform to the representations, and that the
nonconformity resulted in injury to the plaintiff. 40 The Maryland Annotated
Code, by its adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, creates an implied
warranty of merchantability in contracts for the sale of goods, which pro-
vides that goods are "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used. ' 4 1 The Frericks court simply equated the representations of this
warranty with the negligence standards developed in Young, reasoning
that an implied warranty of merchantability includes an assurance of rea-
sonable safety when collisions, which are inevitable, occur. Thus, the court
concluded that the principles established in Young for a negligence action
also controlled the evaluation of claims of breach of warranty.4 2 Applying
these principles to the allegations of design defects in Frericks, the court
determined that causes of action for breach of warranty had been stated
against both the manufacturer and the dealer.43
Both the approach and the conclusions of the Frericks court appear
sound. By its language the implied warranty of merchantability closely
approximates the standards set forth in Young, and in both instances the
38. Id. at 301, 336 A2d at 126.
39. Id. at 294, 336 A.2d at 122.
40. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 602,
332 A.2d 1, 7 (1975).
41. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-314(2) (c) (1975). Allegations were made
in Frericks that the defendants breached both the implied warranty of merchantability,
see MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-314 (1975), and an express warranty that the
automobile was safe for its intended purpose, see MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-313
(1975). 274 Md. at 299 n.3, 336 A.2d at 125 n.3. The Frericks court considered both
alleged warranties together, interpreting each as warranting that the automobile was
fit for its ordinary or intended purpose - to provide reasonably safe transportation.
No issue of privity was raised, given the provisions of MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. §§
2-314(1) (a) & (b) and 2-318 (1975), which abolish any privity requirement between
buyer and seller and extend express and implied warranties to cover injured third
parties. 274 Md. at 299 n.4, 336 A.2d at 125 n.4.
The Frericks case recently returned to the Court of Appeals. Frericks v.
General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976). Frericks II held that the
notice requirements of MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-607 (1975) do not extend to
third party beneficiaries.
42. 274 Md. at 301, 336 A.2d at 126.
43. Id. at 302-03, 336 A.2d at 126-27.
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guiding principle is that transportation, the intended use of an automobile,
should be reasonably safe. The underlying concept is that the intended use
of an automobile includes, inevitably, collisions, and that this aspect of
automobile travel is foresee able to manufacturers and suppliers. Therefore,
reasonably safe transportation, even when collisions occur, is a part of the
warranty given by manufacturers and dealers as well as being a part of a
manufacturer's duty under general negligence principles. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has observed, "it makes
little or no real difference whether liability is asserted on grounds of negli-
gence, [or] warranty ... ; the applicable principles are roughly the same
in any case.''44 Other courts, as the Frericks court noted, have applied the
negligence analysis of Larsen to second collision actions in warranty,
drawing no distinction between the principles applicable to negligence and
warranty claims.45
The primary effect of Frericks is to make a dealer vulnerable to lia-
bility for injuries received in a second collision and resulting from design
defects in the automobile. To support a cause of action in negligence against
an automobile dealer, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the dealer knew or
should have known of the alleged design defect.46 Thus, as was the case in
Frericks, a cause of action in negligence against the dealer may be difficult
to establish. However, a dealer's knowledge of the design defect and lack
of due care need not be alleged and proved in an action based in warranty.4 7
Thus, an element of proof that often prevents recovery from a dealer
under negligence principles is unnecessary in warranty.
Under either negligence or warranty theory, a design defect must be
proved. 48 There is no duty placed upon a designer to create a perfectly
44. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1068 n.2 (4th Cir. 1974).
45. See, e.g., Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1974); Rutherford v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 60 Mich. App. 392, 231 N.W.2d 413 (1975); Bolm v. Triumph
Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973).
Courts that follow Evans in precluding recovery in negligence for second
collision injuries resulting from design defects likewise apply those principles to
preclude recovery under breach of warranty theories. See, e.g., Yetter v. Rajeski,
364 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1973); McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.
W. Va. 1971); Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
46. See notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text supra.
47. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 301, 336 A.2d 118, 126 (1975).
Although the courts are occasionally confused about the matter, warranty ...
is not a concept based on fault or on the failure to exercise reasonable care ....
Liability in warranty arises where damage is caused by the failure of a product
to measure up to express or implied representations on the part of the manu-
facturer [or dealer].
2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY § 16.01 [1], at 4 (1975) ; see R.
ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314:70 & 2-314:71 (1970, Cum. Supp.
1970-74).
48. For extensive discussions of the considerations relevant to proving design
defects see Powell & Hill, Proof of a Defect or Defectiveness, 5 U. BALT. L. REv. 77
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safe product. 49 Rather, as the Court of Appeals has observed, the existence
of a design defect is a question of the degree of care and reasonableness of
action taken by a designer, and "it is wholly illogical to speak of a defective
design even though the manufacturer has 'exercised all possible care' in
the preparation of his product." 50 One test that has evolved for determining
the reasonableness of a design contemplates "a balancing of the likelihood
of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens against the burden of the
precautions which would be effective to avoid the harm."5' 1
Many factors would seem to affect this balance. The style and purpose
of the automobile are particularly pertinent.52 Reasonableness of design
may also vary with the price of a vehicle and with the additional cost re-
quired to implement a specific design feature. 53 The conditions and cir-
cumstances of the accident may bear on the reasonableness of design, 54
as neither a manufacturer nor a supplier can design to prevent all possible
(1975), and Keeton, Manufacturers' Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manu-
facture and Design of Products, 20 SY.AcusE L. REV. 559 (1969).
49. See, e.g., Warner v. Kewanee Machinery & Conveyor Co., 411 F.2d 1060,
1066 (6th Cir. 1969); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir.
1968) ; Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 217, 321 A.2d 737, 745-46
(1974).
50. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 221, 321 A.2d 737,
747 (1974).
51. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 n.3 (8th Cir. 1968),
(quoting Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a
Product, 71 YAiz L.J. 816, 818 (1962)); accord, Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071 (4th Cir. 1974).
52. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 219, 321 A.2d 737,
746; see Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071-72 (4th Cir.
1974); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
The vehicle involved in the accident in Dreisonstok, a Volkswagen microbus,
was designed to provide maximum cargo space in a low priced and easy handling
vehicle, with the front seat placed as far forward as possible. The court observed that
this was the vehicle's primary feature, one which accounted for its popularity and
utility. 489 F.2d at 1074. Given these circumstances, it was not reasonable to expect
the manufacturer to design into the microbus the same protection in front end col-
lisions as could reasonably be expected in a standard passenger car. Id. at 1075.
The obviousness of a danger militates against recovery for a defective design.
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, supra at 219-20, 321 A.2d at 747; Burkhard
v. Short, 28 Ohio App. 2d 141, 275 N.E.2d 632 (1971) (denying recovery for injury
resulting from nonpadded dashboard).
53. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (4th Cir.
1974) ; Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 271 Md. 201, 219, 321 A.2d 737, 746-47
(1974). The Larsen court observed that the state of technology at the time the auto-
mobile was produced limits the safety features a manufacturer reasonably can be
expected to include in the design of an automobile. Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,
391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968); accord, Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 109
(D.N.J. 1973).
54. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073 (4th Cir. 1974);
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 219, 321 A.2d 737, 747 (1974);
see Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974).
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types of accidents or provide for all imaginable contingencies. In short,
"to impose liability, the trier of the facts must be able to conclude that the
design was unreasonable in light of all of the relevant considerations." 55
Thus, the Frericks court observed that facts such as the speed of the auto-
mobile and possible negligence of the driver might be relevant to the deter-
mination of whether an automobile design was reasonable, 56 although the
court also noted that manufacturers can foresee that accidents will result
from speeding or other negligent acts by a driver, and that such driver
negligence "does not abrogate the manufacturer's duty to use reasonable
care in designing an automobile to reduce the risk of 'secondary impact'
injuries." 57
If a driver has negligently contributed to an accident, the applicability
of the defense of contributory negligence becomes an issue in a suit brought
against a manufacturer or dealer for injuries sustained or enhanced in a
second collision. Clearly, a passenger's recovery under either negligence
or warranty theories is not barred by the contributory negligence of a
driver when the passenger has not been negligent in any way.58 It is the
settled rule in Maryland that the negligence of a driver may not generally
be imputed to his passenger. 59 Such a rule is particularly appropriate in
second collision cases, since negligent driving is a circumstance that is, or
ought to be, contemplated by manufacturers in considering accidents as a
foreseeable incident of the intended use of an automobile. 60
A manufacturer or dealer may be more successful in raising the defense
of contributory negligence in a suit brought by the driver. The Frericks
court stated that contributory negligence should preclude a driver's re-
covery under a count for negligence. 61 The court did not clearly indicate,
however, whether the driver would be similarly barred from recovering
in warranty.6 2 It is not certain that negligence of a driver in causing an
initial collision should bar recovery for injuries sustained or enhanced in a
second collision resulting from a design defect.6 The reasoning that the
55. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 219, 321 A.2d 737, 747
(1974).
56. 274 Md. at 303, 336 A.2d at 127.
57. Id. at 304, 336 A.2d at 127.
58. See 274 Md. at 304, 336 A.2d at 127-28.
59. Gellerson v. Rasins, 248 Md. 75, 78, 234 A.2d 758, 760 (1967).
60. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
61. 274 Md. at 304, 336 A.2d at 127.
62. The court merely referred to its decision in Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio
& Television Co., 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970), as setting forth the court's
position on contributory negligence in warranty actions. 274 Md. at 304 n.7, 336 A.2d
at 127 n.7. In Erdman the plaintiffs' continued use of a television set after discovery
of an obvious defect barred recovery under a claim for breach of implied warranty,
for such continued use meant that any breach of warranty was not the proximate
cause of the damage. 260 Md. at 203, 271 A.2d at 750.
63. Cf. DeFelice v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 164, 255 A.2d 636 (1969)
(contributory negligence is a valid defense to a claim brought in negligence but not
to one in strict liability).
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Frericks court applied concerning a passenger's recovery, that negligence
is a foreseeable circumstance in the intended use of an automobile,64 applies
equally to a driver's recovery. Although the negligence of a driver may
be relevant to the determination whether a design was reasonable, 5 there
would seem to be no compelling reason why such negligence should totally
relieve automobile manufacturers and dealers from the duties concerning
design defects recognized in Young and Frericks.66
64. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
65. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
66. See Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CAL. L.
REv. 645, 662 (1967) ; Sklaw, "Second Collision" Liability: The Need for Uniformity,
4 SETON HALL L. REV. 499, 529 (1973).
